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AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY, REGIME SPACE, POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS

BY

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THESIS

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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY GARY PATRICK MUREN

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INTRODUCTION

Assistance to the development of that one of the incipient or underdeveloped sciences which is political science is the hope and the goal of this work. In the course of making choices concerning the particular attempts at attaining this work's goal, what might be called secondary goals or sub-goals emerged; they are derivable from the goal of this work. The main way--though definitely not the sole way--in which this work attempts to attain its goal is via an exploration of a facet of political life in a "context-of-discovery" manner.

Scientific activity can be divided into the "context of discovery" and the "context of justification".[1] A scientist is working in the context of justification when he knows more or less precisely what proposition(s) he wants to test, knows more or less precisely how he wants to test it (them), systematically gathers data or makes observations for purposes of testing, and judges that the evidence confirms, or disconfirms, or lends support for or against, or is completely inconclusive for the proposition(s). When a scientist is not doing these things, he is (qua scientist, of course) working in the context of discovery. Such things as the formation of concepts, consideration of their possible relations to other concepts, consideration of variant perspectives, the formation of propositions, and the consideration of their possible relations to other propositions are concerns in the context of discovery. The context of justification tends to be highly systematic and well-charted; the context of discovery tends to be unsystematic or only

crudely systematic and comparatively uncharted.[2] To summarize this distinction between types of scientific activity, the context of justification deals with the truth or falsity of statements, and the context of discovery deals with the origin and/or development of statements.

A study may be in one context or the other, or a study may be mixed, possibly with this or that degree of emphasis on one of the two contexts. The present work is primarily in the context of discovery. This is not purely such a work: attempts are made to offer some support for some claims by the use of data provided by other scholars and by the use of other data.

This study has three major and interrelated concerns. The first, which could be labelled "conceptual", might have been described during the earliest gropings of this study as "latent issues and the nondecision-making process (and related phenomena)", but as the study progressed what were represented in the parenthetical phrase came to greater prominence, and the emphasis on particulars was modified. Within this general conceptual concern, there is a definite focus on American politics at the national level: this is the second major concern and might be called "substantive". The third concern, which could be labelled "disciplinal", is a consideration of the possible significance of this study for political science. In the course of pursuing the first two concerns (the "disciplinal" concern is largely derivative, though important), we have ranged widely over various subjects; perhaps clarity will be served by the following brief overview of the work.

An empirical or scientific theory of politics (whether conceived as one grand theory or as a set of compatible theories) is the long-

run goal of political science. This goal is, of course, greatly beyond the confines of this work. This work in part involves an attempt to see what direction(s) would seem to be fruitful for the theoretical development of the political science sub-area of American national politics. This attempt stems from the theoretical and empirical interest in latent issues and nondecisions and from the focus on American national politics.

Definitionally, the only difference between an issue and a latent issue is that it is true of the former but not of the latter that it has been publicly and favorably commented upon by some relevant public authorities. An interest in latent issues within the setting of American national politics soon leads to consideration of claims relating to the governing-class hypothesis. The concept "class" has a prominent place in this work and is connected to such matters as latent issues and nondecisions.

The nondecision-making approach as set forth by Bachrach and Baratz has unnecessary limitations, and we attempt to go beyond it by placing it in the context of man's consciousness. That consciousness is a part of society; the most inclusive term for that part being "ideational". Society can be conceived of as a set which can be divided into two subsets: the ideational component and the material component. The former is usually dominated by what can be called the "prevailing definition of reality", and the latter is usually dominated by what can be called the "basic status quo".

The "basic status quo" construct is essential to the conceptual scheme of public policy that we present. This conceptual scheme entails the introduction of other terms: "status quo", "issue range", and "regime space". This conceptual scheme is directly relevant to

latent issues and to the governing class, as is brought out when we consider the "policy change path" from this perspective.

It is of great methodological and theoretical importance that the political scientist keeps fully in mind that the basic status quo and the prevailing definition of reality which form the dominant societal environment in which he studies are--no matter how much he privately loves them or hates them or is indifferent to them--historical products. The very existence of a limited and particular scope of public policy alternatives is well worth the attention of political scientists. We survey segments of American history that seem to have been particularly crucial for the establishment and maintenance of the framework of contemporary American society and politics. Our historical survey shows governing-class members in action and also provides one example of why we believe that political science is most fruitfully conceived and practiced as part of a unified social science--most fruitfully given the goal of theoretical development.

We have no theory to offer, but we do present a primitive attempt which points to areas of theoretical concern. This attempt is called "a model of American national politics". We preceed the presentation of the model with a background discussion of theory, research, models, and related matters in political science. Explanation sketches consistent with the model are attempted for two contemporary problems: poverty and American foreign policy in general and in Vietnam in particular. Here we conclude this brief overview of the present work.

Mention should be made of the fact that a few of the key concepts in this study are each referred to by several terms. The

major justification for this violation of terminological economy is that our purposes are better served by making use of the essentially equivalent meaning of differing terms employed by a variety of writers. To avoid any possible resulting confusion we remind the reader from time to time of this terminological interchangeability.

The rationale for this work is not that it will lead to a scientifically more advanced political science. The rationale for this work is that the question of whether this kind of a study of one type of nondecision-making--the latent-issue type--and of the concerns to which that may lead can be of some aid to the development of political science is a question worth asking and attempting to answer in part.

Footnotes to Introduction

[1]These terms were first introduced by Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).

[2]For a good example of how scientists go back and forth between the two contexts see James D. Watson, The Double Helix (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1968).

Thus we are doomed from the start to some dissatisfaction with our own endeavor. We do hope at the end to be better able to point to some possible direction or directions which might prove to be fruitful for theoretical development.

The methodology of political science and the theoretical development of political science cannot be separated. As an incipient science, the methodology of political science has room for considerable flexibility and improvement. Methodology should serve the work of political scientists and not unduly constrict it. In this context, we adhere to the idea that political science is most fruitfully conceived and practiced as part of a unified social science, to which any discipline or sub-discipline which studies human behavior is also a part. This adherence rests ultimately on the underlying scientific assumption that there are some systematic relations among things. Political behavior, especially when its scope is fairly broad, will be found to be intertwined with other parts of human behavior that traditionally have been the major concerns of disciplines other than political science. It is from this viewpoint that we take the subject matter of political science to be politics. One possible definition of politics--and the one that shall be employed here--is that it is the public policy-making process.

In the remainder of this chapter we shall briefly review some of the literature relevant to "nondecisions", define some terms, overview in a very skeletal manner the public policy-making process from apropos perspectives, and offer a conceptual scheme of public policy.

Some Literature Relevant to Nondecisions

C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite[1] is a work of considerable merit, but it has at least two major faults. The first is that Mills overrated the importance of the top military. On this point pluralists, elitists, and Marxists all agree: civilians are far more important in the determination of public policy--foreign and domestic--than are the "warlords". It would be a mistake, however, to go to the opposite extreme from Mills' view and assume that the top military men are always puppets or mere functionaries; as with other top administrators, generals and admirals sometimes exercise some influence in the determination of public policy. The more important point, however, is that top military men have what modest influence they do have only within the confines set by civilians.

Mills' second major fault, which is related to the first, is that he made a priori assumptions about the components of the power elite instead of beginning with an empirically based class conception which he then could have systematically related to public policy outcomes. G. William Domhoff's work is a partial correction of this fault in Mills' work;[2] the present work is partly an attempt to advance what Domhoff has done. The Power Elite has been raised in this context because, while it cannot truly be said to display an awareness of something on the order of nondecisions (though possibly Mills had such notions in mind at the time), it was one of the--if not the--most crucial works involved in the old pluralist-elitist debate from which the nondecision concept eventually emerged and because it stimulated Domhoff's work, the relevance of which will become clear in the next chapter.

While Bachrach and Baratz deserve the credit or blame for introducing the nondecision concept into political analysis,[3] prior to their published work several social scientists displayed an awareness of something akin to the nondecision-making process without presenting an explicit analysis of it. Among these social scientists are Harold Lasswell, Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, and E. E. Schattschneider.

In his Politics: Who Gets What, When, How,[4] Lasswell maintains that elites retain their privileged positions by, among other things, invoking "symbols of the common destiny". In a properly functioning (from the standpoint of the elite) political system, the masses revere the symbols and the elite continues unthreatened as the elite. The elite's ideology is the thesis of personal responsibility, and, according to Lasswell, once it is well-established it ". . . perpetuates itself with little planned propaganda by those whom it benefits most".[5] Because of the inculcation of the thesis of personal responsibility the thesis of collective responsibility is incomprehensible to the masses. The elite gains from a paucity of critical thought:

> Happy indeed is that nation that has no thought of itself; or happy at least are the few who procure the principal benefits of universal acquiescence. Systems of life which confer special benefits on the other fellow need no plots or conspiracies when the masses are moved by faith and the elites are inspired by self-confidence.[6]

In their Small Town and Mass Society,[7] Vidich and Bensman report that the ritual of talking and the requirement of unanimity on the village board serve to avoid decision-making. Often the process of endless discussion from meeting to meeting deadens

interest in an issue and no action is taken. The requirement of unanimity ". . . makes it difficult for outside groups to find an issue which would threaten the status quo".[8]

In his The Semi-Sovereign People,[9] Schattschneider argues that American politics is the politics of the sixty million who participate in the political community. The other forty million, the nonparticipants, tend to be relatively poor economically and relatively uneducated. But their nonparticipation, Schattschneider maintains, is not due to ignorance or lack of civic duty but rather "reflects the suppression of the options and alternatives that reflect the needs of the nonparticipants".[10] It has been difficult for the forty million to get interested in the Republican-Democratic version of political conflict; but, according to Schattschneider, it is obvious that "the cleavage between the sixty million and the forty million could be exploited by a new kind of political effort devoted to the development of an array of issues now submerged".[11]

Richard Merelman has raised some objections to the work of "neo-elitists", as he calls Bachrach and Baratz. Some of these objections might also be made with regard to the work undertaken here. Three relevant passages from Merelman will be presented; after each quotation an attempt will be made to show that Merelman's remarks present no obstacle to the present work. Merelman states:

> We need not consider the conflicts studied by the pluralists unimportant if we don't presume the existence of an elite. But the presumption itself is not justified unless the theory specifies some independent reasons for us to believe an elite exists. The (false consensus) argument (of the neo-elitists) specifies no such independent reasons. Therefore, we need not believe an elite exists and, without an elite, we cannot have a false consensus.[12]

No one will be asked here to presume the existence or non-existence of an elite. Instead of the term "elite", the term "governing class", borrowed from G. William Domhoff, will be used here, and "elite" (except when referring to the work of others or as part of the term "power elite") will be used only as the adjectival form of governing class. Ample "independent reasons" will be given for a belief in the existence of the *governing class*.

Concerned about the usefulness of "non-events", Merelman states:

> ...we have no reason for accepting the absence of an event as evidence for any particular cause, unless it can be demonstrated that the cause (in this case, an elite) produced the absence of the event (threatening conflict). To do so, some threatening conflict must precede the coming of false consensus. But such threatening conflict is incompatible with false consensus as defined. Therefore, false consensus does not admit the evidence to support itself. To put the point differently, no conflict existing under conditions of false consensus threatens an elite; therefore, no such conflict will cause an elite to show itself. We can never get empirical evidence that an elite exists.[13]

Merelman either assumes or assumes that neo-elitists assume that false consensus is something that either is or is not: something that exists full-blown at a particular point in time or else does not exist at all at that point in time. Such an assumption is wholly unwarranted. The best way to show the inapplicability of Merelman's remarks is to preview what will be presented in fuller form later in this work. The concept "false consensus" will not be used in this work and will be replaced by the concept "political culture". The political culture is not conceived of as something which is or is not; rather it is conceived of as

something which at various points in time is adhered to by varying proportions of the total membership of the society and with varying levels of intensity. By "political culture" is meant the dominant outlooks of members of a political system towards politics. "Outlooks" is being used very broadly here and is meant to include beliefs, emotions, values, attitudes. In the United States (and presumably in any large, modern society) the political culture, while adhered to or accepted by the bulk of the citizenry, is by no means universally accepted. Some members of the political system reject parts of the political culture, and others reject the political culture in general. Support of or rejection of the political culture can vary over time. If a point is reached where rejection becomes a greater force than support, then by definition the political culture ceases to be the political culture. The political culture as it resides in a non-dissentient individual member of the political system is the politically-relevant and extensive part of the entire configuration of recurring mental and emotio-mental patterns which constitutes a world view. Later it will be shown that when the political culture--or some important part of it--appears to be breaking down, i.e., in Merelman's terms, when "some threatening conflict" exists, we do see activity by members of the governing class to remedy the situation; indeed, even in times of great stability there are efforts by organized elements within the governing class to reinforce the political culture. Moreover, there is nothing in Merelman's argument that prevents the investigator from raising and attempting to answer the question

of who benefits and in what degree from the absence of major conflict. Merelman is correct when he says that "you cannot observe what has not happened".[14] Whether "non-events" lend themselves to scientific investigation, however, depends upon what is included in the term. If the lack or absence of major conflict is to be called a non-event, then non-voting is a non-event, too. Yet political scientists study non-voting. Non-voting is part of the larger phenomenon of apathy (lack of concern and participation). Apathy is often cited as an important element in American politics, and no one claims that apathy cannot be empirically investigated. Surely, the revolution in France in 1764 is a non-event (since it never happened); but surely no one is thereby prevented from inquiring as to the reasons why no revolution took place. The Danish political crisis of 1993 is a non-event (since it has not happened yet and may never); if such a crisis does occur, then it is open to empirical inquiry; if such a crisis does not occur, then that fact is equally open to empirical inquiry. Perhaps Merelman or others could point to other examples of non-events that are in principle incapable of empirical study; this would only show that "non-event" is a very poor term because it fails to distinguish things that are fundamentally different.

Merelman thinks the false consensus argument crumbles before the dictates of science:

> (According to my understanding of neo-elitism). . . elites exist in all cases of consensus and in all cases of conflict. The argument cannot be falsified.[15]
>
> . . . . . .
>
> The false consensus argument is non-falsifiable and, therefore, not amenable to scientific investigation.[16]

Once we specify what constitutes an elite (or a governing class, or a ruling group, etc.), its existence in a particular society during a certain period of time is a matter for empirical investigation. The false consensus argument is non-falsifiable only under the condition that false (or genuine) consensus is total in the society--a condition which surely will not be argued here. Propositions about the political culture and its relation to "*who gets what*" are amenable to scientific investigation.

The quotations from Merelman and the comments which followed each of them were presented to show that his seemingly powerful objections to the neo-elitists would be of no force against the work undertaken here. Whatever worth Merelman's objections may have for the work of the neo-elitists (and that worth is questionable), these objections do not constitute barriers to the present work.

A <u>decision</u> is a choice among alternative courses of action, or, as Dahl has excellently defined it: "a set of actions related to and including the choice of one alternative rather than another . . ."[17] A <u>nondecision</u> is defined by Bachrach and Baratz as:

> ...a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker. To be more nearly explicit, nondecision-making is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process.[18]

Whatever may or may not be the merits of the term "non-event" in philosophical discussion, it is unfortunate that Bachrach and Baratz chose "<u>non</u>decision" to refer to what in fact

is a decision, and equally unfortunate that they chose "nondecision-making process" to refer to an empirical phenomenon that is worthy of study by political scientists. This terminology serves more to confuse than it does to clarify. Fortunately, it is not so late in the day that an attempt to rectify the situation cannot be made. Henceforth in this work, the terms "avoiding decision" and "issue-avoidance" will be used in place of the terminology of Bachrach and Baratz. Moreover, we shall use these terms somewhat differently than their Bachrach and Baratz counterparts. An avoiding decision is a decision made by a supporter of (what for now we will call) the prevailing order which directly and intentionally attempts to suppress or thwart a latent or manifest challenge to the prevailing order, i.e., the outcome when successful is a manifest function. There may also be a decision by a supporter of the prevailing order which, though it does not directly and intentionally attempt to do so, may more or less have the effect of suppressing or thwarting any latent or manifest challenge to the prevailing order. In such a case, we can say--and attempt to establish--that the decision has a latent function that makes it similar to an avoiding decision or that the consequence of the decision is as if it were a part of issue-avoidance. In practice, the distinction between two such decisions may sometimes be more or less blurred. At any rate, these various terminological difficulties are not all that important since these and closely related terms will be used much less than we originally thought would be the case: not because avoiding decisions and latent issues and such are not involved,

but because they would seem to be inextricably embedded in other phenomena which we consider to be more fundamental.

While Bachrach and Baratz were crucial for the origins of our work and we acknowledge our indebtedness to them, we wish to make it clear that we dissent from their important issue-unimportant issue distinction, even for heuristic purposes, and maintain that it needs to be modified lest some important issues are tossed into the bin of the unimportant. Bachrach and Baratz posit that: ". . . any challenge to the predominant values or to the established 'rules of the game' would constitute an 'important' issue; all else, unimportant."[19] Certainly such challenges are important and even fundamental issues; but we consider two other types of issues to be important. These are issues which would result in a decision that keeps quiescent or makes more quiescent a substantial number of people, thereby reducing the likelihood of challenges to the rules of the game, etc., and issues whose resolution substantially affects most members of the political system.

Having made these caveats, let us very briefly summarize the Bachrach and Baratz contribution. There is a serious weakness in the enthrallment with decision-making found in pluralist studies. The pluralist approach suffers from the failure to acknowledge that power is often exercised by limiting the scope of decision-making to issues that are relatively "safe", i.e., issues that do not pose any serious threat to elite interests. The pluralist accuses the elitist of accepting reputed power as power, but the pluralist himself is guilty of accepting reputed issues as issues. The nondecision-making process (issue-avoidance) does not assume a

conscious cabal or a murky plot; domination can come in forms more subtle and less scheming.

It is unclear, as Balbus has pointed out, whether Bachrach and Baratz are entirely clear about the nature of their contribution.[20] In their original articles--which appear almost verbatim in the early part of their recent book--Bachrach and Baratz, in effect, take pluralism to task for failing to follow up empirically on the theoretical distinction (which pluralists acknowledge) between individual preferences or wants and issues, i.e., they realize that pluralist analysis has in fact assumed a non-problematic conversion of individual wants or subjective interests into issues; Bachrach and Baratz realize that this conversion is problematic. Such a realization, however, can occur within the theoretical confines of the pluralist framework, and indeed, in their response to Merelman's attacks, Bachrach and Baratz accept individual wants or subjective interests as the theoretical starting point for political analysis. But, in Chapter Four of their recent book, Bachrach and Baratz present a model of the political process which implies that subjective interests or individual preferences are not to be taken as given. The important point, of course, is not whether Bachrach and Baratz are less than perfectly consistent in their latest work; three points are important: (1) Bachrach and Baratz in their original analysis pointed out something that needed to be pointed out; (2) the Bachrach and Baratz critique pointed to an empirical flaw of pluralist analysis and not to a theoretical flaw of pluralism; (3) the analytic framework of Bachrach and Baratz can be expanded in such a manner that subjective interests

or wants are not taken as given but rather are considered phenomena whose generation is worthy of study.

Some Terminology

Edelman has written: "What people get from government is what administrators do about their problems rather than the promises of statutes, constitutions, or oratory."[21] To Edelman's cogent statement it fruitfully can be added that it is not only what administrators do but what they do not do about people's problems that constitutes actual policy.

Public policy is here defined as the decisions and the avoiding decisions that authoritatively allocate values for a society or sanction the existing allocation of values. Although this definition is different from David Easton's justly famous definition, it is indebted to it and compatible with it. Given the above definition of public policy, the definition of politics as the public policy-making process is also compatible with Harold Lasswell's equally justly famous conception of politics as "who gets what, when, how".

Political science is the scientific study of the public policy-making process. Another definition of political science--and one that is not incompatible with the above definition--is that it is "... the study of who says what the issues are, what is to be done about them, and by whom".[22] The concept of "issue" is an important one in political science because political decisions are not decisions about just any old thing; they are decisions about issues. Easton defines an issue as "a demand that the members of a political system are prepared to deal with as a

even if the alternative is simply the cessation of the existing policy. The second condition guarantees that anything that is labeled as an issue will have some degree of controversy surrounding it. Policy alternatives which are approved by all relevant public authorities are not "at issue" and are not issues and presumably soon become public policies (e.g., declaration of war against Japan after Pearl Harbor). Thus an issue amounts to a demand which is given at least some official public recognition and which is a matter of controversy, though either support or opposition from relevant public authorities may not be very wide.

Political decisions are about issues, but avoiding decisions can be about issues or latent issues. Avoiding decisions can be categorized into three types, two of which are associated with issues and the other of which is associated with latent issues. A latent issue is operationally defined here as anything which meets the following four conditions: (1) it is an alternative to an existing public policy; (2) it has been publicly adhered to by more than one individual in the political system; (3) at least some of those favoring this policy alternative are aware that their preference is a shared one; and (4) it has not been publicly and favorably commented upon by any relevant public authority. An issue may or may not enter the decision-making arena, but a latent issue, by definition, never enters the decision-making arena. Moreover, a latent issue--a demand which at least officially lies dormant--is not given serious consideration as a possibility for entrance into the decision-making arena. The scope of decision-making is not wide-open but limited, and some possible demands for change, i.e., latent issues, are beyond the

barriers in that legislative body.

If avoiding decisions I and II differ in that the former involves a latent issue and the latter involves an issue, in what ways are they similar? They have two things in common. First, neither enters the decision-making arena. Secondly--and this is what all three types of avoiding decisions have in common--policy change does not take place, i.e., avoiding decisions leave unaltered the status quo in the particular policy area. A policy change occurs when governmental action alters the existing authoritative allocation of values in some policy area.

That part of issue-avoidance which shall be referred to as avoiding decisions III is similar to avoiding decisions II in that it involves an issue but differs in that it enters the decision-making arena indeed successfully passes through the policy-formation stage of the public policy-making process. An issue associated with an avoiding decision III becomes a stated public policy, but it does not become an actual public policy because it is largely negated in the policy-implementation stage of the public policy-making process. The best examples of this third type of avoiding decision are the independent regulatory commissions. Established by law to regulate various aspects of American business in the "public interest", these commissions in fact are generally influenced heavily by and generally serve the very interests they supposedly regulate. An avoiding decision III differs from the other two types of decisions in that there is a period of time during which it is part of the decision-making process and then, in the implementation (or execution or adminis-

tration) stage, it is converted into an avoiding decision. As here defined, no policy change results from avoiding decisions I, II, or III.

A Glance at the Decision-Making Process and Issue-Avoidance

When a decision is made a policy change may or may not be the result. In American politics at the national level, for example, is the Senate or the House votes against medical care for the aged then that issue, for the time being, has been defeated. An issue is also defeated if the President exercises his veto power and Congress does not override the veto. In either case policy change does not occur because the issue has been defeated, and it has been defeated by a decision and not by an avoiding decision. If an issue successfully passes through each stage of the decision-making arena and if the reality of policy implementation is completely or largely in accord with the rhetoric of policy formation, then a policy change occurs.

Decisions can be divided into two types: those that defeat an issue and result in no policy change, and those that convert an issue into an actual public policy. The former shall be referred to as decisions I, the latter as decisions II. A decision I leaves the status quo unaltered. A decision II changes some part of the status quo in some degree, i.e., as a result of a decion II some part--large or small--of the existing authoritative allocation of values is altered to some extent--perhaps slightly, perhaps considerably.

When the decision-making process is operative, the result is

either policy change or no policy change. When issue-avoidance is operative, the result is always no policy change. No change in public policy is of course a public policy because it allows the existing policy--whether it be a "hands-off" policy or not--to continue. Clearly an understanding of both the decision-making process and issue-avoidance is crucial to an understanding of that process which is politics and whose output is public policy. Yet most political scientists have concentrated on the elements of the decision-making process while often neglecting issue-avoidance. They usually have studied avoiding decisions II and III. Avoiding decisions I have been all but ignored in the literature of the discipline. Given the heavy concentration on only one aspect of the public policy-making process, there can be little wonder that the state of empirical theory in the discipline leaves a great deal to be desired.

The presentation of Diagram I and the brief discussion of it that follows serve to summarize part of what this chapter so far has presented.

DIAGRAM I - THE FIVE POLICY ROUTES IN AMERICAN POLITICS

Decision:

(1) I : issue→decision-making arena→defeat→no policy change

(2) II : issue→decision-making arena→passage→concordant implementation→policy change

Avoiding decision:

(3) I : latent issue→no policy change

(4) II : issue→barriers to decision-making arena→ no policy change

(5) III : issue→decision-making arena→passage→negational implementation→no policy change

The first policy route, decision I, is the one in which an issue

is defeated in the decision-making arena with the result that the existing public policy continues. The second policy route, decision II, is the one in which a decision in the decision-making arena converts an issue into a stated public policy, and then concordant implementation converts the stated public policy into public policy, the result being policy change. The third policy route, avoiding decision I, is the one in which a latent issue does not become a matter of public controversy among the relevant public authorities because no relevant public authority publicly supports it, and the result is no policy change. The fourth policy route, avoiding decision II, is the one in which an issue arises but is blocked from access to the decision-making arena by institutional barriers; the result is no policy change. The fifth policy route, avoiding decision III, is the one in which an issue emerges from the decision-making arena, as in decision II, as a stated public policy but is so implemented that the existing allocation of values in the particular policy area is not altered, the result being no policy change. Of the five policy routes, four lead to no policy change or a continuation of the status quo, and one leads to policy change. While Diagram I is no doubt applicable to state and local politics in the United States and to politics in other countries, it was devised with American national politics in mind.

A Conceptual Scheme of Public Policy

The term "basic status quo" refers to the prevailing set of arrangements by which values (goods, services, benefits, privileges) are produced and distributed or allocated in a society. In the

United States, the core of the basic status quo is the ". . . socioeconomic system which is organized in such a way that it yields an amazing proportion of its wealth to a minuscule upper class of big businessmen and their descendants".[24] One might conceivably argue that a 10 percent increase in social security payments changes the status quo, but no one would argue that such an increase changes the basic status quo. Both the terms "social order" and "regime", the latter borrowed from Easton,[25] will be used interchangeably with basic status quo.

There is the status quo at any given point in time; for our purposes it can be defined as the set of all existing public policies at a point in time, or simply as existing public policy. While the status quo always reflects the basic status quo, the status quo can undergo many changes--what we might call within-regime changes--without changing the basic status quo. Of the set of all possible public policies the status quo is the subset extant at a given point in time.

The issue range is the set of all alternatives to existing public policy (the status quo) such that they would if enacted leave the basic status quo intact. Thus the issue range is also a subset within the set of all possible public policies. The regime space is the subset within the set of all public policies which is comprised of two of the subsets of that set: existing public policy and the issue range. In other words, existing public policy, or the status quo, and the issue range are the two subsets which make up the set which is the regime space, and the regime space in turn is a subset within the set of all possible public policies.

The subset within this all encompassing set which is not the regime space is the set of all public policy alternatives that if realized would change the **basic** status quo. Perhaps Diagram II makes these points more clearly than words alone.

We refer to a "**regime**" space because of its greater economy compared to the terms "basic status quo" and "social order". The only justification we have at the current time for this attempt to add to the jargon of social science is that we find this "conceptual scheme" of public policy to be a more useful aid in thinking about politics than the usual vague notion of an "underlying consensus" or similar term.

DIAGRAM II - THE SET OF ALL POSSIBLE PUBLIC POLICIES



The politics of the protection of the regime space is the politics of class interest, or class politics. The politics within the regime space is the politics of group interests, or interest group politics. The bulk of political scientists have studied politics as it appears within the regime space; but politics, as anyone with even a vague sense of history knows, is more than that. As was indicated earlier in somewhat different language, the concentration on one of these two kinds of politics and the ramifications for the state of theory in political science are the prime justifications for this context-of-discovery-study. The group interest approach alone is not enough to lead to an explanation of American national politics; but neither is the class interest approach enough; rather both the group interest approach and the class interest approach are needed. The conceptual scheme presented here recognizes this "duality" of American national politics. We believe that this conceptual scheme of public policy may be the beginning of a more fruitful context in which to set the matters of latent issues and avoiding decisions as well as issues and the decision-making process and in which to look for the relations among these things as well as connecting them to the factual claims concerning the governing class--claims to which we now turn.

Footnotes to Chapter I

[1] (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

[2] Who Rules America? (Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967).

[3] There are two articles and one book by Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz that are pertinent: "Two Faces of Power", American Political Science Review, Vol. 56 (December 1962), pp. 947-952; "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework", American Political Science Review, Vol. 57 (September 1963), pp. 632-642; and Power and Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[4] (New York: World Publishing Co., 1958); first published by McGraw - Hill, 1936.

[5] Ibid., p. 31.

[6] Ibid., pp. 31 - 32.

[7] (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1960); first published by Princeton University Press, 1958.

[8] Ibid., p. 136.

[9] (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

[10] Ibid., p. 105.

[11] Ibid., p. 110, (italics supplied).

[12] "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power", American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (June 1968), p. 453.

[13] Ibid.

[14] See his communication to the editor, American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (December 1968), p. 1269; the response by Bachrach and Baratz to Merelman's article is at Ibid., pp. 1268 - 1269.

[15] "Neo-Elitist Critique", p. 453.

[16] Ibid., p. 460.

[17] Robert A. Dahl, "The Analysis of Influence in Local Communities", in Charles Adrian, ed., Social Science and Community Action (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1960), p. 26.

[18] Power and Poverty, p. 44.

[19] "Two Faces of Power", p. 950.

[20] Isaac Balbus, "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis", Politics and Society, Vol. 1 (February 1971), pp. 162 - 174, passim.

[21] Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 193, (italics supplied).

[22] D. A. Strickland, L. L. Wade, and R. E. Johnston, A Primer of Political Analysis (Chicago: Markham, 1968), p. 1.

[23] David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", World Politics, 9 (April, 1957), p. 389.

[24] G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 107.

[25] Easton, "Approach to Political Systems", p. 392.

CHAPTER II

THE GOVERNING CLASS, ITS DENIAL, AND THE POLICY CHANGE PATH

Introductory Remarks

However esthetically pleasing a "theory" may be, it will be scientifically worthless if it does not account for some of the phenomena in the world. Theoretical development is always grounded on some factual claims. In this chapter we first present some factual claims and the concepts which they entail; we consider these factual claims--the core of which is the governing-class hypothesis--to be of great relevance for American politics in general and for the "politics of latent issues" in particular, and we submit that political scientists on the whole have not given them the degree of attention that they deserve. Then we try to show that what we will call "standard" political science, by which we mean the discipline of political science as a handsome majority of political scientists usually practice it, is partially impeded by its denial or slighting of these factual claims, or, in other words, that the governing-class hypothesis is worthy of consideration by political scientists. Finally, our presentation of what will be called the "policy change path" will bring together such matters as latent issues and class.

Domhoff's Concept of the Governing Class

By the term "social class" (or simply "class") is meant:

> . . . the largest group of people whose members have intimate access to one another. A class is composed of families and social cliques. The interrelationships

> between these families and cliques, in such informal activities as dancing, visiting, receptions, teas, and larger informal affairs, constitute the function of the social class.[1]

This definition accords well with Dahl's comments on what he calls equal social "standing":

> What I have in mind by referring to social standing in a given circle is the extent to which members of that circle would be willing--disregarding personal and idiosyncratic factors--to accord the conventional privileges of social intercourse and acceptance among equals; marks of social acceptability include willingness to dine together, to mingle freely in intimate social events, to accept membership in the same clubs, to use forms of courtesy considered appropriate among social equals, to intermarry, and so on. To the extent that individuals and groups accord one another these privileges, they may be said to enjoy equal social standing.[2]

There is in the United States a social class that can be fairly called the upper class: that this social upper class, what E. Digby Baltzell calls an "American business aristocracy" (of which he is a member),[3] can be postulated to exist seems reasonable due to a number of points that have been brought together by G. William Domhoff. There are the private schools which are closed to the overwhelming majority of American adolescents; these schools are attended (with important system-maintenance exceptions) by the adolescent members of families that also share other social characteristics which somewhat clearly demarcate them from other American families. There are the elite universities which for generations have continued the education of members of the upper class and also continued and expanded their social contacts with one another as well. There are the exclusive gentlemen's clubs in which membership is

restricted to those of upper-class origins and to those successful men whom club members deem ready and fit for assimilation into their select circle. Unsurprisingly, the members of these exclusive clubs are greatly disproportionately graduates of the private schools and the elite universities. There are also the debutante balls, the summer resorts, the charitable and cultural organizations, the yachting, the polo matches, and the fox-hunts: all of which bring members of the upper class together in social interaction. There is, of course, the institution of intermarriage: the sons and daughters of the upper class marry one another (the attention given to the exceptions only proves the rule). Domhoff gives considerably more detail on the above reasons for believing in the existence of a social upper class in the United States, and he also explains why listees in the Social Register do not correspond perfectly to members of the social upper class (although a listing in the Social Register is one important indicator of upper-class membership).

Does the American upper class constitute what might fairly be called a governing class? To answer this question it is necessary to define the term "governing class" and then see whether the American upper class fits the definition. Domhoff has defined this crucial term in the way in which it will be used in the present work:

> A "governing class" is a social upper class which owns a disproportionate amount of a country's wealth, receives a disproportionate amount of a country's yearly income, and contributes a disproportionate number of its members to the controlling institutions and key decision-making groups of the country.4

Domhoff estimates the size of the upper class as at most approx-

imately 0.5 percent of the American population. The top 0.5 percent in terms of wealth own approximately 25 percent of the country's wealth. The top 0.5 percent in terms of income receive approximately 5 percent of the annual national income. Thus the first two characteristics that a social upper class must have to be a governing class are admirably possessed by the American social upper class. Before considering the third characteristic it is appropriate--though by no means necessary--to interject the term "power elite".

Since the concepts of "power elite" and "governing class" are important in this work and since they can be easily confused, Domhoff will be quoted at some length on the power elite and its relationship to the governing class.

> . . . (T)he American upper class, if it is a governing class, does not rule alone. Thus, it will be necessary to demonstrate that most of the non-upper-class leaders are selected and trained by members of the upper class (co-opted), or to say the same thing differently, that the advancement of these non-upper-class leaders is dependent upon their attaining goals that are shared by members of the upper class. This leads to a discussion of our concept of the "power elite", a term borrowed from Mills but defined in a slightly different manner. We agree with Mills in defining the power elite as those who have a superior amount of power due to the institutional hierarchies they command, but we deviate from Mills by restricting the term to persons who are in command positions in institutional hierarchies controlled by members of the American upper class, or, in the case of members of the federal government, to persons who come to the government from the upper class or from high positions in institutions controlled by members of the upper class. By this definition, any particular member of the power elite may or may not be a member of the upper class. It not only allows for co-optation and for control through hired employees, but it agrees that some members of the upper class--what Baltzell calls the functionless genteel--may not be members of the power elite.[5]

> The "power elite" . . . encompasses all those who are in command positions in institutions controlled by members of the upper (governing) class. Any given member of the power elite may or may not be a member of the upper class. The important thing is whether or not the institution he serves is controlled by members of the upper class.[6]

> Leaders within the upper class do not labor alone in dominating the political process. They have the help of hired employees: high-level managers and officials in corporations, law firms, foundations and associations controlled by members of the upper class. Together, these upper-class leaders and their high-level employees constitute the power elite. I define the power elite as active, working members of the upper class and high-level employees in institutions controlled by members of the upper class. The power elite has its roots in and serves the interests of the social upper class. It is the operating arm of the upper class.[7]

The major corporations, the major foundations, the associations (e.g., the Foreign Policy Association, the Committee for Economic Development, the Council on Foreign Relations), the leading universities, the major media of mass communication, and the federal government are "the controlling institutions and key decision-making groups of the country". Does the American upper class contribute a disproportionate number of the policy-makers in these institutions? Despite the rhetoric of some politicians and obscurantism of some social scientists, the facts are clear and the facts answer "yes". If the non-upper-class members of the power elite are included the disproportionality is of course greater; but the number of upper-class persons in these policy-making positions is more than sufficient for the American social upper class to possess the third characteristic that a social upper class must have in order to be a governing class. Domhoff presents a good deal of information on the top personnel in the above-mentioned institutions, and we will review in the next

section of this chapter that which applies to the executive branch of the federal government.

Let us very briefly summarize some of the major points made by Domhoff in his works: there is a social upper class in the United States; its economic bases are the major corporations and the large banks, law firms, etc. that intermingle in the corporate world (big business); the upper class dominates the foundations, the key associations, the leading universities, the major mass media, and the federal government; in this domination the upper class does not operate merely as a social class but operates through the power elite; the upper class owns a share of the country's wealth which is disproportionate by a factor of approximately 50; it receives a share of the annual income which is disproportionate by a factor of approximately 10; the American social upper class has been a national one since about the turn of the century; there are a number of grounds for antagonisms within the upper class which often result in members of the upper class having differing viewpoints; the political disunity within the upper class is usually such that most of the politically involved members of the upper class can be classified as part of either the conservative wing (e.g., William Buckley, George Humphrey, Robert Taft, Sr. and Jr., the Pews, the Lillys) or the moderate-liberal wing (e.g., John Lindsay, William Proxmire, W. Averell Harriman, the Kennedys, the Danforths) of the upper class; the American social upper class is a governing class. These are among the most basic of Domhoff's points.

If the relevance for political science of Domhoff's points were to be summarized in a single sentence, that sentence would be something along these lines: The governing class shapes the contours of public policy outcomes in the United States. This statement, or similar ones, can be called the governing-class hypothesis. If it is true, or if it has a middling chance of being partially true, it is of great relevance for nondecisions and latent issues. A goodly number of political scientists--though certainly not all--who study American politics have either denied the governing-class hypothesis or else slighted it in their work; such slighting in effect is often an implicit denial of the governing-class hypothesis. We believe that any form of denial of this hypothesis is premature. The next section is a discussion of some of the reasons for our belief.

Some Flaws in the Denial of the Governing-Class Hypothesis

There are at least two satisfactory ways of construing the owrd "values" as it is used in the definition of public policy. First, values can be thought of as desired things, i.e., things which people want as demonstrated by their behavior. Second, values can be conceived of as being positive and negative, or, in more usual terminology, as rewards and deprivations. The second conception simply adds the other side of the coin to the first conception and perhaps is to be preferred since, in so doing, it stresses that public policies can hurt as well as please. A list of values in the sense employed here could be compiled, as Harold Lasswell has done, but such a list would amount to one's "life-chances" and one's life-chances--in American

society at least--are largely dependent on one's economic status; i.e., those values which are what political competition in the United States is all about either are themselves or are closely related to the two dominant values of American society: the related and material values of wealth and income. How much meaning, for example, can the value "freedom" have for the forty million Americans living below the officially designated poverty level? Even educational opportunity, the value which is probably the most dependent on non-economic factors, is still heavily influenced by economic status. Thus the phrase "the fundamental value allocation of American society" means the distribution of wealth and income in the United States. Political scientists generally have paid insufficient attemtion to the fundamental value allocation of American society. On the whole, political scientists have been too little impressed, for example, by such facts as the following: from 1922 to 1953 there was only a slight decline in the percentage of personal wealth owned by the wealthiest 1% when wealth is analyzed by family; in the same time period there has been a substantial increase in the concentration of stocks and bonds with the percentage held by the top 1% going from 61.5% to 76%;[8] from 1910 to 1959 the percentage of personal income received by the upper 30% increased slightly (from 56.4% to 57.4%), while the percentage received by the lowest 30% dropped substantially (from 13.8% to 8.6%);[9] many millionaires pay very little in federal income taxes.[10] Some political scientists might make two objections to the argument that they pay far too little attention to wealth and income distribution. First, they might

the general population holds material values in high regard, the relative stability of substantial economic inequality in the United States is an interesting fact.

If a person or a group receives a greater share of the allocation of values than would be the case under conditions of perfect equality, then that person or that group is said to have a favorable value allocation. If a person or a group receives a smaller share of the allocation of values than would be the case under conditions of perfect equality, then that person or that group is said to have an unfavorable value allocation.

At one time political scientists considered history to be a sister discipline. In more recent decades many political scientists have approached their subject matter as if history were all but irrelevant. The study of the public policy-making process has suffered from this ahistorical methodology. An ahistorical methodology makes it impossible to recognize the tremendous advantages some interests, vis-a-vis other interests, have built up over time. Political scientists who eschew an historical methodology sometimes tend to view each political struggle that arises as a game with largely impartial rules and with competitors having no score at the beginning. Politics may be akin to a game, but it is not a game whose duration is a congressional session or even a decade; rather politics is a game that begins with the emergence or man as a political animal and has been going on ever since. The "rules of the game" in politics vary from political system to political system and can change within a political system over time. Unlike the rules in

what are usually thought of as games, the "rules" in politics are not necessarily impartial, i.e., they may favor certain interests. Moreover, the "referees" or "umpires" in politics seldom--if ever--take on impartial, impersonal, neutral roles: they are human beings who are very likely to be sympathetic to certain interests rather than to others. American history has been such that some interests have received a very favorable value allocation. This results in at least two great advantages for such interests. First, their immense financial resources provide them with an asset that is bound to be of considerable importance in influencing public policy in a society in which material values weigh very heavily (this is of sufficient importance that it will be treated in greater detail as a separate point later on). Secondly, the formal organization of American government--i.e., constitutional provisions and institutional rules and procedures--as it has developed historically is such that interests which desire retention of the status quo are greatly favored while interests which desire major (and under some conditions minor) departures from the status quo are greatly disadvantaged. This basic fact about American government--one which is seldom spelled out in great detail in American government textbooks--is part of what Schattschneider means by the "mobilization of bias". If a group wants to change something in the national political order of the United States and works within the rules of the game, it must transcend many "veto points". Such a group must win a series of victories without a defeat; a single defeat anywhere along the route to actual public policy blocks, at least for the time being, the

desired change. A group which is satisfied with the status quo and whose primary political objective is to block changes it deems undesirable, needs, on the other hand, to win only one victory of the many opportunities for victory which are provided by the veto points. Thus such a group usually finds the game of politics a relatively easy one to play, while a group desiring change usually finds politics a very difficult game to play. While it is true that there is no one-to-one correspondence between groups that favor the preservation of the status quo and groups that historically have received a favorable value allocation or between groups that favor change and groups that historically have received an unfavorable value allocation, there are tendencies in those directions. Moreover and more importantly, the more a proposal for change leans toward a more egalitarian value allocation, i.e., the more "redistributive" a proposal is in the direction of greater equality, the more likely it is that the interests which desire it to become public policy have historically had an unfavorable value allocation, and the more likely it is that the interests which desire to block it from becoming public policy are interests which historically have had a favorable value allocation. Clearly it is a much more difficult political task to shift from an unfavorable value allocation at t_1 to a favorable value allocation at t_2 than it is to maintain a favorable value allocation from t_1 to t_2. Presidents of major American corporations do not have to pressure Congress to pass a law declaring that the United States shall have a capitalist economy, they do not have to persuade the President to issue an executive

order guaranteeing them high salaries, and they do not have to argue before the Supreme Court that the Constitution should be so interpreted as to give their children favorable life-chances. Groups which in the American past have gotten and continue to get "the most of what there is to get" enter **any** "new" political struggle with a tremendous strategic advantage. The formal organization of American government--part of the rules of the game--is not neutral; on the contrary it is biased against those groups which desire a shift towards a more egalitarian value allocation and biased in favor of those groups which desire to block such a shift and preserve the status quo. These rules of the game clearly were not written by or for the "have-nots" of American society. It is a methodological error to approach the the study of politics as if the interests or groups involved do not bring into the present situation a past which accords them substantial advantages or severe handicaps.

Some political scientists, especially pluralists, tend to overrate the importance of Congress.[12] Truman, for example, makes the following assertion: "Especially in the United States, the legislature, far more than the judiciary or the executive, has been the primary means of effecting changes in the law of the land".[13] Congress is probably the most important legislative body in the world; nevertheless, it is not as important as most pluralists think it is. In foreign policy, Congress plays a minor role in comparison with that of the President. In domestic policy, where its influence is comparable with that of the Presidency, the the role of Congress is largely one of blocking or amending

legislation. Most major pieces of legislation are either part of the President's program or proposals by presidential aspirants. Congress blocks more changes than it initiates. Furthermore, whatever importance Congress may have as an institution, the most important people within Congress are the committee chairmen, and the committee chairmen generally espouse views that even the most alarmist members of the upper class would not find threatening to their interests.

More damaging to the development of empirical political theory than the overestimation of the importance of Congress is the underestimation of the importance of money in American politics. In order to wage a serious campaign for most seats in the United States Senate, a candidate usually either must be rich or have rich friends. About one-fifth of United States Senators are millionaires.[14] Thus millionaires enjoy an astronomical over-representation in the Senate. Some political scientists do not seem to regard such a fact as very important; yet it would certainly be startling to find that either Blacks or women, two groups that are much more numerous than millionaires, constitute one-fifth of United States Senators. While rarely as costly as the typical campaign for a Senate seat, some campaigns for seats in the House of Representatives are expensive. It is not irrelevant to note what a leading American government textbook states about the occupational backgrounds of members of Congress: ". . . lawyers account for more than half the membership of Congress, and businessmen and bankers fill almost a third of the seats."[15] Some people can afford to make much greater financial contributions

than others can, and it is unlikely that money is given to candidates for any office in a spirit of altruism. An interesting fact is that 90% of campaign funds in federal elections is given by 1% of the population.[16] Campaign financing is not, of course, the only way in which money is important in American politics, as was indicated earlier in this chapter. Money may not buy everything, but it has been known to make a great many people (including Americans) do things they otherwise would not do.

For the most part, political scientists have failed to give sufficient attention to the backgrounds and affiliations of key office-holders at the national level. What groups send greatly disproportionate numbers of their members to become President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, other Cabinet members, Assistant Secretaries and Under-Secretaries, or holders of other key positions in the federal government? The "Negroes on Dixwell Avenue" and the "teachers in the public schools" and poets and social workers are not among such favored groups. Separate studies reported by Domhoff, Kolko, and Barnet, respectively, tell us something about who is favored with such top posts. Domhoff[17] reports that of the eight Secretaries of State between 1933 and 1964, five can be found in the Social Register and a sixth, Dean Rusk, was President of the upper-class-controlled Rockefeller Foundation before coming to the Secretaryship. There were thirteen Secretaries of Defense or War during the same time period and Domhoff found that eight of them have been listees in the Social Register and that the rest were bankers and corporation executives. Of eight Secretaries of the Treasury, seven qualify

as members of either the upper class or the power elite; the lone exception was Fred M. Vinson--a lawyer, politician, and judge--who served only a year before going to the Supreme Court. Most of the other Cabinet posts, Domhoff finds, do not generally go to upper class-power elite types; but this is by no means always the case and his comments on the Secretaryship of Labor are very interesting:

> . . . three Secretaries of Labor--Perkins, Mitchell, and Wirtz--are members of the power elite; their tenures encompass 23 of the 32 years between 1933 and 1965. This is a very good record in what should be labor's main stronghold in a pluralistic government. It would seem that labor's say-so is filtered through the ear of one or another member or representative of the American business aristocracy.[18]

The following four sentences serve to up-date some of Domhoff's findings. The current Secretary of State--William P. Rogers (Racquet Club)--is a Wall Street lawyer with corporate connections, including membership on the board of directors of the Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation. Of the two most recent Secretaries of Defense, one--Clark Clifford--is a Washington lawyer who has worked for the Du Ponts and was an advisor to President Truman, and the other--Melvin Laird--came to the post after a career in the House of Representatives where he was a strong supporter of business interests and of the top military. Henry Fowler (Links Club), a banker who is also a director of International Harvester, of Commonwealth Edison, of Swift & Co., and of six other corporations; he was preceeded by the brief tenure of Joseph Barr, who is not affiliated with any major national corporation but who has extensive business interests in his home state of Indiana (executive vice-president of Merz Engineering, secretary-treasurer

of Barr Development Corporation, etc.); the current Treasury Secretary is John Connally, a protege of Lyndon Johnson and for years a well-rewarded servant of such Texas oilmen as Sid Richardson and Percy Bass. The current Secretary of Labor, James Hodgson, spent almost three decades as an executive with Lockheed Aircraft; he was preceeded by George Schultz, a dean at the University of Chicago and a director of four business-financial enterprises; the power elite tenure in the Secretaryship of Labor now encompasses 28 of the last 37 years.

Kolko and Barnet present evidence that corroborates Domhoff's findings and the up-dated findings above. Kolko studied the origins of the top decision-makers in the period from 1944 to 1960 and found that for the most part they came from the large corporations, investment houses, banks, and Wall Street corporate law firms. He concludes: "At every level of the administration of the American State, domestically and internationally, business serves as the fount of critical assumptions or goals and strategically placed personnel".[19] Barnet studied the career backgrounds of the four hundred individuals who held top positions in foreign policy and national security at some time during the 1940-1967 period and concluded: "Defining the national interest and protecting national security have been deemed to be the proper province of business. Indeed, as President Coolidge used to say, the business of America is business."[20]

For the most part, political scientists have tended to ignore some important policy-influencing ties between big business and the federal government. Lobbying--official and unofficial--is engaged

in on behalf of big business but is only one of the important ways big business influences public policy outcomes. Another way is the continuing existence of many special advisory committees composed of big businessmen which provide expertise and advice in policy areas that are of direct concern to their members. Most of these committees are in four executive departments: Interior, Commerce, Defense, and Treasury. The outstanding special committee in the Interior Department is the National Petroleum Council. The Commerce, Defense, and Treasury Departments have a number of special advisory committees--some unimportant and some very influential--and the last-mentioned department "openly draws its committees from such private associations as the American Bankers Association."[21] Such upper-class controlled associations as the Committee for Economic Development, the Business Advisory Council, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the National Planning Association constitute important big business-federal government ties (and some of these associations also are big business-intellectual community and/or big business-American public ties). Presidentially-appointed task forces and commissions are often dominated by big businessmen and their representatives, and, while their recommendations do not always become public policy, such task forces and commissions help to define the "feasible" policy alternatives in a given area; hence, they constitute policy-influencing ties between big business and the federal government.

Standard political science fails to explain contemporary United States foreign policy. This does not mean, of course, that standard political science does a good job of explaining

domestic policy in the United States. Policy can be divided in different ways for different analytic purposes, and for some purposes a division into foreign and domestic is justifiable and useful; however, foreign policy and domestic policy are closely related. Notwithstanding all the criticisms of standard political science contained in this chapter, the undeniable fact remains that it has been useful in studying some parts of domestic policy, e.g., along the lines suggested by Theodore Lowi.[22] Since, however, American foreign and domestic policies are closely related and since foreign policy has a good deal to do with shaping the framework within which domestic policy alternatives are defined as feasible (this point will be discussed in greater detail later in this work), it is clear that any of the theoretical schools of thought in standard political science that are inadequate in explaining foreign policy will be of limited utility in explaining domestic policy. Political scientists generally concede both that American foreign policy is made by a small group of decision-makers and that public opinion and other such internal pressures usually have only a minor influence--if any influence at all--on the top decision-makers. Evidence has already been given--and more could have been given--showing that the small group of foreign policy decision-makers is composed predominantly of upper-class persons or persons who have been well-rewarded employees in institutions controlled by the upper class. Some political scientists might counter that such evidence on the decision-makers' backgrounds does not demonstrate that they will act to promote upper-class interests. This counter-argument is very weak for two

reasons: first, it ignores sociological and psychological findings which show that a person's background has considerable influence on his behavior; second, no one has ever shown that any major American foreign policy decision in the twentieth century has been made against the predominant preferences of the upper class while benefiting another class or other classes.

Isaac Balbus has made an excellent case which demonstrates the inadequacy of the pluralist version of the concept "interest".[23] Since pluralism is an important school of thought in political science, his remarks are worth consideration; the remainder of this paragraph consists of a summary of Balbus' argument. Everyday or ordinary language recognizes that the concept "interest" has both subjective and objective meanings. In its subjective sense interest refers to a psychological state of awareness in the individual who has the interest; examples are a white homeowner who says he is "interested" in helping to form a coalition of like-minded fellows in order to keep blacks out of his neighborhood, a person who likes to read detective stories, and a voter who prefers liberal candidates. In its objective sense interest means that a person is affected by something or has a stake in something irrespective of whether or not he is aware of the interest; thus, for example, everyone has an interest in a diet which includes a certain minimum of ascorbic acid, everyone has an interest in avoiding a full-scale nuclear war, and the state of the American economy "interests" every American (and other people, too). Furthermore, ". . . an individual's subjective interests are not merely <u>given</u>, or <u>randomly</u> generated,

but rather are systematically determined by the way in which his life-chances are objectively affected by objective conditions. To rely solely on subjective interest is to ignore the prior and decisive problem of the 'conversion' of objective interests to subjective interests, i.e., the development of consciousness, a phenomenon which any adequate political theory cannot ignore".[24] Either by equating objective and subjective interests or by relying solely on objective or subjective interests, one cannot treat as logical possibilities two potentially theoretically empirical probabilities: lack of consciousness and false consciousness. While an adequate political theory will have to recognize--as ordinary language already does--both subjective and objective interests, pluralism recognizes only subjective interests. Though the conceptual starting point of pluralism is individual preferences, pluralists in practice tend to make issues their actual starting point. This is a serious <u>empirical</u> mistake on the part of pluralists, but more fundamental is their <u>theoretical</u> mistake of accepting subjective interests or individual preferences as the theoretical starting point and thereby treating wants or preferences as random or free-floating, denying a structural basis to consciousness, and failing to recognize "that men have interests which are collectively shaped even if they are unaware of them".[25]

Here we conclude our argument that there are reasons for consideration of the governing-class hypothesis. Next we will tie this argument to the related argument that class in general may be a more important factor in influencing American public policy outcomes than some political scientists have considered it to be.

Success and Failure along the Policy Change Path: Influences on Some Conversion-Arrestment Points

To the extent that prevailing states of value allocations continue, as there is no policy change that significantly affects them, to that extent do governing-class members continue to enjoy the benefits of their class position--benefits which include fewer illnesses, better health care, longer life expectancy, greater educational opportunity, better housing, and less chance of serving in war, to name a few. These and other benefits are inverted for the "lower classes". By this term we shall mean that segment of the American population which the Conference on Economic Progress reported to be living in either poverty or deprivation and which it calculated to be about forty percent of the total population.[26] In the "middle classes" we shall place all those who are not in the lower classes and not in the upper class and not tied to the upper class by the nature of their careers, i.e., the non-upper-class members of the power elite. The middle classes thus constitute a majority of the American population. Let us now take a look at the origins and partial development of the policy routes presented in the first chapter and, in so doing, bring out a few relations among such things as class, latent issues, and public policy outputs. (In our treatment of what we will call the "policy change path" we will oversimplify to some extent by ignoring some complexities in order to attempt to get at the fundamentals.)

A change in public policy may or may not change the basic status quo. If there is no change in public policy there is no

change in the basic status quo. Any change in public policy must begin with discontent. If all individuals in a political system are contented with an existing public policy there will be no change in that policy. There is, of course, no automatic conversion of individual discontent into policy change. The question of how policy change comes into being will now be explored.

In chapter I the five policy routes in American politics were presented. Each route began with a policy alternative that was at the issue or latent issue stage. But we must go temporally further back if we are to have a fuller understanding of a public policy-making process in which only a small percentage of policy alternatives become policy changes. A policy change results from the concordant implementation which follows a decision favoring the change. A decision is about an issue and issues arise from demands. Demands arise from individual wants or preferences which arise from individual discontent concerning an existing public policy. To begin at the beginning, if there is no individual discontent there can be no individual want or preference for a policy change; without such wants there can be no demand; without a demand, no issue; no issue, no decision; no decision, no concordant implementation; and if there is no concordant implementation of a decision there is no policy change. Let us call the series of stages that a policy alternative goes through on the way to becoming a policy change the "<u>policy change path</u>". The five policy routes presented in Chapter I can be seen as summaries of the various possibilities once a policy alternative has reached a certain stage. A policy alternative can fail to become a policy

change through arrestment at any of the conversion points along the policy change path.

Objective grounds for discontent can exist without giving rise to discontent. Through political socialization, the mass media, and political ritual Americans are taught the virtues of patriotism and that everyone ought to be happy to live in the greatest country on earth, that whatever happens is God's will, that the meek shall inherit the earth, that problems are matters of personal responsibility, etc. Putting aside any question of the truth or falsity or of the goodness or evil of such teachings, it is not unreasonable to surmise that individual discontent might arise somewhat more easily and/or somewhat more often were it not for such a set of teachings.

Once individual discontent arises it may or may not take a political form. An individual may or may not possess sufficient information about the workings of politics to see the possibility that governmental policy is relevant to the reduction or elimination of his discontent (there is no concern in this work with discontents that are in principle incapable of reduction or elimination through politics). This leads to the following hypothesis: If an individual L has a low degree of political information and an individual H has a high degree of political information, then L is less likely than H to convert his discontent into an individual want or preference for a public policy change. Similarly, individuals who perceive themselves as politically ineffective are less likely to form policy alternatives from their discontents than are those who perceive themselves as politically effective: If an individual L has

a low sense of political efficacy and an individual H has a high sense of political efficacy, then L is less likely than H to convert his discontent into an individual political want or preference for a policy change.

The want for a public policy change may be limited to a particular policy (or the lack of policy which is, of course, a policy; e.g., the lack of a national policy prohibiting the consumption of alcohol is a public policy), or may extend to a set of public policies, or may extend to public policy in general. In other words, an individual political want or preference has scope, and its scope can be very narrow, or very broad, or somewhere in between.

A policy alternative which is destined to reach the issue stage moves along the policy change path from the individual preference stage to the demand stage to the issue stage. A policy alternative which is arrested at the demand stage, i.e., reaches but does not go beyond the demand stage, is a latent issue. As with an individual discontent and an individual political preference, the conversion from an individual political preference to a demand is problematic. Characteristics both of the individual who has formed the political preference and of the public policy alternative itself are important determinants of the probabilities of the conversion from an individual political preference to a demand. Let us present the following four hypotheses. If an individual L has a low degree of political information and an individual H has a high degree of political information, the L is less likely than H to be involved in the conversion of an individual

political preference into a demand. If an individual L has a low sense of political efficacy and an individual H has a high sense of political efficacy, then L is less likely than H to be involved in the conversion of an individual political preference into a demand. If an individual L has a low degree of access to the mass media and the individual H has a high degree access to the mass media, then L is less likely than H to be involved in the conversion of an individual political preference into a demand. If an individual political preference R is a policy alternative which is not within the issue range and an individual political preference S is a policy alternative which is within the issue range, then R is less likely than S to be converted into a demand.

Once a public policy alternative has reached the demand (latent issue) stage, group characteristics traditionally associated with degree of success in the public policy-making process come into play: status, organization, financial resources, quality of leadership, etc. Other things being equal, the better off a group is in terms of any of these characteristics the greater the likelihood that it will be successful in moving a policy alternative from the demand or latent issue stage to the issue stage. In addition, the nature of the policy alternative is an important factor: If R is a demand which is outside of the issue range and S is a demand within the issue range, then R is more likely than S to continue as a latent issue (or S is more likely than R to be converted into an issue). If a public policy alternative becomes an issue, it will successfully complete the policy change path only if it overcomes obstacles well-known to students of politics--

The major point both of these findings reported by Milbrath and of the preceeding discussion on the policy change path can be summarized as follows: success in moving public policy alternatives that one favors through the stages of the policy change path or in blocking alternatives that one opposes is to a considerable degree a function of socioeconomic status--a concept which is closely related to the concept of social class; in fact, socioeconomic status is usually defined in terms of income, education, and occupation: three characteristics with which the members of the governing class are highly endowed. Class and class-related factors are associated with the different ways in which people perceive themselves and the different ways in which they perceive the political system and their relation to it. As a result of all these factors, the typical member of the governing class is a more successful actor at each of the conversion points along the policy change path than is his middle-class counterpart; similarly, middle-class persons are on the whole more successful political actors than are lower-class persons. Class is important to the politics within the regime space as well as to the politics of the protection of the regime space.

While many of the important actors in the politics within the regime space are not members of the governing class or the power elite, some governing-class members are actors in this kind of politics and they act out of group and partisan interests rather than their class interest. It is in such circumstances that there is often considerable disunity among members of the governing class. Our conceptual scheme of public policy would

seem to provide one way of resolving the problem of unity vs. disunity within the governing class, as the following two simple hypotheses will try to show. If a public policy alternative is within the issue range, then governing-class members will usually differ as to its merits (often they will divide along what reasonably can be called conservative and moderate-liberals included) will unite in opposition to it. (Perhaps it should be pointed out that for a public policy alternative to be outside the issue range--and thus also outside the regime space--it need not be "to the left" of the basic status quo.)

The concept of class is accorded more importance in this work than it has been in most studies of American politics. In many studies class, or socio-economic status, is a variable; in this study it is a key variable. When one considers the manner in which most political scientists have gone about studying American politics, it is not surprising that they have failed to accord to class the high place which it deserves. Class, or the indices of socio-economic status, and other variables are correlated with one another. It is found, for example, that while there is a clear tendency for high-SES persons to vote Republican and for low-SES persons to vote Democratic, some high-SES persons vote Democratic and some low-SES persons vote Republican. It is also found that independent, non-class variables, such as age, correlate with such dependent variables as voter turnout and strength of party identification. Such studies, explicitly or implicitly, reach the conclusion that since non-class variables are involved in American politics, that since class status is by no means a perfect

predictor of party affiliation, and that since the party which has the greater proportion of low-SES identifiers has won more than its fair share of elections in the last three or four decades, it is obvious--notwithstanding the opinions of unsophisticated writers who do not do "scientific" research involving correlations and computers--that class is merely one of a goodly number of factors in American politics. Their conclusion is faulty for class is a factor of fundamental importance.

Their conclusion is faulty because their conception of the American public policy-making process is faulty. To begin with, their conception of American politics accords to elections a place of influence which their own empirical work does not support. In terms of their systemic, ritualistic, and legitimizing functions, elections are of considerable importance; but in terms of their influence on policy outcomes elections are only of minor importance: ". . . what people get does not depend mainly on their votes".[28] Furthermore, to believe that the Democratic party is the "party of the common man" is to accept as reality the rhetoric of the party's spokesmen (hardly something a scientist is supposed to do). The Democratic party has been and is controlled by the men who pay the bills: such men as the Harrimans, the Roosevelts, the Kennedys, the Engelhards, and the Busches. These are not "common" men but men of extraordinary wealth. In making their financial contributions, such men as these probably rarely--if ever--think along lines of protecting the regime space; still, it is interesting that the governing class contributes so heavily and exclusively to the Democratic and Republican parties.

Political scientists who do not accord to class a fundamental position in political analysis conceive of American politics to a considerable, if not to a virtually exclusive, degree as a series of battles among a variety of interest groups and an interrelated series of battles between the Democrats and the Republicans: the politics within the regime space. These battles are an important part of American politics. In the last chapter we dealt implicitly with "interest group politics", which is also one shorthand term for this entire part of politics, within the context of our discussion of the governing class there; now let us state that both major parties, and this especially true to the extent that they can be called national parties, are virtually controlled by members of the governing class.[29] While the two parties tend to attract different elements within the upper class, elements which have somewhat different intra-class interests, and while there are different ideological emphases between the parties (as well as within the parties), the public policy alternatives offered by both the Republicans and the Democrats are clearly within the issue range. Thus the cardinal and shared interest of the governing class is represented by both major parties. Under such conditions, the people choose between groups of regime representatives. Rather than a dichotomous and completely isolated existence, the politics within the regime space and the politics of the protection of the regime space interconnect, and class is significantly involved in both.

Though on the whole they are the most class-conscious people in the country,[30] members of the governing class do not encourage

the American people to think in class terms (and for obvious reasons). It is not surprising that references to class interests in campaign oratory are rare. Some political scientists have taken American politics to be largely what the politicians say it is. Once, however, such concepts as the policy change path, the issue range, and the regime space are introduced into political analysis and applied to existing data, class emerges as a factor of fundamental moment. It is the members of the governing class who on the whole have the highest degree of political information, the highest sense of political efficacy, the highest degree of access to the mass media (they own the major ones), the most status, and the greatest financial resources. It is lower-class members who on the whole have the lowest degree of political information, the lowest sense of political efficacy, the lowest degree of access to the mass media (they own none), the least status, and the smallest financial resources. Middle-class persons on the whole are somewhere between these two extremes.

Imagine a typical member of the governing class who has an individual discontent. Knowledgeable and sophisticated about "how who gets what", he will have little trouble seeing the relevance of politics and will quickly transform his individual discontent into an individual political want or preference. This initial transformation or conversion also will be facilitated by his high sense of political efficacy, developed at lease in part by socialization in a family that has enjoyed a very favorable value allocation. His high sense of political efficacy and his high status will facilitate the next conversion: from individual

political preference to demand. He will soon ascertain whether some of his friends and/or associates in the governing class, with whom he has ample opportunity for interaction in a number of governing-class settings, either already share or can be persuaded to share his individual political preference. This easy access to members of the governing class makes the creation of a demand more probable than otherwise would be the case. The greater the number of governing-class members who favor the public policy alternative and the more enthusiastic they are about it, the more likely it is to be advocated by some organized group or groups controlled by members of the governing class (e.g., the Committee for Economic Development). Some relevant public authorities become aware, in one manner or another, that a public policy change is desired by some men of uncommon financial resources. Some of these relevant public authorities, perhaps because of ideology and/or desire for campaign funds and/or other reasons, are eager to help in the transformation of the policy alternative from the demand stage to the eventual stage of policy change. Other relevant public authorities will probably--since solidarity within the governing class is rare on policy alternatives which become issues in American politics and since other groups may be adversely affected--publicly express opposition to the policy alternative, and an issue will be born (this, of course, is not the only way issues arise). Once a public policy alternative becomes an issue its eventual fate will be determined by characteristics of those who favor it and of those who oppose it, by governmental structure, and by events.

If the typical member of the governing class enjoys certain

advantages over his middle-class and lower-class counterparts in the promotion of public policy alternatives through the policy change path, he also is favored--and this is even more important--when the goal is to block a public policy alternative which one deems undesirable. It has already been pointed out that there is a built-in bias that makes change more difficult than blocking change. In addition, the following generalization can be made: the greater the opposition within the governing class to a public policy alternative, the less probable will be its conversion from the latent issue (demand) stage to the issue stage. The amount of governing-class opposition is always much greater to a public policy alternative that is outside of the issue range than to one within the issue range. It follows that successful movement through this crucial conversion point is more difficult and less probable for public policy alternatives that are not within the issue range than for those that are within it. In blocking a change as in promoting a change, our typical governing-class member will be ineffective unless he has some support from other members of the governing class; less support, however, usually is needed to block a change than to bring one about. If the public policy alternative lies outside the issue range, any governing-class member who opposes it will have no difficulty finding allies because governing-class members will unanimously oppose it.

It should be pointed out that the built-in bias against change sometimes works <u>against</u> this or that group of governing-class members when they desire a particular change or set of changes within the issue range. Failure to achieve these changes, however,

does not alter the fact that these people continue to enjoy the good things that go with being in the governing class; after all, they are part of this larger group which is the most favored by the status quo.

Now imagine a typical member of the American lower classes who has an individual discontent. Poorly informed, unsophisticated, and possessing a low sense of political efficacy, he may well not see (or want to see) the relevance of politics and therefore may not form an individual political preference. Should he form an individual political preference, his low sense of political efficacy and his low access to the mass media will militate against his involvement in the creation of a demand. If he favors a public policy alternative that has reached the demand (latent issue) stage--whether he was involved in the creation of the demand or, what is much more likely, he did not form a political preference until after learning of the demand--the typical lower-class person's low degree of political information, small financial resources, low status, etc., will make it very difficult for him to make much of a contribution to the policy alternative's continued movement--if there is any--through the remaining three major stages of the policy change path.

Some students of politics would acknowledge much of the basic argument of this chapter but point out that "there is strength in numbers" and that numerical strength is a characteristic which the governing class severely lacks and which the lower classes surely enjoy. There is no doubt that under certain conditions sheer numbers can be a very valuable asset in politics; such conditions,

with general and particular consciousnesses. These consciousnesses are properties of human beings, and human beings come into existence and live and engage in behavior in societies. While it often makes scientific sense to focus on the study of Americans or any particular group of individuals, it must be borne in mind that Americans or any other group of people are human beings. Thus it might prove highly relevant for the phenomena involved in issue-avoidance or the regime space and interconnected matters to which we have been led to set forth some more or less general considerations about man and society.

Footnotes to Chapter II

[1] G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), gives this quote on pp. 3-4; he cites his cource as E. Digby Baltzell, An American Business Aristocracy (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), p. 78, and Domhoff tells us that Baltzell is quoting from p. 59 of A. Davis, B. B. Gardner, and M. R. Gardner, Deep South: Social Anthropological Study of Caste and Class (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941).

[2] Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 229.

[3] See Domhoff, Who Rules America?, p. 1.

[4] Ibid., p. 5 (italics supplied).

[5] Ibid., p. 7-8.

[6] Ibid., p. 10.

[7] G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 106-07.

[8] See Robert J. Lampman, "The Share of Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth", in Maurice Zeitlin, ed., American Society, Inc. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 87-104.

[9] Calculated from figures presented by Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964).

[10] For some extreme examples see Philip Stern, How 381 Super-Rich Americans Managed Not to Pay a Cent in Taxes Last Year", in David Mermelstein (ed.), Economics: Mainstream Readings and Radical Critiques (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 347-353.

[11] Herman P. Miller, an economic statistician long associated with the U. S. Bureau of the Census, has questioned Kolko's figures for 1910-37 and argued that income inequality is less now than early in this century (pp. 49-53). Miller concedes, however, that "the share of income received by the lower income groups has not changed for twenty years" (p. 56). See the cited pages in Miller's Rich Man, Poor Man (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964).

[12] The discussion of the overestimation of Congress and the following four shortcomings profited much from and was heavily influenced by a reading of G. William Domhoff, "Where a Pluralist Goes Wrong", Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. 14 (1969), p. 35-57. This article appears in more extended form as chapter nine of Domhoff, The Higher Circles.

[13] David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 321.

[14] Domhoff, The Higher Circles, p. 349 and n. 66.

[15] Marian Irish and James Prothro, The Politics of American Democracy, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 337.

[16] Rose, The Power Structure, p. 459, n. 5.

[17] Who Rules America?, pp. 97-105.

[18] Ibid., p. 101.

[19] Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 13-26; the quote is at p. 26.

[20] Richard J. Barnet, "The National Security Managers and the National Interest", Politics and Society, Vol. 1 (February 1971), 257-268, quote at 261.

[21] Domhoff, "Where a Pluralist Goes Wrong", p. 46; this part of Domhoff's article relies heavily on Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966).

[22] "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory", World Politics, Vol. 16 (July 1964), 677-715. An important work that at least implicitly shows some foreign-domestic scene relations is Harry Magdoff's The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).

[23] "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis", Politics and Society, Vol. 1 (February 1971), 151-177.

[24] Ibid., 153.

[25] Ibid., 156.

[26] Poverty and Deprivation in the United States (Washington, D. C., 1962).

[27] (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965). In the order in which we have listed them, the findings are reported by Milbrath on the following pages, respectively: 53, 56, 56, 57, 64, 68, 77, 79, 80, 116, 120, 124.

[28] Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 3.

[29] See G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 85-96 for some data which support this claim.

[30] See Domhoff, The Higher Circles, chapter four.

CHAPTER III

CONSCIOUSNESS AND REGIME

Man in Society: Consciousness and the Human Condition

Society exists both as objective reality and as subjective reality. If society is conceived as a set composed of two subsets one of which exists as objective reality and the other of which exists as subjective reality, then the former subset as a totality may be referred to as the material component of society and the latter as the ideational component of society. Dominant within the material component is something which can be referred to by a variety of terms: basic status quo, social structure, social order, prevailing order, regime. Charles Reich defines "consciousness" as: ". . . a total configuration in any given individual, which makes up his whole perception of reality, his whole world view".[1] Consciousness in this sense is synonymous with such terms as "weltanschauung" and "definition of reality". Consciousness with a capital "C" will refer to any type of consciousness that is of considerable societal importance; in this we follow the practice of Reich. If a type of Consciousness is dominant or has hegemony within the ideational component of society, then it shall be referred to as the official or prevailing definition of reality, or as Consciousness, or as the culture. The use of the term "culture" here is thus similar to its use by Almond and Verba.[2] What terminology we or other writers may employ is less important than the fact of the binary ontological status of society. This fact means that there is a societal dialectic (unless, by some

chance, the vulgar Marxists are right).

All non-human animals (of which man is aware) live in biologically-fixed closed worlds: they are characterized by "world-closedness". Man, the higher mammal with a comparatively underdeveloped instinctual organization, is characterized by "world-openness".[3] Non-human animals have no choice but to confront their reality as it is. Man, on the other hand, is capable not only of perceiving the natural and social environments but also of envisioning alternative possibilities for the things of nature, for his society, and for himself. Emile Durkheim distinguished man from the rest of the animal kingdom thus: "Animals know only one world, the one which they perceive by experience, internal as well as external. Men alone have the faculty of conceiving the ideal, of adding something to the real".[4]

The individual homo-sapien becomes a human being as he or she interrelates with three environments: (1) a natural environment; (2) a humanly produced social order or regime; and (3) a humanly produced cultural environment or prevailing definition of reality. With social order comes a degree of world-closedness. Still man has some world-openness, and still he continues to produce himself in an ongoing dialectical process.

The continuing dialectical process is composed of externalization, objectivation, and internalization.[5] Externalization is what makes true the statement that society is a <u>human</u> product (a statement the impact of which tends to be overlooked by some sociologists). Objectivation makes true the assertion that society exists as an objective reality. Internalization makes true the

statement that mankind is a social product (a statement the impact of which tends to be overlooked by some psychologists).

Signification, the human generation of signs, is an extremely important subset within the set of all objectivation. All objectivations are at least modestly enduring indices of human subjectivity. Signs are originally and explicitly intended to serve as indices of subjective meanings. Mankind's supreme system of signs is language. The developments of language and of consciousness and of social interaction are interrelated; as Karl Marx put it: "Language is as old as consciousness . . .; for language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men".[6] Once consciousness and language have arisen they have the capacity to act back upon the process of social interaction--a phenomenon similar to that of man's ongoing externalization becoming objectified and acting back upon the producer.

Any social order or basic status quo or regime is "an ongoing human production".[7] That some people are unaware of this fact, as Jose Ortega y Gasset states that the "masses" are,[8] does not change the fact (this lack of consciousness, though, has political implications). While social orders have mechanisms of sanctions for social control, the bulk of social control is provided by the existence of institutions. Institutions control human conduct by channeling it in predefined directions. Since institutions do not arise instantaneously, they can be understood adequately and clearly only when the historical processes of which they are the products are understood.

Once institutions have historically arisen and been objectivated, compliance to them by newly arriving generations is encouraged by the existence of sanctions. Deviance from the established institutions (which provide predictability and stability for the social order) is, however, usually controlled without resort to blatant force:

> The more conduct is institutionalized, the more predictable and thus the more controlled it becomes. If socialization into the institutions has been effective, outright coercive measures can be applied economically and selectively. Most of the time, conduct will occur "spontaneously" within the institutionally set channels. The more, on the level of meaning, conduct is taken for granted, the more possible alternatives to the institutional "programs" will recede, and the more predictable and controlled conduct will be.[9]

Any radical deviance from an institutional structure is considered a desertion of reality--and certainly it is a desertion of the prevailing definition of reality--and is thus labelled as "unrealistic" or "ignorant" or even "insane".[10]

The prevailing definition of reality is the legitimation of the social order (including the major institutions within it). Any prevailing definition of reality is--as we have asserted of any social order--a historically-developed human creation.

Successful socialization means that there is congruence between the prevailing definition of reality or Consciousness and the basic status quo or social order: subjective reality and objective reality are extensively perceived as largely harmonious.

Any micro-sociological or socio-psychological analysis of socialization phenomena which endeavors to see the forest at all

as well as to see the trees the most clearly must always begin with a macro-sociological understanding because the process of socialization is always a process occurring within the framework of a particular regime or social order.[11] In other words, the ideational component of society is always being formulated in the context of the current material component of society. Thus American children are not taught that the President should be selected from a small aristocracy which rules and should rule by divine right; and neither are they taught "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs". Socialization, quite obviously, is not intended to make the individual consider a wide variety of possibilities for organizing human life; rather it is intended to make the individual approve--or at least accept--the possibility as it exists (the degree of diversity within "the" possibility will sometimes be of crucial importance both to the individual and to the social order).

Socialization is always less than perfect: some individuals (often very few) reject the prevailing definition of reality or large parts of it and fail--completely or substantially--to accord legitimacy to the social order.[12] If the unsuccessfully socialized do not offer any competing and threatening definitions of reality, and if the material component of society is going along reasonably well, then the prevailing definition of reality or Consciousness or the culture will continue in its supreme status without more than normal activity. When, however, crises do arise and competing definitions of reality or heresies threaten or seem to threaten, culture-maintenance activities increase substantially.

In a struggle between the official definition of reality and an alternative definition of reality, culture-maintenance activities can take several forms. One form is the incorporation or partial incorporation into the official definition of reality of a few ideas that are associated with but not central to the alternative definition of reality. Another form is the clarification of parts of the official definition--a clarification may involve an expansion of the official definition into matters on which it had been silent. In battling against the competing definition of reality, the prevailing definition of reality not only continues to legitimate itself but also modifies itself (e.g., the church councils in the late ancient and early medieval period and again in the Reformation period).[13]

There are, of course, culture-maintenance activities in quiescent times; some of these may be elevated or intensified in times of crisis. For example, Durkheim (and others) pointed out that the phenomena of ceremonies and rituals are means of upholding and reaffirming the prevailing definition of reality;[14] but in crisis periods--when the prevailing definition is being challenged by a small but vocal minority that may grow--the ceremonies and rituals seem to take on greater than usual meaning to those remaining faithful to the prevailing definition (American "hard-hats" probably take the before-the-game national anthem a little more seriously in 1971 than they did in 1962). The denunciation or "negative legitimation"[15] of alternative definitions of reality occurs in quiescent periods, but alternative definitions are more easily ignored then, and thus this form of culture-maintenance

does not receive full use and a more specified target until a crisis in legitimacy appears to be developing. During the efforts to negatively letitimate the competing definition of reality, the advocates of the competing definition will find that a number of adjectives are thought to apply to them and their Consciousness: "unenlightened", "uninformed", "stupid", "unrealistic", "silly", "immoral", "evil", "sinister", etc.

When two conflicting definitions of reality engage in struggle, the victory will not go to the side that is superior at rational debate but to the side that has the greater amount of and/or makes the more effective use of the relevant resources. Financial resources and communications resources are very important. Under certain conditions, military force--a form of culture-maintenance and of culture-displacement--will be importantly involved in the resolution of a definition-of-reality struggle.

Since the ideational component of society influences the material component of society and vice versa, an alternative definition of reality which has incipient popularity constitutes a threat both to the prevailing definition of reality and to the regime. Those with the most stake in the maintenance of the regime, i.e., the biggest beneficiaries of the basic status quo or the social order, have an obvious interest in defeating any challenging definition of reality. The social order and the prevailing definition of reality are legitimated by people "\. . . who have concrete social locations and concrete social interests".[16]

Some members of a society may learn about a very different

(from their own society's) definition of reality that prevails quite satisfactorily in another society. Awareness of an on-going alternative definition of reality is a threat because it clearly reveals that one's own definition of reality is not sanctified by inevitability.[17]

Consciousness is a property of human beings. Human beings live in societies. Human beings have a comparatively great capacity for world-openness. Human beings are shaped by the fact of their existence in society and by the specific social order or regime in which they develop.

Regime and Community

New regimes have displaced old regimes, and yet something that was there before the change continues on after the change. Regimes and social orders exist in conjunction with something that is different from and not dependent on any particular regime or social order. If a set of individuals is to live within a social order it is a prerequisite that armies of two or more subsets do not engage in war with one another. It is also a prerequisite that a Hobbesian "state-of-nature" mentality does not predominate within the set of individuals. In other words, any social order requires that a state of relative peace be generally prevalent within its boundaries. This state can be achieved by a "police state", but police states seldom long endure as basically police states. In the absence of a police state, in order to achieve the state of generally prevalent and relative peace that premises the continuation of a social order or regime there must be, in effect, a general agreement, which is

widely (though not necessarily universally) and ongoingly (though usually inertly) acquiesced in or approved of (for reasons however pragmatic, however noble or however selfish, however unthinking--it matters not), to settle conflicts within the set of individuals in a pacific manner.[18] Everyday will see, of course, many minor violations of the general agreement ("minor" from the macro-level perspective, of course, and not from the perspective of the victims). Now and then there may be a more significant violation, such as a riot. Such violations as these and the minor "routine" violations do not, however, disturb the fact that most of the individuals and most of the groups within the social order (irrespective of the rest of the content of the social order) settle most of their conflicts--and especially the more politically important ones--without resort to violence.

It might be thought that no such general agreement as we have described should be postulated; but rather that men resolve their disputes peaceably because they fear the consequences--such as imprisonment or loss of life--of employing violence. Most individuals and most groups in a regime really wish, it might be thought, that they could shoot and knife and slug to get what they want; and restrained by fear, they wish that the restraints were not there. There are two major flaws in this argument as a critique of what we have presented. First, the fact that some individuals or some groups sometimes wish that the restraints on violence did not apply to them does <u>not</u> mean that they wish for the restraints not to apply within the society as a whole; thus even if it should be true that most individuals are violence-prone, most of them

still approve of or at least acquiesce in restraints on others. Secondly, we are not concerned here with the motivation for or the ultimate cause behind approval of or acquiescence in the general agreement; if fear leads to acquiescence, then fear lends support to the general agreement.

The general agreement is part of the something which both antedates and postdates the displacement of one social order by another social order (the extent to which the general agreement thrived or waned during the transition period being a function of the extent to which violence was involved in the regime-displacement). The same set of interacting individuals which is involved in some way in the general agreement also has certain "common interests". These are concerns which are shared by all members of the set, i.e., in which everyone within the set has a stake, whether they are conscious of that stake or not, and which would be regardless of the particular social order. It may well occur in the course of an ongoing particular social order that some individuals decide that achievement of a specific common interest would cause them to sacrifice more of other values than they are willing to sacrifice. Nevertheless, the bulk of the individuals in the set still have at least an objective interest in the benefits to be achieved, and hence we may still consider this interest to be a common one.

Since men prefer life to death and freedom to slavery, and since from time immemorial on up to the present there has always been some chance that one society will militarily attack another, our set of individuals has a common interest in the reduction of the probability of military attack upon their set. A strong

defense and the promotion of peaceful relations with other peoples are means of serving this common interest. How, in fact, any common interest is served and how well it is served in relation to other interests are questions that can be answered only at the regime level.

Since men prefer life to death and health to illness and easy breathing to nasal congestion, our set of individuals has a common interest in unpolluted air. They have this interest even if everyone in the set has perfectly good air to breathe; but the interest is dormant. It "wakes up", so to speak, only when the air becomes polluted and people become conscious of what this means.

Some common interests arise from the fact that we are discussing a set of individuals which is involved in an instance of the general agreement. For example, if there is a set of individuals to which can be attributed a general agreement as it has been presented here, then it can be stated--without reference to the nature of the regime--that this set of individuals has a common interest in discouraging acts of murder.

A set of individuals together with their general agreement and their common interests comprise what we shall call a "community".[19] A community is the something which exists during the "old" social order, continues or declines or collapses during the transition period, and exists during the "new" social order.

The community is something quite different from, though related to, what we refer to as the regime or the basic status quo or the social order. A regime, in the course of its history,

can experience (from whatever source and by whatever means) two types of change: within-regime change and terminal-regime change. Once a terminal-regime change has occurred, that particular regime is no longer. But the community which existed in conjunction with this regime can continue through some more history in conjunction with this regime's replacement.

The community could be defined as some of the things we would know about a society if we knew only that it was a society.[20] We would know, of course, that there were some people (a set of individuals). We would know that the probabilities of internecine warfare and of the incidence of a Hobbesian "state of nature" mentality are reduced by what, in effect, is an elementary accord or an intra-society peace treaty which is widely acquiesced in or approved of for possibly quite various reasons (the general agreement). Since the human inhabitants of society have a few virtually universal preferences, we would know that the humans in our society shared a few collective concerns (common interests).

The construct of "community" thus separates out some basic societal things which are common to regimes but not dependent on one regime or type of regime. The community tells us these basic things, but it is silent about other basic things and about all the major and minor details. To know of a society only that it is a community leaves us in the dark about many things: we will <u>not</u> know of the society whether its governmental structure is basically federal or unitary, whether the fundamental value allocation leans toward equality or is highly inegalitarian, where the society would place on an aristocracy-democracy continuum,

whether homosexuality is encouraged or accepted or punished in the society, whether it is capitalist or socialist or neither, whether its national government has branches that have a formal and/or actual "intermingling of powers",[21] whether the family structure is nuclear or something else, etc. To have knowledge of the above-mentioned and other characteristics of a society at a given point in time, we must have knowledge of a society's regime or social order at that point in time.

Sometimes it is the case that one part of the regime will be a central or core part; i.e., all or some of the other major parts of the regime will be either largely determined or substantially influenced by the core part, and no major part will be antithetical to it (such thinking assumes, as we assume, that significant human behavior is largely systematic or "orderly" rather than "chancy"). The Catholic Church was the core part of "the European regime" in the twelfth century, and "the military-slavery complex" was the core part of the regime of Sparta. We consider the core part of the American regime to be what might be called the "socio-politico-economic capitalistic system", or, more simply, the capitalist system.

The United States (or any other society) is characterized by a regime, but the United States <u>is</u> a community. Suppose, for example, that in 1920 Eugene V. Debs had been elected President and candidates of the Socialist Party of America had been swept into office all over the country, and that in the course of time these men managed to achieve socialism, and that this achievement was overwhelmingly popular. Now, in such an

event, we would not want to say that the United States ceased to exist (which is what we would say if the South had won the Civil War); rather we would say that there had been a fundamental change in the United States and now the American regime was a basically different type from what we used to call the American regime, or that one regime had displaced another. The community-regime distinction applies, of course, both to other societies and to other regime-displacements whether capitalism or socialism are involved or not (such phenomena as the "palace revolution" are not, of course, regime-displacements).

Often the community-regime distinction is not made. Indeed, some political speakers intentionally engage in a community-regime equation. Some other people are simply unaware of, or confused about, the distinction. An interesting case in point involves the American Flag. Technically, the Flag of the United States symbolizes the American community; but to many--including those who burn it and those who salute it--Old Glory has come to symbolize the American regime.

It was during the American Civil War that the community was in great danger of permanent termination. Before the Civil War, American diplomatic correspondence contained the wording "the United States <u>are</u>". After the Civil War, the wording was always "the United States <u>is</u>".

The destruction of the community itself, such as in a civil war, is the one change which is outside the bounds of the "community space". In other words, the community, excepting the possibility of its destruction, is "wide-open" to change and alternative

possibilities for human life. The community can survive regime-displacements. The "regime space", on the other hand, is more confining: the regime survives only within-regime changes and regime-shifts and does not survive, quite obviously, a regime-displacement. Thus, if there is a regime from which a certain group of people receive greater benefits than any other group of people and they fear they would lose their happy position were it not for the regime, then that certain group has an interest in keeping all changes within the regime space.

Concluding Remarks

Consciousness arises and develops within the social process, but its existence enables man to act back upon the social process and change it.[22] Man is unique on this planet because he is life aware of itself. Other animals can be said to have no consciousness because they are completely determined by material being. In man, the ideational arises to prominence and interacts with the material. Man is comparatively world-open. That world-openness is always constricted by social order, but the degree of constriction can vary.

Although some references to specific times and places have been made, our concerns in this chapter have been mainly of a more or less general nature. In this chapter and in chapter II we have indicated the importance of some awareness of the relevant historical developments for understanding political and other kinds of human behavior at a later point in time. If a political scientist collects data only of the present time period and if he

does not view his topic historically, he might assume or report his findings as if he assumes that the limited scope of public policy alternatives for decision making is natural, of no particularly greater benefit to anyone, and of little importance or interest for political science; but the very existence of a limited and particular scope of politically feasible alternatives is a product of history and not of inevitability, and one which might well be to the fundamental advantage of some political actors. Our hypothetical political scientist has not examined the definition of the situation, and that definition is crucial and is produced through historical processes. In the next chapter we come down somewhat from the more general spatio-temporal level of this chapter and present some segments of twentieth-century American history.

Footnotes to Chapter III

[1] The Greening of America (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 13.

[2] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 12-13.

[3] Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), p. 47. The first section of our chapter III relies heavily on this work by Berger and Luckmann, to whom we acknowledge our indebtedness.

[4] The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 470.

[5] Berger and Luckmann, Construction, p. 61.

[6] The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 19.

[7] Berger and Luckmann, Construction, p. 52.

[8] The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1932), p. 59.

[9] Berger and Luckmann, Construction, p. 62.

[10] Ibid., p. 66.

[11] Ibid., p. 163.

[12] Ibid., p. 106.

[13] Ibid., p. 107.

[14] Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 477.

[15] Berger and Luckmann, Construction, p. 114.

[16] Ibid., p. 128.

[17] Ibid., p. 108.

[18] We recognize our indebtedness to such well-known social contract theorists as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, without necessarily accepting anything in their works but this central notion.

[19] We are using this term in a sense somewhat similar to its use by David Easton in the article from which we take it: "An

Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", World Politics, IX (April 1957), pp. 391-92. This is the same article from which we took the term "regime", which we use in a sense also but only somewhat similar to Easton's use; our version of the community-regime distinction has its origins in Easton's version of it.

[20] Provided, of course, that it was not at the time either in the midst of large-scale revolutionary violence or a police state.

[21] We learned this phrase, a more accurate one than "separation of powers", from a lecture by Professor Phillip Monypenny.

[22] See George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

CHAPTER IV

THE CONFINEMENT OF ALTERNATIVES IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN HISTORY

Introductory Remarks

This work is in part a product of and in part seeks to be a support for the idea of a unified social science. Within that general context, this work seeks in part to contribute to the restoration of the field of history as a prominent sister discipline to political science (both disciplines being parts of the family of disciplines that comprise the potential for a unified science of human behavior). This restoration does not require nor should (methodologically speaking) it be accompanied by the reverse of the mistake made by many contemporary political scientists; that is, a greater place for history in political analysis should not mean that the contributions of such disciplines as sociology and psychology and of such tools as statistics are ignored or pushed off to the side when they are centrally relevant. When a political scientist studies some psychology and makes use of it in political analysis, he does not thereby become a psychologist. Correspondingly, when a political scientist studies some history and makes use of it in political analysis, he does not thereby become a historian.

Much of this chapter consists of a presentation of segments of American history which we believe to be important to the study and understanding of the American public policy-making

process. Although other sources have been used, and although the present writer has supplied some of his own interpretation, the preparation of this chapter has relied heavily on four works: Gabriel Kolko's The Triumph of Conservatism,[1] James Weinstein's The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900-1918,[2] Samuel Eliot Morison's The Oxford History of the American People,[3] and Paul K. Conkin's FDR and the Origins of the Welfare State.[4]

Big Business and Leftist Discontent in the Progressive Era: The Growing Strength of the Socialist Alternative

Since the end of the nineteenth century, the American regime--while never seriously threatened to the extent that the American community was threatened with permanent termination during the Civil War--has faced incipient challenges and crises. The moderate-liberal wing of the governing class-power elite has favored federal economic intervention to arrest challenges and for other reasons which are also related to "political capitalism". The economic intervention and phenomena surrounding it restored political quiescence (significantly reduced anti-regime activity), bolstered up regime-legitimacy, made the basic status quo more secure than before, and provided other services for business. Some of those who benefitted the most from the regime promoted changes within the framework of the regime, i.e., policy changes within the issue range, and thereby strengthened the regime.

Kolko defines political capitalism as "the utilization of political outlets to attain conditions of stability, predictability, and security--to attain rationalization--in the economy".[5]

From all the public policy alternatives, i.e., from the set of all possible policies minus the status-quo subset, national political leaders in the Progressive Era chose alternatives that constituted the growth of political capitalism. These decisions represented a shift within the American regime but not its replacement by a new order. This regime-shift had salubrious effects for the regime. Some members of the American governing class--a class which as a national class was very young in the times of the Progressive Era--apparently believed in the old adage about "an ounce of prevention", and the regime-shift did not occur as the result of some "impersonal, mechanistic necessity but of the conscious needs and decisions of specific men and institutions".[6]

It is a standard implication of some campaign rhetoric as well as a belief of, and sometimes an unarticulated assumption of, some social scientists that American businessmen stand in opposition to federal economic regulation. Those who hold such a belief either equate owners of ice cream parlors and owners of modest-sized factories with steel magnates and Wall Street financiers and/or are unaware of both some relevant facts in the contemporary period and some relevant facts in our recent history. Kolko has summarized one of his major findings as follows: "The fact of American political life at the beginning of this century was that big business led the struggle for the federal regulation of the economy".[7] Big business did so for two major reasons: (1) to rectify the failure of mergers and other voluntary economic

methods to provide the desired economic rationalization; and (2) to channelize in a "safe" manner the discontents of Grangers, Populists, and trade unionists: discontents which some big businessmen feared might otherwise grow and expand into a mass political movement that would ". . . threaten the entire fabric of the status quo".[8]

Economic competition continued to grow in the latter years of the nineteenth century and in the beginning years of this century. This was true not only of American business in general but also of industries usually associated with "trusts": steel, oil, telephones, meat packing, etc. Mergers generally failed to live up to the promises of stability, higher profits, and industrial cooperation: ". . . the manufacturing sector of the economy after the period of numerous mergers in 1897-1901 was growing increasingly competitive. Private efforts to establish stability and control within the various manufacturing industries had largely failed".[9] With private efforts largely unsuccessful and with many state governments relatively unsympathetic to big business interests, some big businessmen realized that the federal government could provide the means of alleviating their problems. The industrial and financial world divided on the merits of such a role for the federal government in the economy. Support came from the larger railroads, the larger corporations, and the big banks that financed these larger enterprises. Opposition came from small and moderate-sized merchants and manufacturers. In short, big businessmen tended to favor selected federal intervention in the economy while small businessmen tended to oppose it.

Many of the big businessmen who supported federal intervention saw it not only as a means of economic rationalization but also as a means of arresting and reversing a growing threat from the political Left. George Perkins, who counted both J. P. Morgan and Theodore Roosevelt amongst his closest associates, told audiences of businessmen that unless the public policy alternative of federal regulation of business was adopted, ". . . the incoming tide may sweep the question along to either government ownership or socialism".[10] J. P. Morgan's lawyer, Francis Lynde Stetson, asserted that mass discontent was to be allayed not by a strategy of rigid toryism but by a strategy of flexibility.[11] It was a major idea of Brooks Adams, who had talks with Theodore Roosevelt, that governments which sternly opposed social reforms would in due time be overthrown by revolution.[12] Roosevelt himself feared an elite-mass split and saw reform as a means of preventing this split and avoiding radically egalitarian social change.[13] In short, many governing class-power elite types in the early part of this century believed that relatively minor adjustments in the status quo would promote the preservation of the basic status quo.

However funny in retrospect the thought of the United States becoming a socialist country may seem to some people now, in the early part of this century the possibility was not funny to those who had the most to lose by such an occurrence. To be sure, the capitalist-socialist struggle over which kind of a regime was to prevail in the United States never even remotely approached the magnitude of the community-level struggle which

was involved in the American Civil War. Yet some members of the governing class took the capitalist-socialist struggle seriously enough. They perceived socialism as a real threat to their continued well-being, and they took actions. These members of the governing class were seriously concerned about socialism for two reasons: the very nature of socialism itself, and some developments that were occurring in the times they lived in.

Socialism presented a vision of a radically alternative society. Socialist society would involve a re-allocation of values that would drastically reduce the very favorable value allocation which governing-class members enjoy, and indeed would eliminate the governing class as such. Here was a political philosophy fundamentally opposed to big business and to economic inequality period. If socialism had been a movement seeking a radical change in some one narrow policy area, or if it had been a movement seeking an array of modest reforms, indications of growing support for socialism would not greatly have disturbed members of the governing class. Given that socialism sought a radical change in public policy in general, it would not be a cause for alarm in governing-class circles as long as its advocacy was confined to a few and there were no signs that it might gain (threateningly) significant support. The fact is that some members of the governing class were greatly disturbed and alarmed.

There was good reason for disturbance and alarm: for while the dreaded enemy clearly was not an immediate threat to become the regime, it was alive and showing signs of increasing strength.

The Socialist Party of America became a formal organization in 1901, several months after having run its first presidential candidate in the last national election of the nineteenth century.[14] The vote for the Socialist presidential candidate in 1904, Eugene V. Debs, was quadruple the 1900 Socialist vote. Debs held his own in 1908, and in 1912 he enjoyed a half-million vote increase to over 900,000 votes--six percent of the total. During the 1912 campaign Harvard historian Albert Bushnell Hart wrote to the New York Times that "a large minority of the American people, which is likely soon to be a majority, feels dissatisfied and resentful and is bound to make things different. Unless that movement is checked, within sixteen years there will be a Socialist President of the United States".[15] The way to avoid such an unhappy occurrence, Hart argued, was to support the Progressive Party.

It was not only at the presidential level that Socialists were making gains. They elected their first Congressman, party member Victor Berger, in 1910. They soon did even better at the local level:

> In 1911 Socialists elected mayors in 73 municipalities throughout the United States, along with some 1,200 lesser officials in 340 cities and towns. Articles in popular magazines about "The Rising Tide of Socialism" became commonplace and party membership increased in spurts.[16]

In 1911 Socialist candidates for mayor narrowly lost in Cleveland and Los Angeles.[17] The preceeding year a Socialist had been elected Mayor of Milwaukee.[18]

It was not election results alone that worried the more

farsighted members of the governing class. An alternative definition of reality--socialism--was being widely discussed in the society, and few people were ready to condemn a person because he or she was sympathetic to socialistic policy alternatives. Indeed, even some city fathers--while hardly card-carrying Socialists--saw merit in some socialistic proposals. For example, in early 1913 a dozen or more city councils in large American cities gave their approval to the principle of government ownership of telephones. A.T. & T. was not pleased and "realized that its long-term objectives of political stability and economic rationality could be attained only by federal regulation, and its commitment to the cause was intensified".[19]

Another important cause for worry in governing-class circles was labor: would it choose the path of conservative trade-unionism or the path of socialist militancy? The American Federation of Labor sought a better deal for working people but a deal that was within the framework of the capitalist regime and the capitalist Consciousness. The most important figure in the AFL was Samuel Gompers. In 1911 several Socialists were elected to international office by Gompers' own Cigarmakers Union. Within the next two years Socialist labor leaders in Pennsylvania and Illinois won election to the presidencies of their respective state Federations of Labor.[20] In 1912 a syndicalist movement, the Industrial Workers of the World, led a massive strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts.[21] A radical labor movement tied to the Socialist Party could bring about the termination of the basic status quo:

> Not only were economic losses possible in an unregulated capitalism, but political destruction also appeared quite possible. There were disturbing gropings ever since the end of the Civil War: agrarian discontent, violence and strikes, a Populist movement, the rise of a Socialist Party that seemed, for a time, to have an unlimited growth potential. Above all, there was a labor movement seriously divided as to its proper course, and threatening to follow in the seemingly radical footsteps of European labor.[22]

Theodore Roosevelt understood that socialism was a much greater danger than earlier expressions of discontent and therefore warned that the increasing strength of the Socialist Party was "far more ominous than any populist movement in times past".[23] In accord with a prominent academic view of the times,[24] Louis Brandeis declared that Gompers-type trade unions were "a strong bulwark against the great wave of socialism".[25] Most big businessmen greatly preferred a co-opted AFL to a radical labor movement led by a Debs or a Haywood.[26]

In the early years of the twentieth century, a rather small--but larger than ever before or ever since and potentially much larger--number of Americans supported a set of public policy alternatives that was outside the regime space and the issue range: a socialist or even less precise set of leftist alternatives. Support for latent issues increased. Should these public policy alternatives be fully realized by successful movement through the policy change path (or by other means), no people are there who stand to lose so much of the things they value as the members of the governing class. Some of these members in the Progressive Era had a sense of what all this meant under the conditions of a country that more or less clearly could be classified as a formal

democracy and was likely to continue as such--perhaps become even more clearly such--well into the future. In this regard, let us be very explicit about one point: to state that something is a "formal democracy" is to state nothing one way or the other about whether it is a democracy. All the term "formal democracy" means is that the basic constitutional and legal structure provides the capacity for operation as a democracy. The actual operation is a separate question. We submit that the United States is a formal democracy. To be sure, there are a number of undemocratic features to the formal structure of American government, and these are sometimes important; but they do not gainsay the large formal capacity that the United States has for operation as a democracy. In the Progressive Era the undemocratic features were certainly greater, but for the purposes of the political struggle that concerned governing-class members as class actors, the United States was largely a formal democracy.

The most basic phenomenon of the Progressive Era--a period that greatly shaped the succeeding public policy-making process right on up to the present time--was not "trust-busting" or the "growth of democracy" but the protection of the regime space. Since socialism and general leftist discontent clearly never actually attained nationwide a position of co-equal rival with the forces of the regime, some governing-class members may have remained rather unconcerned, and certainly many others took a strictly hard-line and short-run view of protecting what in their judgement (though of course they did use such terminology) was a very narrow

regime space. But there was a not inconsiderable number of governing-class members who were not of a strictly hard-line view. There was a definite tendency--and perhaps fortunately so from the standpoint of the governing class--for these individuals to occupy high places in the larger and more important institutions involved in the world of big business. They knew that once something starts and grows it might well continue to grow. They knew also that anti-regime discontent was growing and that they lived in a formal democracy. Perhaps some of the discontented and potentially discontented should be given a little better shake. Moreover, it was certainly a strategic mistake to openly express, and perhaps even a moral fault to believe in, such a weltanschauung as indicated by the remark "the public be damned". The alternative definition of reality proposed by socialism was an enemy, and any other radical alternative definition was also out of the question; but a variant on the prevailing definition was something else again. If at the same time, the very important purposes of economic rationalization could be served, then a few changes were just what the country needed. Of course, no single member of the governing class dreamed all this up in one night; but we have already seen that there was governing-class thinking along these lines. Now let us look at some action as well.

The National Civic Federation Battles Socialism

The idea that social reforms could preserve the basic status quo by arresting and diminishing the socialist and other potentially dangerous threats--in short, the idea of corporate liberalism--

found its most prominent organizational expression in the National Civic Federation. Established in 1900, the National Civic Federation was a major governing-class response to the social discontents of the period. While officially organized into three divisions representing business, labor, and "the public", the National Civic Federation was always led and dominated by big businessmen (its first president was Marcus A. Hanna); and it "stood in opposition to what it considered its twin enemies: the socialists and radicals among workers and middle class reformers, and the 'anarchists' among the businessmen (as it characterized the NAM)".[27] The big businessmen who were active in the National Civic Federation "had transcended a narrow interest-consciousness and were emerging as fully class conscious".[28] The NCF leaders assumed the indisputable goodness of the capitalist regime. Accordingly, they also assumed that "legitimate" political problems were technical problems that could best be solved by private, informal meetings among businessmen and other experts. While not conceiving of the issue range in the very narrow terms that the NAM leaders did, the NCF leaders sought to restrict the political arena to "safe" public policy alternatives by keeping "unsafe" demands at the latent issue stage to the extent that that was possible. This was the overriding goal of the National Civic Federation.

The goal was achieved by two major means: by extending the hand of friendship to conservative labor and by pounding the fist of hostility at socialism. Eugene Debs told workingmen that they

had no friends among businessmen and that the National Civic Federation was out to guide labor discontent into innocuous issues.[29] But some other labor leaders were willing to co-operate with the National Civic Federation. Samuel Gompers and John Mitchell (United Mine Workers), for examples, held offices in the NCF. (The public, it is interesting to note, was represented by such people as Grover Cleveland and William Howard Taft.) Mitchell called the National Civic Federation a "peace movement" and said he was happy to be involved in it.[30] The big businessmen of the NCF were happy to have labor leaders who were willing to work with them in attempting to stabilize the capital-labor relationship without threatening--indeed, promoting--the long-range interest of the governing class.

While happy about the availability of the alternative of conservative labor, the governing-class activists in the NCF (and elsewhere) were not happy that workers and other discontented souls had the availability of the alternative of socialism. To make the dreaded enemy illegal was not the objective, to make it illegitimate in the consciousness of the American people was. To be sure, the NCF-type businessmen considered the NAM-type businessmen to be enemies of a sort, too; but the threat from the Left was far more to be feared than the threat from the Right. Moreover, the NAM was opposed in part because of the fear that achievement of its objectives might further the growth of what Mark Hanna called the "menace of today . . . the spread of a spirit of Socialism";[31] socialism was opposed for what it was.

Therefore socialism was governing-class enemy number one, and the National Civic Federation was a major instrument in combatting it.

The NCF activity against socialism took a variety of forms. The Catholic Church through an organization known as the Militia of Christ launched an attack against socialism in the trade union movement. Common Cause, a magazine published by militantly anti-socialist Catholics and "devoted to the destruction of Socialist influence among workers", first went to press in 1912.[32] Ralph Easley, founder of the National Civic Federation, helped arrange for a joint conference between representatives of Common Cause and representatives of the Industrial Economics Department of the National Civic Federation. The main result was a special $50,000 fund for the Industrial Economics Department to help it combat "the menace of Socialism to our institutions".[33] Through its Industrial Economics Department the NCF sought to woo those people who had a vague sympathy for socialist programs--but were essentially uncommitted--to a belief in the benefits and basic goodness of the Corporate State.

Those with a more solid commitment to socialism were not wooed but walloped. For example, Scott Nearing, a Socialist and an economics instructor at the University of Pennsylvania, was fired at the urging of Easley. F. G. R. Gordon, one of Easley's close associates, launched a campaign against Metropolitan Magazine because of its socialist editorial policy. These and other examples of the "hard" line were unofficial and as private as possible; the "soft" line was official and public.

Part of the soft approach was a public education program. Newspapers, especially non-dailies geared to specific but sizeable audiences--religious groups, labor groups, education groups, etc.--were provided with articles that attacked socialsim and defended the Corporate State. Well-prepared speakers were furnished to a wide variety of organizations. Encouragement was given to "the preparation, publication, and circulation of attractive popular books" that discussed the advantages of capitalism vis-a-vis socialism.[34]

The NCF leaders were also concerned with education in the public school system. Senator Wadsworth told the 16th Annual Meeting of the National Civic Federation that the purpose of compulsory education was "to protect the nation against destruction from forces operating within. It is to train the boy and the girl to be good citizens, to protect against ignorance and dissipation". The internal danger, according to Wadsworth, was that "these people of ours shall be divided into classes".[35]

A central idea in the National Civic Federation's view of education and a frequent motif or implication in NCF-sponsored books, speeches, and articles involved the equation of the American regime and the American community; private enterprise was American, socialism meant the downfall of the country, capitalism was patriotic, socialism was un-American and unpatriotic, etc. Governor Brumbaugh told Easley that the American educational system should produce "an educated citizenry, trained in the real American doctrines and holding substantially the same

fundamental ideals of government organization for the protection of our industries and of our working people".[36] When Senator Wadsworth said that the "nation" had to be protected "against destruction from forces operating within", what he meant was that internal forces threatened the regime (and not the community). The fourth president of the National Civic Federation, V. Everitt Macy, declared that American youth should be provided with assistance that would facilitate the implantation of ". . . the sense of responsibility and partnership in the business of maintaining and perfecting the splendid social, industrial, and commercial structure which has been reared under the American flag".[37] Other governing-class members and political leaders (including Presidents of the United States), both in and out of the NCF, also made the community-regime equation. Indeed, Theodore Roosevelt went so far as to equate the regime with civilization itself.[38]

The community-regime equation with special reference to socialism had been developed before American entry into the First World War,[39] and Socialist opposition to that entry was then used to further denounce the Socialist Party as unpatriotic. Just a few months before American entry, John Hays Hammond addressed the 17th Annual Meeting of the National Civic Federation and enunciated a common theme. The activities of pacifists and Socialists, Hammond asserted, were much more serious threats than the activities of enemy spies. Patriotic spirit was being undermined, according to Hammond, by Socialists and other assorted radicals who busied themselves by "viciously denouncing all

proposals to prepare our nation for defending itself against threatened attacks from without or within".[40] It was in the spirit of this NCF address that some Socialists, including Eugene Debs, were soon to be jailed (Bertrand Russell and others were imprisoned in Great Britain in a similar spirit).

The National Civic Federation's battle against socialism was both a failure and a success. The NCF failed in that it did not quickly destroy the socialist movement, in that some Socialist candidates achieved minor electoral successes, and in that socialism continued for a time to be publicly debated and defined as an alternative that had some appeal beyond any tiny, odd-ball sect. The NCF succeeded in that no uniquely socialist proposal was ever in any danger of Congressional enactment or even under Presidential consideration, and in that in the long view the NCF must be credited with playing a significant role in the prevention of the possible development of a widespread and solid socialist consciousness among Americans. Weinstein discusses the significance of the NCF activity in the Progressive Era:

> The approach to organized labor and to social reform developed by Federation leaders over the years did set very definite limits on the potential of revolutionary politics as long as the economy could continue to expand. The extent to which the Federation had succeeded in educating businessmen to the need for longterm responsibility and to an understanding of the value of co-optation of potential revolutionaries among workers, farmers, and in the middle classes was first clearly demonstrated in the wartime policies of the Wilson Administration. After a period of stabilization and consolidation in the 1920's, the full impact of Federation teaching became apparent especially the character of the dominant socialist groups, that further limited the possibilities for the building of a socialist-conscious popular movement

> in the 1930's; but as in the 1910's, the sophistication and ability of those in power to move to the left in the face of real, imminent, or anticipated threats from the radicals circumscribed the space within which revolutionaries could act. In its confrontation of the problem of socialism, the Federation had helped develop a basic aspect of politics in the United States in the twentieth century.[41]

Consciousness I, Consciousness II, and the Importance of the Progressive Era for the New Deal

The National Civic Federation was in part one result of, and in part one contributor to, the development of an alternative consciousness to socialism that was different from the earlier American consciousness, Consciousness I, and yet fundamentally compatible with it. This new consciousness was the ideal of corporate liberalism or Consciousness II. Consciousness II first emerged as a strong force in the United States during the Progressive Era. Consciousness II was an alternative not only to the ideal of socialism but also differed from Consciousness I, which was the ideal of laissez faire, the Protestant ethic, Social Darwinism, and rugged individualism, and which was dominant during the preceeding century. While Consciousness II has been the leading consciousness during the first seven-tenths of the twentieth century taken as a whole, Consciousness I has not disappeared from the scene but has continued--now stronger, now weaker--to be a potent form of American consciousness. Consciousness I still believes in the American dream because it still believes passionately in the thesis of personal responsibility: degree of individual success is dependent on degree of ability, degree of character, degree of hard-work, degree of self-denial, and degree

of morality. Consciousness I does not accept the view that organizations are now of paramount importance in the United States. Consciousness I views social problems as the results of bad character, and it sees morality and individual initiative as the ways to alleviate social problems and only in certain areas does it desire more than a very limited role for government. "It believes that the present American crisis requires reducing government programs and expenditures, greater reliance on private business, forcing people now on welfare to go to work, taking stern measures to put down subversion at home and threats from abroad, and, above all, a general moral reawakening in the people".[42] Throughout much of its history Consciousness I was favorable to a strong isolationist bent in foreign affairs, but this became less true as the United States became a greater and greater world power.

However great the visceral appeal of Consciousness I for the highly successful, many governing-class leaders in the Progressive Era (and since) recognized the desirability of an ideology that would have very broad appeal and that would quiet the thunder from the Left without fundamentally changing the regime which permitted them such a favorable value allocation. Consciousness II was to a large extent the product of leaders of what can be called the moderate-liberal wing of the governing class: ". . . the ideal of the liberal corporate social order was formulated and developed under the aegis and supervision of those who then, as now, enjoyed ideological and political hegemony

in the United States: the more sophisticated leaders of America's largest corporations and financial institutions".[43] Any regime, and especially one laden with democratic forms, ultimately rests on a Consciousness which accords it legitimacy. In the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, many Americans outside of the business community--Populists, Grangers, laborers, middle-class reformers, and others--no longer paid homage (at least not whole-heartedly) to Consciousness I, and some of them had converted to the anti-regime consciousness of socialism and many more seemed to be potential converts to such a consciousness. While NAM-type businessmen held on rigidly to Consciousness I, many governing-class leaders, some of them associated with the National Civic Federation, recognized both that what was needed was a new pro-regime consciousness and that co-optation could be helpful in keeping successful public policy alternatives--i.e., those which emerge from the decision-making arena as policy changes--within the issue range:

> In a formal democracy, success lay in evolving a social vision that could be shared by most articulate people outside the business community. Corporate liberalism evolved such a vision. More than that, it appealed to leaders of different social groupings and classes by granting them status and influence as spokesmen for their constituents on the condition only that they defend the framework of the existing social order.[44]

Consciousness II was and is the ideational partner of the corporate liberal variant of the American regime.

The quintessence of Consciousness II can be captured by summarizing its stance towards the three R's of politics: Consciousness II always really rejects revolution, usually rhetorically

and sometimes really relishes in reform. Consciousness II believes in a flexible approach to social problems and asserts the desirability of reforms over a rigid adherence to the status quo; but it maintains that such reforms must be within the issue range, i.e., that "good" reforms are within the framework of what NCF President Macy called "the industrial and commercial structure which is the indispensable shelter of us all".[45] Today Consciousness II "believes that the present American crisis can be solved by greater commitment of individuals to the public interest, more social responsibility by private business, and, above all, by more affirmative government action--regulation, planning, more of a welfare state, better and more rational administration and management".[46] Consciousness II recognizes the important place of organizations in twentieth-century American life and dutifully accepts the "proper channels" and procedures that are associated with organizations. It believes that the corporate social order makes for a more rational, orderly, and happy life for all (or at least most). Consciousness II is generally internationalist in its outlook on foreign policy.

Some examples of Consciousness II in things American are the following: the National Civic Federation, Franklin Roosevelt, the editorial page of the New York Times, the Democratic Party (more or less), a majority of social scientists, John Kenneth Galbraith, the AFL-CIO, the National Planning Association, and Hubert Humphrey. The following are representative of Consciousness I: the National Association of Manufacturers, the editorial page

of the Chicago Tribune, the Republican Party (more or less), AMA-type doctors, William Buckley, small businessmen, the Farm Bureau, and Barry Goldwater. Consciousnesses I and II are not, of course, individuals or organizations but types of consciousness. While there are some Americans who are "pure" representatives of one type or the other, in a majority of Americans both types are found. In some Americans Consciousness I is dominant, but there is room for aspects of Consciousness II. In other Americans Consciousness II is dominant, but there is room for aspects of Consciousness I. In still other Americans the two types are scrambled in roughly equal portions.

The principal difference between the two types of consciousness is that Consciousness II "is adjusted to the realities of a larger scale of organization, economic planning, and a greater degree of political administration".[47] The two types are compatible to a large extent. Consciousness II is not opposed to hard-work, morality, or inequality; and Consciousness I favors rationality and opposes revolution. While Consciousness I may in general favor a reduction in governmental activity and while Consciousness II may in general favor an increase in governmental activity, both favor a continuation of the American regime or the American basic status quo: a hierarchical society with a capitalist order as its base.

Consciousness II, or the "new" liberalism (vis-a-vis the "old" liberalism of the nineteenth century), was and is pro-big business. Yet many have believed, and corporation leaders and their academic allies have encouraged the belief that the new liberalism or

the New Deal--actions which expressed Consciousness II--stands along with characteristics of the left-wing groups in the 1930's (which are of no particular concern here) as the crucial factors in understanding the weakness of anti-regime consciousness in the New Deal period, mention should be made of the repressive actions carried out after the First World War and which are known as the "Red Scare". These actions, which were supervised by A. Mitchell Palmer (Wilson's Attorney General), were so repressive that even Admiral Morison called them "sad doings on the domestic front".[49] The Red Scare and the development of Consciousness II are examples of different forms of issue-avoidance.

Three Reform Leaders

Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt--all political leaders infused with Consciousness II and strong doses of Consciousness I--had differing personalities and differing political styles, but they portray an essential unity on the central concerns of twentiety-century American politics. In his first Annual Message to Congress, Theodore Roosevelt defended big business.[50] In his second Annual Message to Congress, he did the same.[51] Roosevelt saw social reform as a means of preventing the radical social change which he hated and feared. Roosevelt "usually discussed the corporation in the context of an attack on 'sinister demagogs and foolish visionaries' who 'seek to excite a violent class hatred against all men of wealth'".[52] However sinister he thought radicals were, Roosevelt "never questioned the ultimate good intentions and social value of the vast majority of

businessmen, nor did he ever attack an obvious abuse in business or take a stand on regulation without discreetly couching his terms with luxuriant praise for the basic economic status quo and the integrity of businessmen".[53] While some historians have made much of the feud between Roosevelt and Mark Hanna, there were never fundamental differences in ideology between the two men. Both Roosevelt and Hanna took the goodness of the basic status quo for granted and both believed in similar approaches to preserve the basic status quo.

Woodrow Wilson shared the basic views of Roosevelt and Hanna. America's welfare (America as community or regime?), Wilson maintained, was dependent on business: "Business underlies everything in our national life, including our spiritual life".[54] The most the nation needed to cure its ills, Wilson asserted, was a minor operation and when that is over "business can get and will get what it can get in no other way--rest, recuperation, and successful adjustment".[55]

Franklin Roosevelt dominated the New Deal to an extent that no single political leader dominated the Progressive Era. He greatly admired Theodore Roosevelt, his distant cousin, and he responded to the political crisis engendered by the Great Depression in much the same way that the earlier Roosevelt almost certainly would have had he been elected to the Presidency in 1932. The great political goal and the great political achievement of Franklin Roosevelt, who owed his presidential nomination more to such multi-millionaires as Joseph P. Kennedy and William Randolph Hearst than to "the people",[56] were the saving and the strengthening

of the American regime. Fittingly for an NCF member, Roosevelt's views on public policies to meet the crisis were patterned after Consciousness II or the ideal of corporate liberalism, which "was the product, consciously created, of the leaders of the giant corporations and financial institutions that emerged astride American society in the last years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth".[57] To Roosevelt's way of thinking, "new (anti-regime) political ideologies surely reflected evil instead of possible alternatives".[58] One could say of Franklin Roosevelt, of Woodrow Wilson, and of Theodore Roosevelt what Elihu Root said of the last-mentioned: they were great "conservative force(s) for the protection of property and our institutions . . .".[59]

The Legislation of Reform

Among the major legislative achievements of the two reform periods that are temporally located between the Spanish-American War and the Second World War are the workmen's compensation laws, the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Social Security Act, and the Wagner Act. After presenting the complicated story of the movement for workmen's compensation laws in the states, Weinstein concludes:

> Despite Socialist and labor criticism, the movement was clearly a success. In 1911 (after the Ives decision invalidated the New York law), no state had an effective compensation law, yet by 1920 every state but six in the South had one, and the federal government had amended the Act of 1908 to include all civil employees. This sweeping achievement was made possible by the concerted activity of the National

> Civic Federation, with the strong support of its big business affiliates. It represented a growing maturity and sophistication on the part of many large corporation leaders who had come to understand, as Theodore Roosevelt often told them, that social reform was truly conservative.60

Banking reform came with the Federal Reserve Act of 1914. Alarmed over tendencies "toward instability and decentralization" in the world of finance, large bankers strongly favored the Act; and they were its principal beneficiaries: ". . . the major function, inspiration, and direction of the measure was to serve the banking community in general, and large bankers specifically".[61]

Aware of the protection afforded the railroads by the Interstate Commerce Commission, big businessmen favored the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. The FTC was dominated by big business from the very start; and Woodrow Wilson shared the view of NCF leaders that the FTC was "a friend of business" and "helpful to the corporations in every way".[62]

The Agricultural Adjustment Act and related measures were supported, not by farm workers, but by the large farm organizations. Conkin summarizes the effects of the administration of these statutes by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration:

> The A.A.A. brought benefits to almost all commercial farmers. But in limiting acreage and providing the strongest possible incentive for more efficient land use, and thus for better technology, it forced sharecroppers off the land and worsened the plight of farm laborers. It also by-passed harassed farmers in several minor crops and, basing payments on production instead of need, inevitably aided most generously the already large and prospering farmers.63

However strong the humanitarian impulses of the governing class and of the United States Congress (and there is no doubt that humanitarian impulses do reside in some members of both),

the growing popularity of the Townsend Plan and of Huey Long's "Share Our Wealth" program certainly contributed to the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935. While it is true that many businessmen opposed social security (some businessmen almost always oppose any legislative proposal), it is also true "that the Business Advisory Council, made up of men from very large businesses all over the country, strongly endorsed the social security program . . .".[64] It is also true that the Rockefeller Foundation went to considerable effort to stir up support (especially among businessmen) for social security.[65] To be sure, there were differences within the governing class on the merits of social security, but the moderate-liberal or Consciousness-II wing of the governing class won out--though not until some concessions were made to some Consciousness-I-types in Congress.[66] The direct benefits of the Social Security Act (and of the many changes in it since 1935) go to the category of people who are by and large the category of people who endure the costs: the masses pay for what they get. The less immediately obvious benefits of Social Security go to the governing class: a reduction of individual discontents means greater political quiescence; greater political quiescence means a more secure regime; and that means more security for those who benefit the most from the continuation of the regime. For their benefits, governing-class members pay at most very little. That the Social Security program does reduce individual discontents is one of the classic examples of what Murray Edelman calls "the symbolic uses of politics"--a fact which Edelman points out.[67]

The Wagner Act of 1935 brought organized labor more securely

into the confines of the Corporate State and made the co-operative leaders of the big unions virtual--albeit junior--partners in the power elite. As with Social Security, the leaders of the governing class power elite differed on how to deal with organized labor. Again as with Social Security, conditions in the 1930's aided the Consciousness-II form of elite response. Domhoff has summarized very well the chief points relating to the Wagner Act:

> All in all, organized labor, through the Wagner Act, did make some gains, particularly in its right to recognition, collective bargaining, and a voice in working conditions. The upper class, then, is not omnipotent; nor do all members appreciate what their far sighted leaders have done for them in channelling serious discontent into a moderate course. However, even after acknowledging that labor showed considerable strength in forcing acceptance of the Wagner Act, the fact remains that the story of how labor acquired its rights is a very different one from what is generally believed. A powerful mass of organized workers did not overwhelm a united power elite position. Rather, moderate members of the power elite, faced with a very serious Depression, massive unemployment, declining wages, growing unrest, and spontaneous union organizing, and after much planning and discussion, chose a path that had been traced out gradually over a period of thirty-five years by the National Civic Federation, the Commission on Industrial Relations, and other pro-union forces within the power elite. By making certain concessions and institutionalizing their conflict with labor, <u>they avoided the possibility of serious political opposition</u> to the structure of the corporate system.68

It can be asked of the Wagner Act and of all the social reform legislation of the New Deal and of all the social reform legislation of the Progressive Era: Did these statutes adversely affect the very favorable value allocation enjoyed by the members of the upper or governing class? The answer is certainly in the negative. This answer, which is as empirically based as any set of election statistics, is tantamount to Kolko's observation:

relation to the governing class. These comments are based upon but not limited to the historical materials presented in this chapter.

A class which enjoys a very favorable value allocation will (through the actions of its individual members, of course) seek to preserve the basic status quo. The American governing class enjoys a very favorable value allocation. Therefore, the American governing class seeks to preserve the basic status quo. Indeed, the basic goal or the common interest of the governing class is the preservation of the basic status quo or the regime. This goal is served by the promotion and reinforcement of political quiescence among the non-elitist elements which could improve their value allocation by a fundamental change in the regime or basic status quo. This basic goal is also served by the promotion and reinforcement of regime-loyalty among the materially well-off non-elitist elements.

Whenever objective conditions furnish the grounds--and this is always the case when the clearly most highly-valued rewards of the society are also clearly inegalitarianly distributed--for objective interests in a substantial re-allocation of values, the frequency and extent of mass political activity that seeks to serve such objective interests can be reduced by the prevention of the transformation or conversion of the objective interests into subjective interests, which prevention normally can be largely achieved by the inculcation and cultivation of a political culture that:

(1) maintains that the basic status quo is a natural

and good order; in other words, believes that the way things basically are is the way things basically should be; or, in still other words, accords legitimacy to the regime;

(2) maintains that all or most of the imperfections in the society are due to something other than the fundamental socio-economic structure of the society; the "something other" is usually either one of or some combination of three conditions that are thought to be present in the society: (a) lazy and/or immoral individuals (hard-working, decent people are successful and happy); (b) limitations on the human spirit (man is by nature an imperfect and imperfectible being and there is always bound to be some injustices); (c) the current lack of knowledge sufficient to solve some problems (an academic favorite);

(3) asserts the thesis of personal responsibility;

(4) believes that public policy is determined through democratic means;

(5) believes that some central national public authority, e.g., the President of the United States, is the "voice of the people", i.e., somehow represents all of the people;

(6) equates the regime with the community;

(7) believes that every group is accorded a place in the sun;

(8) believes that politics is a series of battles involving the major political parties and freely competing interest

groups (or de-emphasizes, or ignores, or denies the possibility of class politics).

This list of components of a type of political culture is not meant to be exhaustive; neither is it mutually exclusive: some of the components overlap with others. This list of components does, however, briefly point to some of the major elements of American political culture as it has existed at most times during the twentieth century. The list reflects that broad mixture of outlooks which reflects Consciousness I and Consciousness II and which constitutes the American political culture. Consciousnesses I and II are, of course, compatible to a considerable extent, and they are mixed together--though not always perfectly smoothly--in the American political culture. There are differences in emphases. For example, in regards to component (2) above, Consciousness I would stress (a) as a factor in accounting for societal imperfections, while Consciousness II would stress (b) and (c).

The American political culture is basically a "quiescence-promotive" political culture. Adherence to it does not lead one to dissatisfaction with the basic status quo and does not stir one with a vision of an alternative society (these points are, to make an understatement, hardly peculiar to <u>American</u> political culture). The American political culture does help to prevent the conversion of some objective interests into subjective political preferences and does have a pro-regime impact on the policy change path. The American political culture--while certainly not the only contributor--is a very important contributor to political quiescence.

Since the American political culture is basically quiescence-promotive, an increased likelihood of future mass political activity geared to a substantial re-allocation of values (an increased likelihood such as would be indicated, for example, by growing support for public policy alternatives outside of the issue range or by a decline in the legitimacy of regime norms) can be seen--as it is seen by the more farsighted members of the governing class--as the beginnings of a breakdown in the political culture or some major components of it. Such a threatened breakdown will be cause for serious concern in governing-class circles because of three related considerations: (1) the continued achievement of the basic goal of the governing class depends upon the political failure of those who advocate a policy change or policy changes that would mean a substantial re-allocation of values; (2) only a state of political quiescence can guarantee the political failure of these change-seekers and their potential followers; and (3) the political culture is crucial to the maintenance of political quiescence. Thus a decline in support for the political culture--even a rather small decline--is correctly perceived by at least the more sophisticated members of the governing class as a threat to their class interest. The perception is correct because if the incipient breakdown in the political culture is not checked but continues to grow, the result could be public policy outcomes that are very unfavorable to the governing class.

That the American political culture permits of variation gives it broad appeal and makes for more easily successful mainten-

ance. Its variation, however, is within limits, and anyone who challenges the prevailing definition is not likely to be greeted warmly by those who adhere to it. As Edelman has written:

> The rebel who assures liberals that the reform legislation which gives them their reason for being liberals is a sham can expect severe resistance and not gratitude, and he can anticipate the same reaction from conservatives, whose world he just as fundamentally undermines. It is the conventional responses to such words as "liberal", "conservative", "regulation", and "law" that constitute the prevailing political sign structure, providing an order that permits groups to act, to anticipate the responses of others, and to acquire status. To suggest that the signs around which all this group interplay revolves are misleading is to threaten chaos and to arouse opposition. In the existing order the elite can gain both the material and the symbolic rewards of politics through defense of the prevailing sign structure, while other groups are unable to achieve both forms of benefit through any single course of action.[74]

Perhaps Edelman best states some of what we have been trying to convey about the confinement of alternatives.

Our survey of parts of American history has given us some very interesting examples. Political science as a science, however, must strive for much more than examples.

Footnotes to Chapter IV

[1] (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); the subtitle is A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916.

[2] (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

[3] (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

[4] (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967).

[5] Kolko, Triumph, p. 3.

[6] Ibid., p. 2.

[7] Ibid., pp. 57-58.

[8] Ibid., p. 58.

[9] Ibid., p. 54.

[10] Ibid., pp. 173-174.

[11] Ibid., p. 164.

[12] Morison, Oxford History, p. 813.

[13] Kolko, Triumph, p. 76; see also Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 61.

[14] Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 5.

[15] Ibid., p. 169-170.

[16] Ibid., p. 120.

[17] Morison, Oxford History, p. 814.

[18] Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 120.

[19] Kolko, Triumph, p. 180.

[20] Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 121.

[21] Morison, Oxford History, p. 840.

[22] Kolko, Triumph, p. 285.

[23] Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 17.

[24] Kolko, Triumph, pp. 214-215.

[25] Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 17.

[26] Kolko, Triumph, p. 164.

[27] Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 6.

[28] Ibid., p. 10 (italics supplied).

[29] Ibid., pp. 21-22.

[30] Ibid., p. 9.

[31] Kolko, Triumph, p. 66.

[32] Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 123.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., pp. 128-129.

[35] Ibid., p. 134.

[36] Ibid. (italics supplied).

[37] Ibid., p. 135.

[38] Kolko, Triumph, p. 69.

[39] We are not implying, of course, that the community-regime equation first existed in the Progressive Era; two things were different about it in the Progressive Era: (1) its greater prominence and (2) the special place of socialism as the major enemy.

[40] Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 136.

[41] Ibid., pp. 137-138 (italics supplied).

[42] Charles Riech, The Greening of America (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), pp. 24-25, quote at p. 25. The terms "Consciousness I" and "Consciousness II" are Reich's.

[43] Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. ix.

[44] Ibid., p. xiv.

[45] Ibid., p. 135 (italics supplied).

[46] Reich, Greening, p. 70.

[47] Ibid., p. 382.

[48] Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. xi.

[49] Morison, Oxford History, p. 883.

[50] Kolko, Triumph, pp. 66-67.

[51] Ibid., p. 69.

[52] Ibid., p. 127.

[53] Ibid., p. 111.

[54] Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 162.

[55] Kolko, Triumph, p. 266.

[56] Morison, Oxford History, p. 948.

[57] Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. xv.

[58] Conkin, FDR and Welfare State, p. 11.

[59] Kolko, Triumph, p. 73.

[60] Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 61.

[61] Kolko, Triumph, pp. 220, 222.

[62] Ibid., pp. 271, 277; and Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 91.

[63] Conkin, FDR and Welfare State, p. 42.

[64] Domhoff, The Higher Circles (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 213.

[65] Ibid., p. 215.

[66] Ibid., p. 216.

[67] Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 42.

[68] Domhoff, Higher Circles, p. 249 (italics supplied).

[69] Kolko, Triumph, p. 302.

[70] Ibid., p. 280.

[71] Ibid., p. 284.

[72] Ibid., p. 302.

[73] Conkin, FDR and Welfare State, p. 23.

[74] Edelman, Symbolic Uses, p. 127.

CHAPTER V

A MODEL OF AMERICAN NATIONAL POLITICS: BACKGROUND, PRESENTATION, AND SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS

Political Science and Science

The scientific spirit has been popular in the social sciences for some time now (it blossomed much earlier in some fields than in others). Within the discipline of political science--where it was strenuously and fairly widely resisted--the scientific perspective now commands a clear majority. The scientific perspective within the discipline of political science probably would begin to approach almost universal acceptance--in practice if not in explicit subscription--but for three not-very-large groups in the discipline: (1) those (once more common) who view its major concern as the study of the history of political ideas; (2) those (once dominant) who view its foremost endeavor as the study of the legalities and formalities of political life; and (3) those who view it as and/or would like to make it into something of a launching pad for their political activity.

We do not desire to deny to anyone the study of the history of political ideas (indeed, we have received some pleasure and some benefit ourselves from modest endeavors in that area); nor do we desire to deny to anyone the study of legalities and political formalities; nor do we desire to prevent anyone from engaging in political activity. We do, however, given our definition of political science and the corresponding and dominantly influential

perspective on the discipline, make the following three assertions: (1) the view of the third group (which does not include, of course, all political scientists who are political activists) qua political scientists is entirely our of order; (2) while political science needs to make references to legalities and political formalities and while their scientific study is a worthy--though not the foremost--endeavor for political scientists, the study of legalities and political formalities per se should not occupy political scientists qua political scientists; and (3) at least during this early stage of the development of political science as a scientific enterprise, and perhaps more frequently in its even less developed sub-areas, something from the history of political ideas may lead to something that perhaps will be of use to one qua political scientist, but this will not be a common occurrence, nor usually of great importance.

We have not mentioned the "practical problems" type of political scientists as a fourth group dissenting from the scientific outlook. There are three reasons for this. First, some of these political scientists accept the scientific outlook (though only as part of their professional outlook). Second, this type of political scientist engages in empirical research some of which--whatever its immediate purpose--can conceivably be used in theory-building. Third, these political scientists make recommendations, which means they expect Y to happen when X is done: low-level generalizations are, in essence, being tested in the field.

Despite the popularity of the scientific perspective in the

social sciences, there still exist some misconceptions about what a social scientist is supposed to do and not supposed to do. Since some of these misconceptions relate to the present work, and since they have bothered some political scientists and others, and probably have had a hindering influence on the scientific enterprise, we will briefly discuss the more relevant of these misconceptions. In doing so, there is no implication that most "scientific" political scientists are guilty of all or most of these misconceptions, only that some of them are guilty of one or more.

Some political scientists who enthusiastically acknowledge that political science is a scientific study fail, at least some of the time, to realize not the fact but the full methodological and theoretical impact of the fact that their field is not a science in the sense that physics is a science but is simply a scientific study, or a science in its earliest stages, or an incipient science, or a transparently underdeveloped science. Thus political scientists should not scorn one another or engage in professional self-deprecation (and seemingly, and hopefully actually, these behaviors are on the decline) because political science does not have a theory even remotely comparable to relativity theory in physics. Physics, while an ongoing and developing scientific enterprise, is an advanced science; political science is an incipient science. This state of affairs, is not due to some assumed and incredibly poor performance by political scientists in the past, and it means that political

science currently cannot expect to be well down the road of theory development, for if it were, then--by definition--it would not be an incipient science, which it now is by definition and by history. This state of affairs also has methodological implications.

Before friefly pointing to these methodological implications, let us be very explicit about what we take science to be. Science is both a body of general knowledge and a way of making observations, or gathering empirical evidence, to test that general knowledge or parts of it.[1] That is what science is as an abstraction removed from any particular science; but sciences are always practiced as particular sciences, united only by the common defining characteristics above. The specific methods which are fruitfully employed by a particular science at one stage of its development may not be desirable at another stage of development. The specific methods found desirable in one particular science may not be desirable and/or applicable in some other particular science.

The experimental method has been used in the physical sciences and in the social sciences. We also would like to have employed this method in relation to the historical account in the preceeding chapter. Take the United States as it was at the turn of the century; keeping everything else as it was at the start, remove for the ensuing quarter-century any and all governing-class or elite opposition (whether based on some sense of class-consciousness or not) to socialism, and then observe the unfolding outcome. Would the United States have been the same c. 1925?

Take the United States as it was in 1927, but maintain prosperity until 1967; would social security, which had been talked about for years before the Great Depression and the national prominence of Dr. Townsend and Huey Long, have become law in 1935? If not, then when--if at all--and in what form? There would be many interesting outcomes to observe; but, alas, the experimental method cannot be used in such a study. The closest thing to it would be an "imaginary experiment", a poor substitute indeed. The experimental method certainly has been and is an important method in scientific research on a variety of topics, but certainly--misconceptions to the contrary notwithstanding--it is <u>not</u> a defining or indispensable part of science. Moreover, and more importantly, science does not rest on the employment of <u>any</u> specific method.

In political science were a highly advanced science and a few of its accompaning research methods had proven themselves to be most effective tools, confinement to these methods and scoffing at research that did not employ them would be justified. Since political science is an incipient science and no one method or subset of methods can claim clear superiority over the others in the currently available set of research methods, advantages and disadvantages being common to all, a pragmatic approach to research methodology is justified. This certainly does not mean that anything goes, but it does mean that political scientists should not become afflicted with self-paralysis in an area of inquiry because the relevant and available methods do not meet the high standards

justifiably demanded by practicioners in the more developed or "hard sciences".

Misconceptions about methodology can lead to the following misconception: the correct scientific procedure includes the choice of a narrow and more easily manageable topic of inquiry; therefore the political scientist selects a narrow range of phenomena and engages in micro-analysis, leaving broad concerns and macro-analysis to philosophers and pamphleteers. In truth, "correct scientific procedure" requires only that the investigator objectively observe the behavior, and then either relate what he has observed to some already existing general knowledge (theory-building) and/or formulate his own potential theory or theoretical fragment, and then make some observations, and so on along the reciprocal course of the theoretical construction-observation process. Science does not inherently require the choice of topics of a certain breadth: both narrow ranges and broad ranges of behavior can be selected for scientific study. To be sure, given the same number of man-hours, one's conclusions after a study of the activity of an ad hoc businessmen's group on behalf of mayoral candidate X in the last election will be more precise and more empirically firm and less crude and less speculative than one's conclusions after a study of the twentieth-century politics of business-labor conflict in the Western democracies; thus there are good reasons for some political science studies to have narrow topics (breadth, of course, is actually a continuum with at least three dimensions). On the other hand,

given the implicit scientific assumption of systematic behavior and given the preponderance of nation-states in the world, there are good reasons for some political science studies to have broad topics. Narrow studies should help us to do better broad studies, and broad studies should help us to do better narrow studies. This potential relationship is analogous to--though not the same thing as--the relationship between research and theoretical construction. There is ample room, then, for narrow topics and broad topics in the scientific study of politics. Ultimately, however, and by definition, scientific political theory will be of considerable breadth. (To the extent that the present work has a substantive topic--rather than conceptual concerns--it is, while not as broad as it might be, certainly in the broad rather than the narrow category.)

The assumption that human behavior is systematic underlies our previously declared adherence to the idea of a unified social science as opposed to the misconception--which at least in practice, and probably also in conscious advocacy, has become increasingly less common in recent years, though is still very clearly around--that scientific progress is to be achieved by drawing clear disciplinary boundaries and specializing work accordingly. W. S. Runciman is among the scholars who have argued recently against the idea of a unified social science and for disciplinary autonomy.[2] In our view, the social sciences as they are found today are historical products which encourage distinctions that sometimes are useful and sometimes are not. Human behavior is not neatly divided into self-contained categories,

and neither can the scientific study, ultimately and on the whole, of that behavior be so divided.

There are at least two views sometimes associated with the idea of a unified social science that we reject. The first view, advocated by some psychologists and by some psychologically--oriented political scientists, is that when and if a complete science of human behavior is achieved, it will be reducible to the complete science of psychology and thus will be that science. This view is valid only if psychology is so broadly defined that it is indistinguishable from social science itself. The second view is that adherence to the idea of a unified social science leads to and/or stems from a belief that one can have "real" knowledge of some part of human behavior only if one has equivalent, or at least considerable, knowledge of all the other parts of human behavior, and thus the "true" social scientist must master all social science. To be sure, no matter how human behavior is divided into parts there will be relationships among the parts; but some parts will be much more crucial for understanding some other part than others will be. There will always be much knowledge that can be safely ignored for many purposes. It all depends on what it is that the individual social scientist wants to know. Thus, in advocating the idea of a unified social science, we are not arguing against specialization; on the contrary, social scientists must and should specialize. Both for purposes of analysis and of work specialization, human behavior and social science can be divided in a variety of ways, one sometimes fruitful one of which is reflected in current academic departments.

In the course of pursuing a problem area a social scientist will often find that some things normally studied outside of his discipline are very relevant to his work. If this is the case, and he possesses the needed extra-disciplinary competence, he obviously should make use of it. If he lacks the competence, he should acquire it, or else drop the problem area, or at least modify it.

The present work would not be possible if we accepted sharp disciplinary boundaries. In our substantive concern with politics, or, more modestly and more accurately, with parts of twentieth-century American national politics, we are making use of some political science but do not limit ourselves to it; we make use of very relevant parts of some other fields: some history, something of the sociological areas of social stratification and sociology of knowledge, some psychology, some economics, and a touch of anthropology. Fortunately, we are far from unusual in our utilization of other fields.

Despite some individual and/or disciplinary differences in research tools, conceptualizations, substantive concerns, and preferences for theoretical construction or research, we believe that, in the long run at least, all social scientists share in a grand and common scientific adventure. They would do well to keep this in mind in the short run. It is also important to keep in mind the basic point that the extent to which a study is scientific is not dependent on the breadth of topic or the use of a specific method.

Theory and Research

"Theory" is justifiably considered among the very most important terms in the philosophy of science.[3] The main points concerning this basic term are briefly summarized by Park:

> The system of concepts . . . and assumptions concerning their characteristics and behavior that serve to explain a large body of observational data is referred to as a theory. Although the fundamental notions of a theory are not directly sensible, the consequences deduced from it must be empirically verifiable for it to be accepted as a scientific theory. In this sense it is more than mere speculation, although it contains speculative elements.[4]

A theory imposes cognitive order on a substantial set of empirical phenomena and permits confirmation and disconfirmation by accepted standards of investigation and evidence. Outside of the social sciences and everyday usage, the term is normally reserved for those conceptual systems imposing cognitive order on a substantial set of empirical phenomena for which a modicum or more of confirmatory evidence already exists. Thus, in this sense, a theory is something substantially more scientifically advanced than what a social scientist refers to when he speaks of, say, Gelstalt "theory" or Parsonian "theory". We prefer the more strict usage and use the term accordingly--though to emphasize the point we sometimes supply the adjectives "scientific" or "empirical".

We believe that the business of political science and of the other social sciences should be the development of theories of human behavior. Whether the final goal is completely achieved in two decades, or two centuries, or two millenia, or never

achieved is not nearly as important as the striving after it, for in the course of pursuit--in the long run at least--it is unlikely that the social sciences will regress scientifically and probable that they will progress scientifically.

Thus it is a concern for scientific progress that actually underlies our position on what the activities of social scientists should be all about. We have already defined political science as the scientific study of the public policy-making process; it would have done just as well to define it as the striving after or pursuit of an advanced science that has as its subject matter the public policy-making process. Perhaps someday that is what political science will be. But whether it becomes a complete science, an advanced science, or "only" takes large strides on the continuum of scientific advance, theory-building will be indispensably involved in any significant improvement of political science; for lying at the very heart of science is the explanation of empirical phenomena, and the very heart of such explanation is theory. To be sure, observations are and will be indispensable, too; without them a theory is incapable of verification and thus of no scientific worth. But, by the same token, observations or research data or collections of specific knowledge--no matter how vast--are scientifically meaningless unless they are connected to and involved in the development of the general knowledge which is expressed in the laws and theories of a science (or in their less advanced counterparts). Without general knowledge there can be no scientific explanation, and without that there can be bunches of

facts but there can be no science. Thus it is that there is a mutual interdependence between data-gathering and theory-building, between research and theory. Put all of the efforts of a discipline into the "improvement" of either one to the neglect of the other, and you have something--but not a developing science. The result is largely the same if "theory-building" and "data-gathering" are conducted in near isolation. But develop each as an improving response to developments in the other and you have an ongoing scientific endeavor. (In stating this we are not accepting the position that science is an orderly and cumulative process period. We do believe that scientific advances can be made in a more or less orderly and cumulative fashion but that this is not the sole way, and our statement does not declare that it is.)[5]

Even while recognizing the mutual interdependence between theory-building and data-gathering, and acknowledging the indispensable role of research in science, the ultimate priority must be given to theory-building. The scientist qua scientist collects data because he wants to build an empirical theory--the goal is the theory. The scientist qua scientist, however, does not engage in theory-building because he wants to collect data: he collects data in order to build the best possible theory. This is why we have asserted that social scientists should, if they desire a greater explanatory capacity than they currently possess, make their business the development of scientific theories.

Theory and Model

The importance of theory in science has been stressed. Political science as a science must strive for theory. No theory will be presented here. Instead, what we call a "model" will be presented. As the term is used here, a "model" resembles a theory--not a research design--in four ways. A model: (1) attempts to impose some cognitive order on a substantial set of empirical phenomena; (2) is capable of empirical verification in principle and to some extent in practice; (3) can guide research; and (4) can be modified and refined by research (without being substantially refuted).

Notwithstanding these resemblances, a model is definitely not a theory. A model--of the usual social science variety, at least--has at least three serious shortcomings as compared with a scientific or empirical theory. Let us consider these differences. The ideal organization of a theory is in an axiomatic system. Most scientific theories, however, have not attained this highest form of organization, but they nevertheless possess two key characteristics of good scientific organization: (a) a relatively small number of basic statements serve to explain an impressively sizable body of data; and (b) a relatively small number of fundamental concepts is all that the theory need employ (in research or in less than the most economical presentation of the theory or parts of it, derived concepts--definable in terms of the fundamental concepts--will be employed but are not actually necessary). To take the most impressive example, and the one most

painful to those of us who must learn the many concepts of "socspeak" and especially to those of us who then invent new concepts, all of modern physics needs only <u>five</u> fundamental concepts. The organization of a model, on the other hand, will be rather loose, or perhaps even somewhat disjunctive at points, and thus remote from an axiomatic system. The concepts of a model are relatively large in number and often relatively less precise vis-a-vis those of a scientific theory. Similarly, there are a comparatively large number of statements in a model.

This first of three related shortcomings of a model as compared with a theory might be called the "organization gap", or "simplicity" if we are thinking of a theory, or "complexity" if we are thinking of a model. Whatever term is used, the model to be presented here certainly suffers from this shortcoming. It is loosely organized, and it has a generous supply of concepts. There are a relatively large number of statements in the model (the numbering of these serves to remind the reader of this flaw, as well as to make for ease of cross-reference and identification).

It has already been stated that a scientific or empirical theory, while never unquestioned beyond all doubt and sometimes not even solidly established, has at least a modicum of existing and clear empirical support. This is the second shortcoming of a model: it has only a very tiny fragment of clear and existing empirical support and/or all--or almost all--of its empirical "support" is rather vague, ambiguous, and untested (when first created a model can have no empirical support, which must await

ensuing research, but it will have some empirical base); thus a model does not have a modicum of confirmatory evidence. This does not mean that models are created out of this air, but they may be no more than elaborated hunches, or they may have a somewhat better empirical base. The statements in the model to be presented here vary considerably in the extent to which we would claim that any clear empirical support exists for them. Many of statements have previously appeared in this work in one form or another; they and the remaining ones gain what empirical base they may have from the factual claims presented previously and from highly similar factual claims that were not presented for reasons of style. These factual claims, strictly speaking, do not represent any empirical support for the model; this is because the present work is a work in the context of discovery--the only place where models are created--which has proceeded autobiographically in a manner that can be oversimplified as follows: a few conceptual tools seemed to need analysis, American national politics was chosen as a substantive focus, some factual claims seemed relevant, other concepts were brought in, general methodological and theoretical implications were considered from time to time, more factual claims were taken into account, some concepts and "model fragments" from the works of others were considered, an awareness grew that a variety of very worthy studies might have been even better if each had employed some of the concepts and generalizations found in some of the other studies, some conceptual modification occurred, more factual claims were

seen to be relevant, some pondering in relation to several existing perspectives took place, and the already evolving model was ginally explicitly stated. Thus the model was a product of a context-of-discovery process that included the factual claims. These same factual claims cannot now be used as empirical support for the model; that support can come--if at all--only in the context of justification, and that cannot begin until the model is created. To be sure, some of the statements in the model already have considerable empirical support, and this fact means that the empirical base of the model includes a good deal more than hunches, but it does not mean that confirmatory evidence for the model as a whole already exists (a point much clouded by the loose organization of the model).

A third point on which models fall short of theories is that the former (because of their looser organization and less precise concepts) are much more open to debate as how best to proceed with testing, provide fewer research short-cuts, and even after some evidence is in, are more likely to allow of individual interpretation. In short, though models are not incapable of empirical verification, they normally do present greater research difficulties than theories normally do. This is certainly true of the model to be presented here.

In view of their considerable disadvantages, it might be maintained that models lead us down the path of scientific regress and ought to be shunned. Certainly it would be absurd for a physicist, given the present state of knowledge and unproblematic

practice, to develop a model of thermodynamics. Yet the non-social or natural sciences, including physics, have employed models or something akin to them in the past, and they will continue to be of use in the future of the natural sciences (in these sciences, due to a number of advantageous factors, the models are often much "better" from the start in that they do not fall nearly so short on the first and third shortcomings as do social science models). Moreover, given the goal of theory-building in social science, and the obvious advantages of a theory for both research and further theory-building, and the current lack of theories in social science, it is clear that models--which imitate some of the characteristics of theories--can be (though many may not be) useful aids in the development of social science.

Taking all of the sciences together, there would seem to be about five basic possibilities for the histories of particular models: (1) sometimes they will be virtually ignored; (2) sometimes they will be next to be virtually ignored; (3) sometimes they will stimulate thought and research with the eventual conclusion being that here is a possibility that can be eliminated from the set of possibilities that might have or develop the capacity to explain the relevant phenomena; (4) rarely, after a good deal of research, considerable modifications (model-building), and so on, they (changing over time) develop into theories or important parts of theories; (5) extremely rarely (and not very likely to occur in the social sciences for the foreseeable future),

at least a modicum solid confirmatory evidence is gathered and, perhaps with little modification, they become theories or important parts of theories. Many particular models may bear no scientific fruit, but models as a whole are a clear plus factor for science.

This is true for political science, notwithstanding that possibilities (4) and (5) are very unlikely for some time to come. Possibility (3) is useful since it shows what can be eliminated because it does not work, and because it can stimulate the development of better models. There is also the ongoing and uncertain middle-ground between possibilities (3) and (4), which provides the opportunity, if political scientists truly view themselves as a community of scientists engaged in a common pursuit in an incipient science, rather than as inflexible agents of the truth committed to the defense of bickering factions, for methodological and theoretical improvements. Thus while low-level generalizations, the collection of data, the techniques for collecting that data, and the techniques for analyzing that data and existing data are all crucial to the development of political science, models and model-building have their roles, too. Models can guide research, and research can modify and improve models or discard them. The creation of a model is an attempt to guide research and begin the process of model-building that just perhaps, and hopefully, will lead in time to a theory or an important part of a theory. Thus, at least in the typical case in the social sciences, a model is, in a sense, a primitive attempt at a theory.

The model to be presented here ignores or slights some important things that would have to be included in or more fully taken into account in a full-scale theory of American national politics. For example, since there has been an emphasis in political science on the politics of interest groups within the regime space, we have given it more scant attention than we would if we did not believe that currently more attention is needed elsewhere to restore a balance and more scant attention than it would deserve in a full-scale theory. Despite this and other flaws, the model will be called "a model of American national politics"; we recognize that it is not a model of all of American national politics. In addition, some parts of the model are applicable to countries other than the United States.

Although we may sometimes refer to the model as "our" model or refer to the "creation" of the model, these phrasings are not to be taken literally. We and all other contemporary social scientists, as well as the set of social scientists at any point in time, inherit a scholarly past, and we would all be fools if, in our concerns of the scholarly present, we did not try to make some use of some of the best and most relevant parts of that past. Various approaches or theoretical attempts, or "models", if you will, which have been used and are used in political science and other social sciences--systems analysis, pluralism, elitism, reinforcement theory, symbolic interactionism, etc.--have influenced "our" model in ways small or large. Furthermore, from some of the individual scholars cited in earlier chapters

we have borrowed concepts and generalizations, as well as supplying our own of both of these. Thus much of the credit for whatever merit the model may have is due these scholars; the enormous defects of the model are our responsibility.

The decision to attempt to put together a model--however loosely--was at least in part a response that evolved out of an increasing awareness which originated as a supervention of our examination of the conceptual notions of Bachrach and Baratz and which was accelerated as consideration of the state of that examination led us on to explore several factual and conceptual areas that are disciplinally diverse and do not immediately seem to be very interrelated, and which awareness was that there were some studies--studies of admirable quality--each of which might have benefitted had it made use of at least a few of the concepts and generalizations found in at least a few of the other studies. We did not concern ourselves with the question of whether or not these individual scholars had knowledge of these other generalizations and concepts, but only with the fact that they had not expressed an awareness of them in print--even in places where, in our opinion, they would have done well to have brought at least a few of them into the analysis. Perhaps they were not aware of these other generalizations and concepts, or, more likely, they were aware of them but judged them to be--possibly correctly--insufficiently relevant for <u>their</u> purposes; it does not really matter. Our in-progress study did not have and was not bound by their purposes.

To save space and to avoid a repetition of some parts of earlier chapters, let us depict in an oversimplified and laconic manner the model-engendering situation: here political scientists presented some concepts, there a sociologist made use of a concept, here an economist offered some generalizations, there a political scientist had some theoretical notions, here some historians with conceptual notions, there a scholar of law with theoretical suppositions, here sociologists with a conceptual scheme, there a political scientist presented generalizations. Sometimes these different concepts and generalizations in these various studies were out of some tradition while sometimes they were reformulations or inventions of these studies. The result of taking some of the concepts and generalizations virtually as they are found in these studies, of taking some of the others and modifying them, of adding our own concepts and propositions, and then of attempting to achieve at least the rough semblance of some integration by bringing all of these potentially explanatory tools together in a very modestly organized way is the model that follows. The model is divided into eight parts or sections: governing class, symbolic politics, foreign policy, politics within the regime space, prevailing definition of reality (or Consciousness or culture), influence on the political culture, individual consciousness-expansion and political activity, and flexibility and maintenance.

A Model of American National Politics

Governing Class

If we define a "governing class" as any set of individuals

which constitutes a social upper class, and which has a highly favorable value allocation, and which has a clearly disproportionate number of its members in high-level positions in the major decision-making institutions of the society, then we can state that there is a governing class in the United States. The class interest (which is not the only political interest of its individual members) of the American governing class is the continuation of the American regime which furnishes the class members their highly favorable value allocation; in other words, their class interest is the prevention of a regime-displacement.

The governing-class interest cannot be assumed to be the same as that of everyone else in the society. There will always be objective interests in a substantial re-allocation of values and objective interests in the preservation of the existing allocation of values and hence some fundamental conflicts of objective interests in a society whenever two conditions obtain: (1) there is substantial inequality, and (2) the values which are unequally allocated are accorded considerable importance both by at least some of the people who have unfavorable value allocations and by at least some of the people who have favorable value allocations. It would seem that these conditions obtain in the United States and that thus there are some fundamental conflicts of objective interests in American society. In a formal democracy, such as the United States, where a significant number of voters and potential voters have objective interests that are in conflict with the objective interest of a governing class, the governing-class

interest is served by the lack of transformation of the objective interests of these non-elitist elements into subjective interests.

It is obvious that the interest of the American governing class will be served or continue to be achieved if no anti-regime political activity occurs. Any regime will continue, by definition, if all political activity takes place within the regime space; in other words, any basic status quo will be preserved if anti-regime political activity does not occur; or, in still other words, any social order will continue if there is political quiescence. It is on matters of class interest that governing-class members have unity, but there is also frequent disunity within the governing class:

> Proposition I-1: If a public policy alternative is outside the regime space, then the members of the American governing class will unite in opposition to it.

> Proposition I-2: If a public policy alternative is within the regime space, then American governing-class members will often display considerable disunity about its merits.

From the two propositions just presented it can be seen that it is fair to describe the governing class as united and fair to describe it as disunited. It is true by definition, as was stated in the last paragraph in somewhat different language, that the greater the extent to which American politics is confined to the regime space, the more securely served is the interest of the American governing class. That interest is served by elite unity and elite disunity:

> Proposition I-3: The confinement of politics within the regime space is facilitated both by governing-class unity in protection of the regime space and by governing-class disunity within the regime space.

The old saying that "in unity there is strength" is true only in part so far as the American governing class is concerned. Governing-class disunity on public policy alternatives within the issue range strengthens its position as a class actor in American politics.

For any given public policy alternative we can divide the influence on its outcome into governing-class influence and influence due to factors outside or other than the governing class, and we can in principle measure (and in fact attempt to very roughly estimate) the support, opposition, and indifference levels within the governing class in the manner represented below:

level of governing--class support =

(percentage of set in support) (median intensity)

(median influence) = S

level of governing--class opposition =

(percentage of set in opposition) (median intensity)

(median influence) = O (not zero)

level of governing--class indifference =

(percentage of set indifference) (median influence) = I

Then the following propositions can be made:

I-4: Given a constant I, as the ratio of S/O or O/S increases, the governing-class influence on the outcome increases and the influence of other factors decreases.

I-5: Given a constant I, as the ratio of S/O or O/S decreases, the governing-class influence on the outcome decreases and the influence of other factors increases.

I-6: Given a constant ratio of S/O or O/S, as I decreases, the governing-class influence on the outcome increases and the influence of other factors decreases.

I-7: Given a constant ratio of S/O or O/S, as I increases, the governing-class influence on the outcome decreases and the influence of other factors increases.

I-8: If S = 0, then there will be no governing-class influence on the outcome and other factors will completely determine the outcome.

I-9: If I is total, then there will be no governing-class influence on the outcome and other factors will completely determine the outcome.

I-10: If S is very high or total, and O is very low or non-existent, and I is very low or non-existent, then the public policy alternative will become a policy change, with the governing-class influence virtually total and the influence of other factors notwithstanding.

I-11: If O is very high or total, and if S is very low or non-existent, and if I is very low or non-existent, then the public policy alternative will not become a policy change, with the governing-class influence virtually total and the influence of other factors notwithstanding.

The last two propositions, I-10 and I-11, which are the most important ones of the above in terms of this work, are propositions that cannot be made of any other set of individuals in American society which constitute one-half of one percent or less of the population.

If Proposition I-1 (governing-class unity in opposition to policy alternatives outside the regime space) is recalled, then in conjunction with the just presented Proposition I-11, we can conclude that if a public policy alternative is outside the regime space (and thus a threat to alter substantially and adversely the highly favorable value allocation of the upper class), then it will not become a policy change. (We take this conclusion to be a universal law of American national politics, i.e., one negative case disproves it; that it is an "obviously" true statement only shows the extent to which Americans consider as "unrealistic" such

things as a "share our wealth" program or a real and extensive "soak the rich" proposal; thus the obviousness of the law lends support to our perspective rather than being a cause for scientific chagrin.) This conclusion can be modified and given a little more specificity, as is done in the concluding proposition of this section:

> Proposition I-12: If a public policy alternative is outside the regime space, then it will not reach the issue stage of the policy change path (that is, it will be a latent issue or an even less "developed" form of policy alternative.)

Symbolic Politics

While we can posit that the goal of governing-class members as class actors is the confinement of American politics to the regime space, Proposition I-12 does not guarantee the automatic achievement of that goal. There always exists the possibility that stability will give way to rather drastic change, and, in fact, at various times in the past at least some governing-class members have felt threatened by incipient breakdowns in the "routine" course of American politics. This can be expressed by the following proposition:

> Proposition II-1: If the containment of American politics within the regime space is beginning to be threatened, members of the governing class themselves and their political spokesmen will do one or more of the following: (1) denounce the threatening political activity and its perpetrators (calling them such things as "oddballs" and "unpatriotic menaces"); (2) promote what appear to be appropriate within-regime policy changes (reforms) and couple them with strong doses of rhetoric (these first two behavioral patterns fall under the rubric of "symbolic politics"); (3) endeavor to punish some of the anti-regime leaders.

In the course of time, the elite responses to incipient political threat have the effect of restoring political quiescence. These elite responses are parts of the phenomenon of issue-avoidance. Indeed, Proposition II-1 can be rephrased in shorter and less specific form as follows: When there are increasing signs of an incipient threat to the governing-class interest, the incidence of at least some forms of issue-avoidance will increase.

Symbolic politics is involved not only in efforts at restabilization during times of crisis or incipient threat, but also has a maintenance function during more quiescent times. There are substantive or tangible value allocations (or simply value allocations) and symbolic appeal allocations or symbolic politics. Unlike the allocation of substantive values, the allocation of symbolic appeals is not zero-sum or, in other words, symbolic politics is not inherently divisible, and public authorities can and do dispense symbolic values with ease. In the United States there are some public policies regulating businesses in what is heralded as "the public interest" and some other public policies that are widely disseminated as benefitting a mass public, and these types of public policies confer tangible benefits to the regulated businesses and to relatively small groups while conferring symbolic reassurance to the public-at-large. The central government in a governing-class regime makes or is involved in or permits decisions and avoiding decisions that help determine the allocation of (substantive) values. The value allocation of any X (individual, family, group) at t_2 usually can be predicted fairly

accurately from knowing it for some not-too-distant t_1. Thus far in this paragraph we have presented a series of comments that are more or less connected with symbolic politics, and in the last paragraph we presented Proposition II-1; now let us conclude this section with a list of four other propositions relating to symbolic politics:

> Proposition II-2: If in a formal democracy fairly large numbers of people, rather than only a few, generally believe that elections result in the public policy preferences of a majority of the people being translated into public policies, then the existing allocation of values will be less questioned and its continuation more secure.
>
> Proposition II-3: Electoral outcomes do not substantially alter the value allocation in a society.
>
> Proposition II-4: Symbolic reassurance helps to sustain regime-legitimacy (and thus promotes political quiescence, and thus is a form of issue-avoidance).
>
> Proposition II-5: Those with highly favorable value allocations continue to benefit from year to year by the decisions and avoiding decisions occurring in the society and which are allowed or made and enforced by the central government, and those with highly unfavorable value allocations likewise continue (usually) in their state from year to year.

Foreign Policy

The sections on "governing class" and "symbolic politics" and the sections which follow the present one focus on internal or domestic phenomena, but the importance of foreign policy for these phenomena cannot be overlooked. While foreign policy has a significant ideational component (centering on anti-communism) which is so employed that this section might have been placed under symbolic politics, foreign policy also has a material component of substantial

impact and is overall of sufficient importance to warrant special consideration. An argument--though not an indisputable one--can be made, and will be made in the next chapter, that the general level of American prosperity is somewhat higher than would be the case if the United States did not have supremacy as a national actor in the international basic status quo; this supremacy permits, and in part is composed of, behaviors involving raw materials, foreign trade, and foreign investment. These behaviors have domestic impacts which are supportive of governing-class hegemony because a state of material well-being, ceteris paribus, hinders rather than facilitates individual consciousness-expansion, as we point out later in this chapter. In conjunction with this, and as we have suggested earlier in this work, the American governing-class regime will not long endure if it is strongly opposed by the bulk of the members of the American middle classes. The three propositions below reflect our brief discussion here of foreign policy: the first concerns the symbolic facet, and the second and the third concern the importance of middle-class prosperity and the linkage of the degree of that prosperity to foreign policy.

> Proposition III-1: One major premise of American foreign policy is the division of the world into a free-world camp led by the United States and a communist (sometimes claimed or implied to be identical or highly similar to "socialist") and untrustworthy camp, and this premise and its reiteration have the consequence of lending psychological-ideological support to the domestic political culture.
>
> Proposition III-2: The predominance of a political culture in a formal democracy with a governing class, and thus high regime-legitimacy, is much more easily maintained given the relative material well-being of the middle classes (including, of course, relatively well-paid laborers).

> Proposition III-3: The continuing simultaneity of the American governing-class retention or increase of its highly favorable value allocation and of the relative prosperity of the American middle classes is to some extent due to the conduct of foreign policy by the governing class (which policy the governing class shapes with less input from other internal forces than is the case with domestic policy).

It is easy to see, assuming for the moment the truth of the above propositions, that American foreign policy is an important factor in the maintenance of the political culture and in the protection of the regime space. Nevertheless and quite obviously, it is not the only important factor in American politics--as we already have shown and will show now with a section on the kind of politics to which a majority of political scientists have given the majority of their attention; we hope to indicate that this kind of politics is relevant to the rest of the model.

Politics within the Regime Space

Some governing-class members will be affiliated with and support group interests A and B, and some other governing-class members will be affiliated with and support group interests C and D, which are anti-A and anti-B. It is by no means rare for U.S. Senators, cabinet members, and other prominent public authorities to be members of the governing class. But as they perform these roles from day to day their class interest is not typically a foremost consideration, or, as we put it in the following proposition:

> Proposition IV-1: Governing-class members who are actors in within-regime space politics are usually more immediately concerned with group interests and partisan-personal matters than with their class interest.

Thus governing-class members are by no means purely class actors,

but rather they also function in what we might call "non-class political roles". Indeed, governing-class members are active and influential in a number of fields: politics, finance, commerce, industry, law, education, charity, etc. The model being presented here is not predicated upon the notion of a handful of faceless men who engage in clandestine operations behind the throne and who secretly control the throne: governing-class members occupy many prominent seats of authority in diverse fields of endeavor. Most members of the governing class are hard-working (the publicity sometimes given to the more flamboyant behavior of the "function-less genteel" notwithstanding), and in their work they do not normally give attention to their class interest. However, neither Proposition IV-1 nor the supplementary comments that we have made should be taken to mean that the class interest is not fundamental. Because of a number of factors which we either already have pointed to or soon will point to, the governing-class interest normally enjoys security sufficiently great such that governing-class members need not unduly concern themselves about protecting the regime space. When this high level of security is threatened, then, within the set of governing-class political actors taken as a whole, the class role increases in prominence. (See Proposition II-1 above.)

Many individuals who are clearly <u>not</u> in the governing class are important actors in the politics within the regime space. That this is the case is certainly not harmful to the governing-class interest; for the very success of these non-upper-class individuals

not only fosters the notion that the United States is a classless or relatively classless society but usually also firmly weds these important individuals to the major characteristics of the regime--if they were not so wedded in the first place. (See the section on individual consciousness-expansion below.)

Organized interest groups play very important roles in politics as they pursue their group interests. The consequences of the behaviors of these groups are not limited to the kind of politics which these groups superbly exemplify; this point is expressed in the following proposition:

> Proposition IV-2: The pragmatic and organized interest groups by confining their activities to the regime space bolster the belief that competition (with compromise) thrives, and this belief is in accord with conventional views of American politics.

What the members of a society believe is a crucial element of the society and of its politics; and we now turn to the last four sections, all of which relate to the ideational component of society.

Prevailing Definition of Reality (or Consciousness or Culture)

The ideational component of society and the material component of society reflect one another. By this we do not mean that there always must be perfect correspondence between the two components; but we do mean that there are limits to the divergence that can exist between the two, and that the two components cannot long endure in a state of basic hostility, and that a significant change in one component will have some effect on the other component. The American regime has been an enduring (but not a changeless) one,

and it has been (and is) legitimated by a prevailing definition of reality. This relationship between that which is dominant in the material component and that which is dominant in the ideational component holds for the cases other than the American; thus, centrally (but not exclusively) concerned with its applicability to the United States, we offer the following proposition:

> Proposition V-1: Whenever there is an enduring regime, there is a corresponding and congruent prevailing definition of reality or Consciousness which accords that regime legitimacy.

It is true by definition that if all of the ideational component of a society is accounted for by the pro-regime definition of reality or the culture, then there will be no anti-regime definition of reality within that society. We make an empirical claim with the next proposition:

> Proposition V-2: If there is no anti-regime consciousness or no alternative definition of reality within a society, then there will be no anti-regime political activity within that society (political activity will be completely confined to the regime space) and the regime will continue.

While this proposition is an empirical claim, its antecedent condition is very, very unlikely ever to be the case for societies similar to the United States. Thus Proposition V-2 is, at least as far as modern and complex societies such as the United States are concerned, an "ideal" statement, and in this respect it is similar to something such as the theory of pure competition in economics. We lose a sense of absoluteness but gain a sense of actuality with this related claim:

> Proposition V-3: The smaller the proportion of anti-regime consciousness in a society, the less likely

> anti-regime political activity will be or the more likely political quiescence will be in that society (i.e., the more politics will be contained within the regime space).

The same proposition put in another way follows: The larger the proportion of anti-regime consciousness in a society, the more likely anti-regime political activity will be or the less likely political quiescence will be in that society (i.e., the less politics will be contained within the regime space or the more likely that demands will be of an anti-regime nature and the more likely that latent issues of that nature will tend to threaten to reach the issue stage of the policy change path).

The conclusion is obvious that the smaller (larger) the proportion of anti-regime consciousness in the United States (the U. S. as an ideational component), the more (less) likely the interest of the American governing class will be served or continue to be achieved (the U. S. as a material component). Returning to an even more general level, we present the following proposition:

> Proposition V-4: Whenever a fundamental and very widespread change in Consciousness occurs, a regime-displacement will occur. (A fundamental and very widespread change in Consciousness is not a necessary but it is a sufficient condition for a regime-displacement.)

One hardly needs to examine for long this proposition or the other propositions presented in this section to realize the importance to governing-class members of the material-ideational interrelationship. Now let us take a glance at the ways in which at least some governing-class members acting, not necessarily knowingly or exclusively, as class actors influence the American political culture.

Influence on the Political Culture

In any modern, complex society, such as the United States, some people much more than other people will be in a position to exert great influence over the cultivation and reinforcement of the substantial influence on the content or inculcation framework of the political culture. The ability of a group to define the limits of the political culture is dependent on a number of characteristics of the group:

> Proposition VI-1: A group's ability to define the limits of the political culture will be the greater: (a) the greater the extent to which it controls the major means of mass communications; (b) the greater the proportion of funds for individual campaign financing that it provides; (c) the more influence it has on all the major political parties; (d) the greater the status accorded the group; (e) the greater its ability, through the mechanism of co-optation, to reward the most competent and articulate individuals who are not in the group; (f) the greater the ability of the group to fund and to influence the funding of research projects of social relevance.

If any one group in a society is superior to all other groups in the society on all or most of these characteristics, then we can say that that one group substantially defines the limits of the political culture.

We believe that the governing class substantially defines the limits of the American political culture. The American political culture is quiescence-promotive. While it is true that this quality of a political culture is certainly not peculiar to the United States or to governing-class regimes, it is nevertheless also true that the American political culture serves the interest of the governing class. Thus it is not surprising that the more farsighted members of the governing class are concerned when the political culture seems to be beginning to decline.

Individual Consciousness-Expansion and Political Activity

The likelihood of a decline in the political culture will be lessened to the extent that barriers exist to individual consciousness-expansion in the society. Consciousness-expansion is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the acceptance or development of an alternative definition of reality (individuals can and do experience consciousness-expansion and choose adherence to the prevailing definition of reality). Thus a "revolution-by-consciousness" requires--but is not guaranteed by--a very high rate of consciousness-expansion within a society.

There is a tendency for consciousness-expansion to be facilitated by above-average intelligence, exposure to higher education (especially in the social sciences and humanities), association with others with exposure to higher education, and a state of material ill-being; and there is a tendency for the lack of these factors to hinder or be barriers to consciousness-expansion, or to support consciousness-confinement. Under normal and not-so-normal conditions, consciousness-expansion is clearly less likely than consciousness-confinement even when most of the above-mentioned facilitating factors are present. We should stress that these are <u>facilitating</u> factors and not necessary and/or sufficient factors. The following three propositions indicate some obstacles to a "revolution-by-consciousness":

> Proposition VII-1: Those possessing the socio-cognitive factors facilitating consciousness-expansion are likely to possess also the consciousness-confinement factor of material well-being.

> Proposition VII-2: Those possessing the material factor for consciousness-expansion are likely to lack at least some of the socio-cognitive factors facilitating consciousness-expansion.
>
> Proposition VII-3: Barriers to consciousness-expansion generally exist in such a way that without extraordinary circumstances the incidence of consciousness-expansion in American society is likely to be very low, thus lending additional support to the American political culture.

The state of affairs depicted in the above propositions has a profound effect on political activity. But the confinement of an individual's political activities to the regime space can be the result of any one of a variety of factors. In this regard, let us suggest the following proposition:

> Proposition VII-4: An individual will not engage in anti-regime political activities provided any of the following are true: if he or she: (a) adheres to the political culture; (b) rejects the political culture but believes nothing can be done to change the regime; (c) rejects the political culture but believes that no other possible regime would be any better; (d) rejects the political culture and believes that the regime can be displaced by a better one but is restrained by other considerations; (e) does not truly have as a part of his or her consciousness the realization that alternative ways of organizing human life are possible.

The preceeding section treated influence on the political culture, and this section has treated related matters at the individual level and their ramifications at the societal level. The next section--and the last one of this model--will focus on an important characteristic of the political culture itself.

Flexibility and Maintenance

If there is a regime X that has a governing class, some fundamental conflicts of objective interests, and a rigid prevailing definition of reality which corresponds to its narrow

regime-space conception, and if there is a regime Y that has a governing class, some fundamental conflicts of objective interests, and a flexible and comparatively broad definition of reality (possibly with sub-parts within it) which corresponds to its comparatively broad regime-space conception, and if those with anti-regime objective interests in each regime are just beginning to develop some consciousness of their interests and what to do about them, i.e., an objective interest-subjective interest transformation has just started to grow within a group or groups of people and some of them are openly manifesting their vague and not-so-vague discontents, then the governing class in regime Y is better able than the governing class in regime X to channelize these discontents in ways that do not adversely affect its share of the existing allocation of values, while at the same time arresting the objective interest-subjective interest transformations and bolstering regime-legitimacy.

Since the American regime is clearly a Y-type one, we can conclude that the American governing class has a capacity--and a greater capacity than it would have if the regime were of the X-type--to respond to potentially dangerous discontents in ways that serve its fundamental and long-range interest. Much of the behavior of governing-class actors is an outgrowth of the condition of living in a formal democracy. Under this condition a key factor is flexibility, as is expressed in the following proposition:

> Proposition VIII-1: In a formal democracy when a political culture has room for some flexibility and has two or more major variants within it, the political cul-

> ture is more easily maintained than when it is rigid or narrowly-focused.

The American political culture is a mixture of Consciousnesses I and II, and that culture is more easily maintained than it would be if it were rigid and contained no variants. Recalling the material-ideational interrelationships, it is easy to see that the governing-class interest is served by the nature of the American political culture.

Supplementary Remarks

A question arises: does the governing-class hypothesis as we have elaborated upon it and around it assume a conspiracy? While there is a sense in which we would answer in the affirmative, our basic answer is negative. It is undeniable that there have been and are sets of governing-class behaviors that have a conspiratorial flavor: Theodore Roosevelt's "detente" with the Morgan interests, some NCF-related behaviors, the secret meetings of study groups of the Council on Foreign Relations, etc.; thus at least some governing-class members do get together in private and make plans that either serve the governing-class interest as a whole or serve some part of the governing class without, of course, threatening the class interest. But the larger portrait of American national politics drawn by the governing-class hypothesis as we have presented it does not rest on the base of conspiracy.

The CBS Evening News is not what it is because the upper-class individuals who control the network meet monthly and then

remind the upper-middle-class reporters who it is that signs their checks. But the CBS Evening News does live in an environment, and that environment does include upper-class control of the network and does include such sponsors as Texaco, which reiterates that it "will never willfully pollute the beaches of the world" and defines reality such that the alternative to a sharp reduction in the number of automobiles is the horrible situation of almost everyone walking almost everyplace. That definition is a small part of a larger definition of reality which legitimizes a social order in which the upper-middle-class reporters of CBS were born, grew up, live, and expect to spend their futures.

In the typical case, when an upper-class member helps to finance the campaign of a candidate for public office, he does not consciously act out of class interest. Nevertheless, the candidate has a further incentive, if he needs one, to refrain from challenging the basic status quo. It is interesting to note that the same people who financed John Kerry's activities on behalf of the Vietnam Veterans Against War (at a time when many in the governing class had decided that Vietnam was a strategic blunder) were amongst the very biggest contributors to the Democratic party in 1968.[6] Kerry of course is "safe", others in the anti-war movement are not.

That the disunity within the governing class serves the governing-class interest does not make that disunity a conspiracy. Governing-class members are quite sincere in their disagreements. That they are sincere does not make their disunity any less a

service to the larger phenomenon of continued hegemony in shaping the contours of American politics.

Life, *Time*, *Look*, and *Newsweek*, to give a few examples, are not owned by the disadvantaged. The advertising revenues for just the first half of 1971 for these four publications were almost $53 million, almost $51.5 million, almost $28.75 million, and over $33.75 million, respectively.[7] We would hardly expect to find their pages aflame with challenges to the basic status quo.

The American governing class has tremendous structural advantages that have developed historically and which permit it a large role in the definition of reality. Most of its members believe in that definition themselves, and their historical position is such that it eases the way for a substantial majority of non-elitist people to define reality in that way, too.

If the model we have presented in this chapter never serves any useful purpose, it at least will have brought together in one place a previously somewhat insular set of important statements which are of concern to the same subject matter. In the next chapter we will try to indicate how the model might be usefully involved in political analysis.

Footnotes to Chapter V

[1] We view it as a universal law about science that any particular science is practiced by a community of scientists, though some see this community as a defining characteristic of science.

[2] Social Science and Political Theory, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: University Press, 1969).

[3] We make no claim to expert knowledge in philosophy of science. We do claim to know something about the basics of philosophy of science, especially as it applies to social science in general and political science in particular. What we know of philosophy of science we have learned from books, articles, etc., and from the excellent teaching of Professor Milton Hobbs, who also directed us to some of the reading we have done. The influence of Professor Hobbs on the first three sections of this chapter is clear, and thus we are indebted to him; but it should be pointed out that he would not agree with some of what we say here.

[4] Peter Park, Sociology Tomorrow (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 26-27.

[5] See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[6] Liberated Guardian, II, No. 3 (June, 1971), p. 10.

[7] The New York Times, July 22, 1971, p. 60-M.

CHAPTER VI

THE MODEL IN USE: EXPLANATION SKETCHES OF TWO CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Explanation Sketch

An explanation sketch is to a scientific explanation what a model is to a theory. An explanation sketch indicates what some of the factors involved may be and roughly points toward the possible development of some law or laws.

The explanation sketches below contain basically three kinds of statements: statements not inconsistent with the model (the most common type), model-based statements, and statements from the model. In treating two complex problems we range far and wide, especially with the second problem, but always we are striving for some potential theoretical orientation, or support for one, with relation to these central problems. At times we engage in speculation, but there is a difference between speculation and "wild" speculation, and we submit that ours is not of the latter variety.

Poverty, Deprivation, and Inequality

Income is much the more equalitarianly distributed of the two components of the fundamental value allocation of American society. Take the governing-class and take the twenty percent of the American people with the most unfavorable fundamental value allocation. The wealth per capita ratio is almost incalculably high but can be estimated very conservatively at 220

to 1.[1] The income per capita ratio is estimated to be roughly 50 to 1.[2] From year to year, here and there, in this direction or that, the exact figures vary slightly; but the exact figures are not important. What is important is that the fundamental value allocation of the United States, whether we take income (where the total amount received by the top one-half of one percent exceeds the total amount going to the bottom twenty percent), or whether we take wealth (where the total amount possessed by the top one-half of one percent is about seven times as great as the total amount possessed by the bottom twenty percent--if not a fair deal greater), is characterized by very substantial inequality (including the not insignificant differences among segments not at the extremes).

In 1962 the Conference on Economic Progress (CEP) issued a report entitled Poverty and Deprivation in the United States.[3] It claimed that 38 million Americans lived in poverty and that another 39 million lived in deprivation (slightly above the impoverishment level but clearly below the minimal comfort level). The CEP firmly put itself on record as claiming--and backing up with abundant data--that forty percent of American people lived in poverty or deprivation (even subtitling its report: The Plight of Two-Fifths of A Nation). The CEP was not composed of radicals. Rather it was composed of wealthy corporation executives, respected labor union leaders, and other prominent men of the type that has come to be called "establishment liberals" or "corporate liberals". The CEP set what it called "practical" goals to be achieved in the 1960's. One of these was to reduce

the number of Americans living in poverty from 38 million in 1960 to 2.2--2.2 not 22--million by 1970. Another practical goal was to reduce the number of families living in deprivation from 10.3 million in 1960 to 3.5 million by 1970.[4]

In 1964, in his first State of the Union Message, President Lyndon B. Johnson declared an "unconditional" war on poverty, and he announced shortly thereafter that its objective was no less than "total victory". The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and other poverty legislation soon followed.

The goal of President Johnson and the practical goals of the CEP have not been even remotely achieved. Indeed, as of 1971, such establishment liberals as Senator Abraham Ribicoff were setting the poverty population at twenty-five percent--or at least 50 million--of the American people. Thus, to date, the effort to eliminate or even significantly reduce poverty in the United States must be declared a failure. We do not believe that this failure can be attributed to any phoniness on the part of such groups as the CEP. Nor do we believe that the effort failed because it was merely an electoral gimmick by a sinister politician who was not sincerely concerned with the poor, or because Sargent Shriver lacked sincerity. We believe that all these people were sincerely concerned; moreover and more importantly, their motives do not have to be called into question because the persistence of poverty is attributable to things more fundamental.

A great many claims about why there is poverty in the United States can be made. At least one of them is difficult to dispute:

if the extremes of economic inequality were markedly reduced (they need not be eliminated), then there would be no poverty in the United States. This is one way of defining the problem of poverty. It is not a common way in the United States. That it is not is key to our explanation sketch.

As Elinor Graham has pointed out, the war on poverty was need-based and service-oriented rather than based on the idea of citizenship rights and on direct income payments.[5] The war on poverty defined the poverty problem as the problems of impoverished individuals, rather than as any flaw of the system, and defined the solution as providing services for impoverished individuals so that they could perform better within the system, rather than as requiring some change in the system. In other words, the poverty problem was defined in accordance with the American political culture. In addition, and in accordance with other political realities, the war on poverty was always massively underfunded.

From the model: the governing class substantially defines the limits of the American political culture, and an elite-supported decision which fosters acceptance of the American political culture or increases political quiescence is a form of issue-avoidance. Given the extent of poverty, the genuine concern of establishment liberals, and the growing discontent over the racial situation (which was in good measure economic) as manifested by such phenomena as the March on Washington in August, 1963, many in the governing class were willing to go along with and some

enthusiastically favored the kind of poverty program that emerged (Proposition II-1). But the program would be on their terms, i.e., it would not threaten the interest of the governing class. Only "safe solutions" to the poverty problem were to be given any consideration. The obvious--though politically "unrealistic" because of the governing class--solution of moderately (from the standpoint of a disinterested observer) reducing inequality by re-allocating a portion of the value allocation of the upper stratum to the poverty population (not to mention a socialist solution) was not worthy of consideration. Any poverty program would have to--and the war on poverty did--assume what the political culture maintained: the basic status quo was good, and social problems were the results of something other than the fundamental socio-economic structure of American society.

Such an egalitarian-leaning alternative solution as that mentioned in the last paragraph, certainly a solution not given consideration in the places of authority, is a latent issue. In the model we conclude that such a latent issue will not move along the policy change path to become a policy change. Two Propositions, I-1 and I-2, provide the basis for this conclusion: the members of the governing class are united in opposition to public policy alternatives outside the regime space, and a united governing class has always won.

The question arises as to why, in a formal democracy, the forth percent or so who live in poverty and deprivation, we can call them the lower classes, do not coalesce with other disen-

chanted souls and vote in a government strongly committed to a more egalitarian regime which would eradicate poverty and deprivation. A major aspect of the answer has already been given; another major aspect, closely related, lies in the quality of lower-class life. In comparison to other segments of American society, lower-class individuals are more likely to be immediately concerned with survival, to take a short-term perspective, to be uneducated, to read less, to be of generally rather poor health, to have a lower definition of self or less self-esteem, to be less politically sophisticated, to have a lower sense of political efficacy, etc.

The evidence is clear that intelligence, at least as measured by psychologists, is a product of both heredity and environment. As the typical lower-class child is growing up, his environment is not conducive to the development of above-average intelligence. Later in life, because of financial reasons and/or reasons of past educational performance, he is considerably less likely than other Americans to attend college and less likely to associate with, converse with, or have his imagination goaded by any form of socio-cognitive contact with those who have been exposed to and can rationally discuss definitions of reality other than the prevailing one.

While some individual responses to the quality of lower-class life, or to the unfavorable lower-class life-situation, comprised of a number of characteristics, are more common than other responses, they vary considerably. The responses include: denial of the situation by vicarious pleasures in the glories of

patriotism, a belief that their time will come, resignation to harsh reality (perhaps with a hope that the children will have it better), deep pessimism, guilt, alcoholism, and racial hatred. At any rate, consciousness-expansion, which can lead to anti-regime consciousness, is not the most common result. As Proposition VII-2 put it: those possessing the material factor for consciousness-expansion are likely to lack at least some of the socio-cognitive factors facilitating consciousness-expansion. Even when a lower-class individual does develop an anti-regime consciousness, it does not follow that he will engage in anti-regime political activities. For such an individual, only (a) and (e) from Proposition VII-4 can be eliminated as possibilities, and those two will still hold for some other lower-class individuals: an individual will not engage in anti-regime activities, i.e., will be quiescent, if he or she: (a) adheres to the political culture; or (b) rejects the political culture but believes nothing can be done to change the regime; or (c) rejects the political culture but believes that no other possible regime would be any better; or (d) rejects the political culture and believes the regime can be displaced by a better one but is restrained by other considerations; or (e) does not truly have as a part of his or her consciousness the realization that alternative ways of organizing human life are possible. The following point is also relevant here: any governing class in a formal democracy has its interest served by the lack of objective interest-subjective interest conversion on the part of lower-

class elements.

A number of other factors, more than can be treated here, would have to be taken into account in a full attempt at an explanation of the lack of effective political action by the impoverished and the deprived on behalf of a clear alternative to the poverty program. One very important factor is racial disunity--a factor which the national governing class does not directly encourage. Blacks have been much more prone in recent years than have poor whites to engage in at least the semblance and sometimes the substance of anti-regime activity. Some of their more publicized activities, which more justifiably could have been called "rebellions",[6] were defined over the mass media, and thus soon by most people, as "riots". Which is just one reason why a key political resource is occupation of a strategic position in aiding the defining of reality.

The nature of the war on poverty accorded with the American political culture, did not threaten the interest of the governing class (as it was clearly within the regime space), and was not effectively opposed by the politically impotent lower classes. These same factors account in good measure for the great--great if the practical goals of the Conference on Economic Progress were to be even modestly approached--underfunding of the program; but other factors were involved: the always present demands of competing interest groups and the contemporaniety of heavy American involvement in the Vietnam war.

American Foreign Policy: The World and Vietnam

American involvement in Vietnam cannot begin to be under-

stood unless, in accordance with science's underlying assumption of interrelationships, it is placed in the context of general American foreign policy. Three topics will be of concern in this explanation sketch: American foreign policy-makers, the general setting and aims of American foreign policy, and American policy in Vietnam.

Many who would question the fundamental role we have attributed to the governing class in shaping the contours of domestic policy would acknowledge at least the likelihood of something akin to a governing-class dominance in foreign policy. There is a good reason for this: the governing class does have a supremacy in foreign affairs that it falls short of in domestic affairs. Groups and factors that are sometimes important in carving out domestic policy have at best a minor influence in the making of foreign policy. Virtually all important foreign policy-makers are one of two types: (1) upper-class persons, or (2) non-upper-class persons whose careers have been in service to institutions controlled by members of the upper class, or, in other words, the non-upper-class members of the power elite. Evidence already has been presented in Chapter II on behalf of the proposition of governing-class supremacy in foreign policy-making. Only a few remarks about the important Council on Foreign Relations shall be added here.

The Council on Foreign Relations is a non-commercial and "non-political" research and discussion group financed by major corporations and large foundations.[7] Almost half of its membership is listed in the Social Register (which is not, of course, a

necessary condition for upper-class membership). The vast majority of its membership is composed of corporate executives, bankers, educators, and lawyers (almost half of whom are corporate directors in addition to being lawyers). President-elect Kennedy had prepared for him a list of possibilities to consider for staffing the State Department; at least sixty-three of the first eighty-two names on the list belonged to members of the Council of Foreign Relations.[8] The Council publishes Foreign Affairs, whose current editorial advisory board includes such notables as McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger, and John J. McCloy. The Council's current Chairman of the Board is David Rockefeller. Lester Milbrath concludes: "The Council on Foreign Relations, while not financed by government, works so closely with it that it is difficult to distinguish Council actions stimulated by government from autonomous actions".[9] While there are other organizations that play a role in the governing-class control of foreign policy, the Council on Foreign Relations is the single most important one.

It is a truism that the President of the United States makes the final decisions on foreign policy; and, indeed, his constitutional authority makes him the most key of figures. Yet he does not decide in isolation. If there is considerable controversy among the set of foreign policy-makers, as there often may be over tactics, the President has considerable latitude. If, on the other hand, there is extensive concurrence among foreign policy-makers, as is very often the case on broad strategies, the President's decisions are very likely to be in accord. Moreover, every

twentieth-century President--but for the lone possible exception of Truman--had definite ties with upper-class businessmen prior to coming to office. More than half of the twentieth-century occupants of the White House were millionaires prior to taking the oath of office (and four of them were indisputable members of the upper class).

Having made some basic points about American foreign policy-makers, points which are in concert with the model, we will now present a summary of what we will call "the Magdoff thesis" of American foreign policy and of American involvement in Viet Nam. The name is from economist Harry Magdoff, who has documented the thesis with care and presented it with sophistication.[10] While we believe we are justified in such labelling, a point should be made. Other scholars have presented the same thesis, and we will draw on their particular explications, which are more explicit on a few points, as well as that of Magdoff (mixing in also, of course, some model-based notions, etc.).

American industry, just as any other modern, large, inter-dependent, and diversified industry, cannot function without access to foreign sources of raw materials. There are many examples to demonstrate this and a few will be mentioned. Airplanes can be produced only if aluminum is available, and aluminum cannot be made without bauxite, and at least 80 percent of bauxite used in the United States comes from foreign countries.[11] It is an absolute requirement for the continuation of the United States steel industry that it have manganese. Once again, only foreign sources

can supply what is needed.[12] For over half (38) of the items (62) on the Defense Department's list of strategic and critical materials, 80 to 100 percent of the American supply comes from abroad; for a majority (14) of the remaining items (24), at least 40 percent--sometimes considerably more--depends on imports.[13]

President Truman appointed a special commission which was called the International Development Advisory Board. The President's Board issued a report in which it stated that it had found that 75% of the imported strategic and critical materials came from the underdeveloped parts of the globe. The President's Board did not consider this fact to be of little significance: ". . . it is to these underdeveloped countries that we must look for the bulk of any possible increase in these supplies. The loss of any of these materials, through aggression, would be the equivalent of a grave military set-back".[14] Furthermore, as the world now stands, most of the raw materials which are cardinal to the economic growth of American (and European) industry are in adequate supply only in the regions of the world which are experiencing social unrest and agitation.[15]

Just as the dependence of the United States on foreign sources of raw materials has grown tremendously during the course of the twentieth-century, so have the foreign investments of American businesses. In 1914, the United States accounted for 6.3 percent of the world's total foreign investments; by 1930, it was up to over 35 percent; and by 1960, it was almost 60 percent of the total.[16] The foreign enterprises of American firms have a gross value of output that exceeds that of any nation in the world

stationed in three foreign countries; the number rose to thirty-nine during the Second World War; today the number of foreign countries is sixty-four (sometimes the number of military personnel is relatively small, but those are just the places where other forms of American military assistance are likely to be well-provided).[20] In 1918, American banks had branches in sixteen countries; by the close of 1967, American banks had established branches in fifty-five countries. As with other forms of profit-making enterprise, so with the business of banking the little home-town bank was not likely to engage in international expansion: over 86 percent (259 of 298 in 1967) of all American branches overseas belong to one of three banks: Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank of America, and First National City Bank.[21] Magdoff brings together some of the matters we have mentioned and connects them with other matters:

> The United States as leader has the economic power to invade the industry and markets of its chief trading partners and politico-military allies. It has the resources to maintain a dominant world military position. It can carry on foreign aid, invest in and lend to the underdeveloped countries, thus tying them closer to the United States through the resulting financial dependency of these countries. All of this, plus the maintenance of prosperity and fending off depressions, is made feasible because of the position of the United States as the world banker and of the dollar as the world reserve currency. And it can be the world banker and supply the reserve currency, because of the cooperation its military and economic strength commands among the other industrialized nations. And, necessarily, within the United States this is accompanied by 'an inexorable entanglement of private business with foreign policy'.[22]

(Ironically enough, Magdoff ends this paragraph by quoting a phrase from a study sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.)

Clearly "the Magdoff thesis" is an economic one. It is not, however, a "pure" economic perspective since Magdoff attributes some impact to other forces. Still he conceives of American big business--the economic base of the governing class, we might add--as the cardinal driving force of American foreign policy. Thus Magdoff's description of some essential points about business and about giant corporations is worth noting:

> The urge to dominate is integral to business. Risks abound in the business world. Internal and external competition, rapid technological changes, depressions, to name but a few, threaten not only the rate of profit but the capital investment itself. Business therefore is always on the lookout for ways of controlling its environment--to eliminate as much risk as possible. In industry after industry, the battle for survival has also been a battle for conquest, from which the giant corporations best fitted for their environment have emerged. Their ways and habits are the result of a process of adaptation to the battle for survival and growth; these ways and habits have been built into their organizational structures and their modes of operation as ways of guaranteeing and sustaining victory.[23]

The big businesses of the United States have certainly adapted well to the international arena. To take one example, from 1950 to 1964, total domestic sales of United States manufactures more than doubled (2.26), while their total foreign sales much more than tripled (3.67).[24] To take another example, from 1950 to 1965, domestic profits of nonfinancial corporations fell short of doubling (1.67), while foreign profits were closer to almost quadrupling than to barely trebling (3.71).[25]

Given its very lucrative foreign dealings and its necessity for access to raw materials, the American governing class (of course, there are varying degrees of international involve-

ment among its members, but many have large immediate stakes overseas and all have a general stake that will be discussed shortly) is very concerned that there be and remain the fullest possible "open door" for American private enterprise. It is crucial that the principle of available options for the United States be preserved. The world, however, is not always the way members of the governing class would like it to be:

> Maintaining the open door creates problems, some because of conflicting interests among the more mature capitalist nations, some because of the actual and potential social revolutions which threaten to eliminate (or limit) capitalism and freedom for private investment trade. Hence, opening the door and keeping it open require eternal vigilance and will power. What is needed, in other words, is the strength and persistence on the part of the more advanced nations to influence and control the politics and economics of the less advanced nations. Since outright colonial possession has in the main become impractical, other means--some traditionsl, some new--are being explored and exploited.[26]

There are four major American means, according to Magdoff: military aid to champion "reliable" governments against the forces of discontent; economic assistance; the CIA; and the use of military force.[27] The basic purpose of each of them is control--control sufficient to ensure a present and future privileged open door with all that that implies.

Considering their very favorable international position, the American governing-class stake is in the stability of the international economy. Anything that threatens this stability, and thus their position, is a threat to the governing class. The governing class has not suffered from passivity in the face of threat in domestic affairs (Proposition II-1), and it will not do

so in foreign affairs: "Countering, neutralizing and containing the disturbing political and social trends thus becomes the most imperative objective of its foreign policy".[28]

Two means of control, economic assistance and military assistance, come under the foreign aid program. Foreign aid has five desired results, according to Magdoff, and we believe that they can be slightly re-phrased and viewed as the desired results of American foreign policy in general as well: (1) enforcement of the open door so that there will continue to be free and easy access to raw materials, to trade, and to investment opportunities for American business; (2) implementation of the American global political and military policies; (3) procurement of immediate economic benefits for United States businessmen seeking opportunities for trade and investment; (4) fostering of increasing dependence of aid-receivers on mature capital markets, especially the American; and (5) assurance that whatever economic development does occur in underdeveloped countries is capitalist or semi-capitalist and not communist or anti-capitalist or basically socialist, so that, in addition to its other implications, governing-class members can take comfort in the improbability that the United States will become a capitalist island in an anti-capitalist sea.[29]

As President Kennedy, in so many words, often said: what we do on the domestic scene influences our relations abroad, and what we do in our foreign affairs reflects back on our life at home. Whatever the President's interpretation of such statements may have been, the interconnections of domestic policy and foreign

policy are of great significance for this explanation sketch because the governing-class conduct of foreign relations is an important factor in the protection of the regime space (as the model maintains).

For purposes of discussion we divide the interconnections of domestic policy and foreign policy into the economic and the psychological or ideological, though of course they are political as well. From Proposition III-2 we can derive the conclusion that the predominance of the American political culture, which serves the interest of the governing class, is much more easily maintained given the relative material well-being of those non-elitist elements not living in poverty or deprivation, i.e., of the American middle classes. Now imagine that the leftist social revolutionary forces (which may call themselves and/or be called by others socialist and/or communist) become a substantially more influential factor within the political systems of underdeveloped countries as a whole than they are today (i.e., some places the revolutionaries may come to controlling power, other places they may become a very important part of a coalition government, elsewhere a more conservative but shaky government may be wary of too greatly displeasing the local revolutionaries and their potential supporters, in still a few places the revolutionary forces may remain relatively weak). A very possible consequence of such a turn of events would be a severe decrease in the extent to which the open door still would be open to American business. Let us indicate what might well happen under such conditions. The cost of raw materials to Americans would rise sharply. The dominant

> and its disappearing strength in a global context would soon open the door to the internal dynamics which might jeopardize the very existence of liberal corporate capitalism at home.[31]

A decline in the international position of American business resulting from a substantial growth of the left-wing as a force in the politics of the Third World likely would pose a serious enough problem for the governing class on the domestic front. Yet it would be aggravated greatly if such a turn of events should historically coincide with a virtually complete closing of the productivity gap as Western Europe and Japan catch up with the United States.[32] The trends already would seem to be moving in such a direction: the rapidly advancing technologies and the movements toward economies of scale in Western Europe and Japan. The closing of the productivity gap very likely would mean, among other related things, that many currently relatively well-paid American laborers would be in for a hefty cut in their real income. The potential coupling of the closing of the productivity gap and a strong leftward turn of events in the Third World must be a prospect of horror to the most farsighted and sophisticated governing-class leaders because, while a domestic regime-displacement does not logically or empirically follow from it, it would certainly set the stage for a sharp decline in regime-legitimacy, greater anti-regime activity, a widespread belief that the domestic anti-regime forces were not a small and deviant faction, the possible growth of a new Consciousness, the greatest challenge ever to the American regime space, and very possibly for a termination of governing-class hegemony. As we stated in the

model: if any governing-class regime in a formal democracy is strongly opposed by the bulk of the middle classes, then that regime will not long endure.

While very important, economic factors do not and will not tell the whole story (and we, of course, are not even attempting to tell the whole story). Another type of factor involved in the interrelationships of foreign and domestic policy is what we might call the psychological or the ideological or by a variety of other labels. American foreign policy has always been hostile to communism (or Bolshevism, as it was often called in the early years), and since the end of the Second World War the frequently proclaimed and overriding enemy of the United States, according to the American foreign policy-makers, has been communism, to which socialism often is linked or equated. Such a stance in foreign policy helps to set the tone and define the limits of the domestic issue range: most Americans cannot even begin to give serious and rational consideration--much less support--to public policy alternatives that have even the presumed or ascribed semblance of a set of public policies which in words and deeds American foreign policy vigorously opposes and implicitly and explicitly presents as the other and usually iniquitous competitor for the championship of the world.[33] Once again the importance of the prevalence of the community-regime equation is seen. Foreign policy is said to be conducted in the national interest (which sometimes is said to include humanitarian goals). We will not deal with the question of what the "national interest" is or might be but only state that it usually is presented as if it were the community interest; and

that American foreign policy in part does serve the community interest cannot be denied. The regime, however, is also a beneficiary of American foreign policy; and, beyond the establishment of both an adequate national defense and peaceful relations with other countries, the regime interest would seem to be the determining factor in foreign relations (let us remember, however, that there is no necessary conflict between the regime and the community). Actually, this is a very difficult if not unresolvable problem because of the debatability as to where to draw the line in the defense of the community. Where one thinks the line should be drawn is a matter of judgment--a judgment which involves both personal values and an empirical assessment. The cases that are marshalled on behalf of differing empirical assessments may be considered to be better or worse; that is all that really can be said, except that some men are in a much better position than are others to make their judgments prevail.

If the situation of the United States as a capitalist island in an anti-capitalist sea became substantially closer to a reality, there might be a domestic psychological or ideological impact which (assuming that the country in the meantime had not turned to fascism) simply by itself, though actually, of course, greatly facilitated by the implicated economic factors, could lead to increasing questioning of the American regime as a way of organizing human life, i.e., a serious decline in the American political culture, and to the favorable raising of alternative definitions of reality. This possibility and our discussion of anti-communism and the community-regime equation can be given a brief conspectus

by Proposition III-1: One major premise of American foreign policy is the division of the world into a free-world camp led by the United States and a communist (sometimes claimed or implied to be identical or highly similar to "socialist") and untrustworthy camp, and this premise and its reiteration have the consequence of lending psychological-ideological support to the domestic political culture.

The psychological or ideological factors and the economic factors of the interconnections of foreign and domestic policy are also, of course, interconnected, as well as being interconnected with other factors (which is why one cannot long and fruitfully study one factor in total isolation from all the others). Magdoff quotes a statement by the Treasurer (at least in 1964) of General Electric Company; this man manages in one sentence to express the community-regime equation, to express an economic-ideological interrelationship, and to capture the interrelationship between these two: "Thus, our search for profits places us squarely in line with the national policy of stepping up international trade as a means of strengthening the free world in the Cold War confrontation with Communism".[34] Then Magdoff concludes: "Just as the fight against Communism helps the search for profits, so the search for profits helps the fight against Communism. What more perfect harmony of interests could be imagined"?[35] We conclude our treatment of the interconnections of foreign and domestic policy be restating that American foreign policy is an important factor in the maintenance of the political culture and of the regime space.

It is in the general context of American foreign policy that American involvement in Vietnam is to be viewed. What "the Magdoff thesis" as we have presented it here leads to as the rationale for American involvement in Vietnam can be conceived of either as one complex reason or as two interrelated reasons. The latter way would seem to be best for a more lucid presentation; hence we shall devote a paragraph to each of the two important reasons for the American role in Vietnam, and, in so doing, strive to present them in a very clear and summary form which Magdoff, notwithstanding the generally superb character of his work, never quite does.

The first reason for American involvement in Vietnam in the form it took in the 1960's was to send a very clear signal to the world, especially the Third World, of American resolve to support the general principle that the open doors shall remain open and the dominoes shall stay in place. Vietnam developed into a test case--a test case for American foreign policy-makers to demonstrate for all to see that the United States intends to maintain the international basic status quo and that it will, when its other methods have failed to prevent the development of a revolutionary course that it deems to be a threat, intervene with the employment of large-scale military force. Such a stance was meant to serve the five results or aims of American foreign policy presented above, and thus to serve the basic purpose of maintenance of control sufficient to ensure the continuation of economic privileges. The United States involvement in Vietnam prior to the introduction of American combat troops was also not based on any great signif-

icance of Vietnam per se. Rather American involvement largely was based on two facts: the Vietnamese situation was not dissimilar to other actual and potential situations, and Vietnam is a part of larger things: Southeast Asia, Asia, the Third World, and the globe. Thus this first and probably foremost reason was present from the start; but it was not until internal developments in Vietnam eventually provided a full-fledged test case that there was a truly clear and global signal. This signal was to the world but most especially to the Third World. Perhaps we should label this reason the "Third World Signal" reason, because it is in the Third World where a number of crucial raw materials are found and where revolutionary potential is the greatest.

The signals conveyed by the actions of the United States in Vietnam had an Asian emphasis which in turn had an Southeast Asian emphasis. While it is true that these emphases flow from geography, it is also true that prior to and during its involvement in Vietnam the United States has considered itself to have a stake in this part of the world and most especially in Southeast Asia. The second of the two intertwined reasons for American involvement recognizes Vietnam as a part of Southeast Asia and of Asia, where China is cause for American concern, and recognizes that the United States desires and intends to have a future as well as a present role in Southeast Asia. After all, Southeast Asia is 1.5 million square miles of territory, has over 200 million inhabitants, and its present and potential markets and sources of raw materials have not escaped the attention of American business interests.[36]

Here is what the Vice-President in charge of Far Eastern operations of the Chase Manhattan Bank had to say in 1965:

> In the past, foreign investors have been somewhat wary of the over-all political prospect for the Southeast Asia region. I must say, though, that the U. S. actions in Vietnam this year--which have demonstrated that the U. S. will continue to give effective protection to the free nations of the region--have considerably reassured both Asian and Western investors. In fact, I see some reason for hope that the same sort of economic growth may take place in the free economies of Asia that took place in Europe after the Truman Doctrine and after NATO provided a protective shield. The same thing also took place in Japan after the U. S. intervention in Korea removed investor doubts.[37]

It is very difficult to read through the "Pentagon Papers" on Vietnam--which are now conveniently available in one 700-page volume[38] and which first came to public attention when The New York Times began publishing them in mid-June, 1971--without coming to the conclusion that they are solidly supportive of the interpretation of American involvement that we have presented here. Of course there are not explicit references to huge profits for American business, to communication to Third World peoples that they are not free to choose a leftist, anti-American destiny without paying a heavy price, to the governing class, etc., and for obvious reasons. But one can be far less than the world's greatest "reader-between-the-lines" and realize that the explanation sketch of American foreign policy in general and in Vietnam presented above may well be moving in the right direction--or at least we can have more confidence in it than some things social scientists have promulgated. The Pentagon documents suggest that what dissent there was among the foreign policy-makers on Vietnam was almost wholly of a tactical nature, rarely questioned

the basic strategy of American policy in Vietnam, and never even hinted at anything less than embracement of the general aims of American foreign policy. It is clear that the makers of American foreign policy saw Vietnam in a Southeast Asian, Asian, and global context. We submit that the Pentagon documents lend support to "the Magdoff thesis". We will now back up this claim by extensive (though not nearly as extensive as it would have been had we used all that was relevant) quotation from the documents in the Pentagon study. We shall supplement our case with several other quotations and some model-relevant information. While supporting the ideas of Magdoff we will at the same time be supporting, of course, the ideas of such scholars as Domhoff, Kolko, and Barnet. Let us turn to the Pentagon documents after making two points: (1) all emphases in the wuotations below have been supplied by us; and (2) the quotations from the documents are verbatim as published by The New York Times and the use of sic, to which diplomatic and governmental correspondence sometimes lend themselves, has been avoided.

Below are excerpts from a 1954 report of the special Committee on the threat of communism. Under the heading "IV CONCLUSIONS" we find:

> A. The speical Committee considers that these factors reinforce the necessity of assuring that Indo-China remain in the non-Communist bloc, and believes that defeat of the Viet Minh in Indo-China is essential if the spread of Communist influence in Southeast Asia is to be halted.
>
> B. Regardless of the outcome of military operations in Indo-China and without compromising in any way the overwhelming strategic importance of the Associated States to the Western position in the area, the U. S.

> should take all affirmative and practical steps, with or without its European allies, to provide tangible evidence of Western strength and determination to defeat Communism: to demonstrate that ultimate victory will be won by the free world; and to secure the affirmative association of Southeast Asian states with these purposes.
>
> C. That for these purposes the Western position in Indo-China must be maintained and improved by a military victory.
>
> D. That without compromise to C, above the U. S. should in all prudence reinforce the remainder of Southeast Asia, including the land areas of Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines.39

A little later the report recommends that:

> Extraordinary and unilateral, as well as multinational, efforts should be undertaken to give vitality in Southeast Asia to the concept that Communist imperialism is a transcending threat to each of the Southeast Asian states. These efforts should be so undertaken as to appear through local initiative rather than as a result of U. S. or UK, or French instigation.40

Apparently it is possible for communist imperialism to proceed by the ballot-box, as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, an upper-class member with a background that included both the large Wall Street firm of Sullivan and Cromwell and the Rockefeller Foundation, acknowledged in a cablegram, July 7, 1954:

> Thus since undoubtedly true that elections might eventually mean unification of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh this makes it all more important they should be only held as long after cease-fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation to give democratic elements best chance.41

The elections called for by the Geneva Accords of 1954 were never held because of opposition from the American-backed (backed with a great deal more than moral support) Diem Administration. The Wall Street Journal stated on July 23, 1954: "The U. S. is in no hurry for elections to unite Vietnam; we fear Red leader

Ho Chi Minh would win. So Dulles plans first to make the southern half a showplace--with American aid."[42]

Although the United States did not sign the Geneva Accords, which it later claimed its efforts observed because the Geneva Accords "guaranteed the independence of South Vietnam",[43] though, in fact, the 1954 agreements declared the opposite intent and did not even recognize such a thing as "South Vietnam", it did--through Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith (a General and a business executive on close terms with Eisenhower)--make a statement at the time of the signing of which this was the last sentence:

> We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future.[44]

At the current time, (July, 1971), according to the testimony of two recently-resigned officials of the U. S. Agency for International Development (AID) before a House Government Operations subcommittee, the United States through the AID, the CIA, the USIA, and the COROS program, is providing funds, personnel, and equipment to support a variety of methods, including imprisonment and torture, intended to ensure the re-election of President Thieu.[45] National Security Memorandum 52, May 11, 1961, signed by McGeorge Bundy, a member of the upper class, who was Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and who in 1966 became President of the Ford Foundation, states:

The U. S. objective and concept of operations stated

> in report are approved: to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam; to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society, and to initiate, on an accelerated basis, a series of mutually supporting actions of a military, political, economic, psychological and covert character designed to achieve this objective.46

Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, multimillionaire and longtime representative of Texas oil interests, reported on his visit to Asian countries in a memorandum to President John F. Kennedy, a member of the upper class. The memorandum was entitled "Mission to Southeast Asia, India, and Pakistan", was dated May 23, 1961, and here is part of what the-then Vice President wrote:

> The battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there--or the United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our own shores. Asian Communism is compromised and contained by the maintenance of free nations on the subcontinent. Without this inhibitory influence, the island outposts--Philippines, Japan, Taiwan--have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea.
> .....
> The key to what is done by Asians in defense of Southeast Asia freedom is confidence in the United States. There is no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia. Leadership in individual countries--or the regional leadership and cooperation so appealing to Asians--rests on the knowledge and faith in United States power, will and understanding.47
> .....
> Vietnam and Thailand are the immediate--and most important--trouble spots, critical to the U. S. These areas require the attention of our very best talents--under the very closest Washington direction--on matters economic, military and political. The basic decision in Southeast Asia is here. We must decide whether to help these countries to the best of our ability or throw in the towel in the area and pull back our defenses to San Francisco and a "Fortress America" concept. More important, we would say to the

> world in this case that we don't live up to treaties and don't stand by our friends. This is not my concept. I recommend that we move forward promptly with a major effort to help these countries defend themselves. I consider the key here is to get our best MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group people to control, plan direct and exact results from our military aid program. In Vietnam and Thailand, we must move forward together.[48]
>
> .....
>
> The fundamental decision required of the United States--and time is of the greatest importance--is whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or throw in the towel. This decision must be made in a full realization of the very heavy and continuing costs involved in terms of money, of effort and of United States prestige. It must be made with the knowledge that at some point we may be faced with the further decision of whether we commit major United States forces to the area or cut our losses and withdraw should our other efforts fail. We must remain master in this decision. What we do in Southeast Asia should be part of a rational program to meet the threat we face in the region as a whole. It should include a clear-cut pattern of specific contributions to be expected by each partner according to his ability and resources. I recommend we proceed with a clear-cut and strong program of action.[49]

General Maxwell D. Taylor, former chairman of the Mexican Light and Power Company, Ldt., adviser to President Kennedy in 1961, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1962 to 1964, United States Ambassador to South Vietnam from 1964 to 1965, special consultant to President Johnson from 1965 to 1969, and now on the Institute for Defense Analyses board, sent a cablegram to President Kennedy on November 1, 1961, in which he said: ". . . there can be no action so convincing of U. S. seriousness of purpose and hence so reassuring to the people and Government of SVN and to our other friends and allies in SEA as the intro-

duction of U. S. forces into SVN".[50] At this time Taylor was not thinking of a truly large-scale introduction of troops but still one large enough ". . . to provide the military presence necessary to produce the desired effect on national morale in SVN and on international opinion".[51] Similarly, he then suggested that one of the tasks of such a force would be to: ". . . provide a U. S. military presence capable of raising national morale and of showing to SEA the seriousness of the U. S. intent to resist a Communist takeover".[52]

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, former President of Ford Motor Co., sent a memorandum, dated November 8, 1961, to President Kennedy. McNamara said that he, the Joint Chiefs, and Roswell Gilpatric (an upper-class member) had reached some conclusions, the first of which was that:

> The fall of South Vietnam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accomodation to Communism, in the rest of the mainland in Southeast Asia and in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly in the Orient, would be extremely serious.[53]

The second conclusion was that: "The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing that fall by any measures short of the introduction of U. S. forces on a substantial scale".[54]

Secretary McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, former President of the Rockefeller Foundation, sent a memorandum to President Kennedy, November 11, 1961, which stated in part:

> The deteriorating situation in South Viet-Nam requires attention to the nature and scope of United States national interests in that country. The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would involve the transfer of a nation of 20 million people from the free world to the Communist bloc. The loss of South Viet-Nam

would make pointless any further discussion about the importance of Southeast Asia to the free world; we would have to face the near certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move to a complete accommodation with Communism, if not formal incorporation with the Communist bloc. The United States, as a member of SEATO, has commitments with respect to South Viet-Nam under the Protocol to the SEATO Treaty. Additionally, in a formal statement at the conclusion session of the 1954 Geneva Conference, the United States representative stated that the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression . . . with grave concern and seriously threatening international peace and security".

The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would not only destroy SEATO but would undermine the credibility of American commitments elsewhere. Further loss of South Viet-Nam would stimulate bitter domestic controversies in the United States and would be seized upon by extreme elements to divide the country and harass the Administration.55

. . . . . .

We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism and that, in doing so, we recognize that the introduction of United States and other SEATO forces may be necessary to achieve this objective. (However, if it is necessary to commit outside forces to achieve the foregoing objective our decision to introduce United States forces should not be contingent upon unanimous SEATO agreement thereto.)56

General Taylor sent a memorandum entitled "Vietnam and Southeast Asia", January 22, 1964, to Secretary McNamara. We believe that future historians probably will regard this memorandum as one of the most representative--and very possibly as one of the most important--of the Vietnam documents, and we will quote from it at great length. The highly respected General wrote:

1. National Security Action Memorandum No. 273 makes clear the resolve of the President to ensure victory over the externally directed and supported communist insurgency in South Vietnam. In order to achieve that victory, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the United States must be prepared to put aside many of the self-imposed restrictions

which now limit our efforts, and to undertake bolder actions which may embody greater risks.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly mindful that our fortunes in South Vietnam are an accurate barometer of our fortunes in all of Southeast Asia. It is our view that if the U. S. program succeeds in South Vietnam it will go far toward stabilizing the total Southeast Asia situation. Conversely, a loss of South Vietnam to the communists will presage an early erosion of the remainder of our position in that subcontinent.

3. Laos, existing on a most fragile foundation now, would not be able to endure the establishment of a communist--or pseudo neutralist--state on its eastern flank. Thailand, less strong today than a month ago by virtue of the loss of Prime Minister Sarit, would probably be unable to withstand the pressures of infiltration from the north should Laos collapse to the communists in its turn. Cambodia apparently has estimated that our prospects in South Vietnam are not promising and, encouraged by the actions of the French, appears already to be seeking an accommodation with the communists. Should we actually suffer defeat in South Vietnam, there is little reason to believe that Cambodia would maintain even a pretense of neutrality.

4. In a broader sense, the failure of our programs in South Vietnam would have heavy influence on the judgments of Burma, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines with respect to U. S. durability, resolution, and trustworthiness. Finally, this being the first real test of our determination to defeat the communist wars of national liberation formula, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there would be a corresponding unfavorable effect upon our image in Africa and in Latin America.

5. All of this underscores the pivotal position now occupied by South Vietnam in our world-wide confrontation with the communists and the essentiality that the conflict there would be brought to a favorable end as soon as possible. However, it would be unrealistic to believe that a complete suppression of the insurgency can take place in one or even two years. The British effort in Malaya is a recent example of a counter-insurgency effort which required approximately ten years before the bulk of the rural population was brought completely under control of the government, the police were able to maintain order, and the armed forces were able to eliminate the guerrilla strongholds.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that, in keeping with the guidance in NSAM 273, the United

States must make plain to the enemy our determination to see the Vietnam campaign through to a favorable conclusion. To do this, we must prepare for whatever level of activity may be required and, being prepared, must then proceed to take actions as necessary to achieve our purposes surely and promptly.

7. Our considerations, furthermore, cannot be confined entirely to South Vietnam. Our experience in the war thus far leads us to conclude that, in this respect, we are not now giving sufficient attention to the broader area problems of Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that our position in Cambodia, our attitude toward Laos, our actions in Thailand, and our great effort in South Vietnam do not comprise a compatible and integrated U. S. policy for Southeast Asia. U. S. objectives in Southeast Asia cannot be achieved by either economic, political, or military measures alone. All three fields must be integrated into a single, broad U. S. program for Southeast Asia. The measures recommended in this memorandum are a partial contribution to such a program.

8. Currently we and the South Vietnamese are fighting the war on the enemy's terms. He has determined the locale, the timing, and the tactics of the battle while our actions are essentially reactive. One reason for this is the fact that we have obliged ourselves to labor under self-imposed restrictions with respect to impeding external aid to the Viet Cong. These restrictions include keeping the war within the boundaries of South Vietnam, avoiding the direct use of U. S. combat forces, and limiting U. S. direction of the campaign to rendering advice to the Government of Vietnam. These restrictions, while they may make our international position more readily defensible, all tend to make the task in Vietnam more complex, time-consuming, and in the end, more costly. In addition to complicating our own problem, these self-imposed restrictions may well now be conveying signals of irresolution to our enemies--encouraging them to higher levels of vigor and greater risks. A reversal of attitude and the adoption of a more aggressive program would enhance greatly our ability to control the degree to which escalation will occur. It appears probable that the economic and agricultural disappointments suffered by Communist China, plus the current rift with the Soviets, could cause the communists to think twice about undertaking a large-scale military adventure in Southeast Asia.57

Secretary McNamara shared the views of General Taylor, as

can be seen in this memorandum to President Johnson, March 16, 1964, from which we quote only the first of seven parts:

> We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security. This assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social pressures but also police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements.
>
> Unless we can achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective U. S. and anti-Communist influence (Burma), or fall under the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist but likely then to become so (Indonesia taking over Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a period with our help, but would be under grave pressure. Even the Philippines would become shaky, and the threat to India to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north and east would be greatly increased.
>
> All these consequences would probably have been true even if the U. S. had not since 1954, and especially since 1961, become so heavily engaged in South Vietnam. However, that fact accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in Asia, but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U. S. capacity to help a nation meet a Communist "war of liberation". Thus, purely in terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high. They are increased by domestic factors.58

President Johnson made it clear that the United States was not interested in a neutral South Vietnam in a cablegram, March 20, 1964, to Henry Cabot Lodge, U. S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and a member of the upper class. The President stated:

> It ought to be possible to explain in Saigon that your mission (to Paris) is precisely for the purpose of knocking down the idea of neutralization wherever it rears its ugly head and on this point I think nothing is more important than to stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we can.59

Then the President added: "I have made this point myself to Mansfield and Lippmann and I expect to use every public opportunity to restate our position firmly".[60]

We have already pointed out the fact of public record that the Geneva Accords of 1954 do not recognize or mention such an entity as "South Vietnam" and instead establish a unification plan based on general elections (which the supporters of Ho Chi Minh but not the supporters of Diem were quite willing to carry out). A draft resolution, dated May 25, 1964, and which was to become the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in August of that year, presents a definition of reality which is essentially captured in the small but important part of it quoted below:

> Whereas the Communist regime in North Viet Nam, with the aid and support of the Communist regime in China, has systematically flouted its obligations under these Accords and had engaged in aggression against the independence and territorial integrity of South Viet Nam by carrying out a systematic plan for the subversion of the Government of South Viet Nam, by furnishing direction, training, personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare within South Viet Nam, and by the ruthless use of terror against the peaceful population of that country; . . . 61

A cablegram from the United States Mission in Saigon to the State Department, August 18, 1964, stated:

> . . . throughout this period (the coming months), we should be developing a posture of maximum readiness for a deliberate escalation of pressure against North Viet Nam, using January 1, 1965 as a target D-Day.62

A memorandum, September 3, 1964, entitled "Plan of Action for South Vietnam", and attributed to Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton, states in part:

> There is a chance that the downward trend can be reversed--or a new situation created offering new

> opportunities, or at least a convincing demonstration made of the great costs and risks incurred by a country which commits aggression against an ally of ours--if the following course of action is followed. The course of action is made up of actions outside the borders of South Vietnam designed to put increasing pressure on North Vietnam but designed also both to create as little risk as possible of the kind of military action which would be difficult to justify to the American public and to preserve where possible the option to have no U. S. military action at all . . . 63
>
> .....
>
> The relevant "audiences" of U. S. actions are the Communists (who must feel strong pressures), the South Vietnamese (whose morals must be buoyed), our allies (who must trust us as "underwriters"), and the U. S. public (which must support our risk-taking with U. S. lives and prestige). During the next two months, because of the lack of "rebuttal time" before election to justify particular actions which may be distorted to the U. S. public, we must act with special care--signaling to the DRV that initiatives are being taken, to the GVN that we are behaving energetically despite the restraints of our political season, and to the U. S. public that we are behaving with good purpose and restraint.64

A draft of a paper on handling world and public opinion, November 5, 1964, was prepared by Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy (brother of McGeorge), a member of the upper-class who is scheduled to take over the editorship of Foreign Affairs, the quarterly of the Council on Foreign Relations, in 1972. Bundy wrote of the coming need for "a Presidential statement with the rationale for action . . .". Then Bundy suggested a preparatory tactic for such a statement: "An intervening fairly strong Presidential noise to prepare a climate for an action statement is probably indicated and would be important in any event to counter any SVN fears of a softening in our policy."65

Here is the first two parts of the nine parts of a draft of a paper, "Action for South Vietnam", by McNaughton, November 6, 1964:

> 1. U. S. aims:
> (a) To protect U. S. reputation as a counter-subversion guarantor.
> (b) To avoid domino effect especially in Southeast Asia.
> (c) To keep South Vietnamese territory from Red Asia.
> (d) To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods.
> 2. Present situation:
> The situation in South Vietnam is deteriorating. Unless new actions are taken, the new government will probably be unstable and ineffectual, and the VC will probably continue to extend their hold over the population and territory. It can be expected that, soon (6 months? two years?), (a) government officials at all levels will adjust their behavior to an eventual VC take-over, (b) defections of significant military forces will take place, (c) whole integrated regions of the country will be totally denied to the GVN, (d) neutral and/or left-wing elements will enter the government, (e) a popular front regime will emerge which will invite the U. S. out, and (f) fundamental concessions to the VC and accommodations to the DRV will put South Vietnam behind the Curtain.66

Further on McNaughton wrote: "The start of military actions against the DRV will have to be accompanied by a convincing world-wide public information program". Then he immediately and parenthetically added: "(The information problem will be easier if the first U. S. action against the DRV is related in time and kind to a DRV or VC outrage or "spectacular", preferably against SVN as well as U. S. assets)".[67]

McGeorge Bundy, "often described as principal architect of U. S. Vietnam policy",[68] wrote to President Johnson, February 7, 1965. Here is part of Bundy's statement to the President:

> We cannot assert that a policy of sustained reprisal will succeed in changing the course of the contest in Vietnam. It may fail, and we cannot estimate the odds of success with any accuracy--they may be somewhere between 25% and 75%. What we can say is that even if it

> fails, the policy will be worth it. At a minimum it will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own. Beyond that, a reprisal policy--to the extent that it demonstrates U. S. willingness to employ this new norm in counter-insurgency--will set a higher price for the future upon all adventures of guerrilla warfare, and it should therefore somewhat increase our ability to deter such adventures. We must recognize, however, that that ability will be gravely weakened if there is failure for any reason in Vietnam.69

McNaughton began a draft of a long appendage, March 24, 1965, to a memorandum to Secretary McNamara in this way:

> 1. U. S. aims:
> 70%--To avoid a humiliating U. S. defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).
> 20%--To keep SVN (and the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.
> 10%--To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life.
> ALSO--To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used.
> NOT--To "help a friend", although it would be hard to stay in if asked out.70

Further on McNaughton wrote:

> Evaluation: It is essential--however badly SEA may go over the next 1-3 years--that U. S. emerge as a "good doctor". We must have kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten bloodied, and hurt the enemy very badly. We must avoid harmful appearances which will affect judgments by, and provide pretexts to, other nations regarding how the U. S. will behave in future cases of particular interest to those nations--regarding U. S. policy, power, resolve and competence to deal with their problems. In this connection, the relevant audiences are the Communists (who must feel strong pressures), the South Vietnamese (whose morale must be buoyed), our allies (who must trust us as "underwriters") and the U. S. public (which must support our risk-taking with U. S. lives and prestige).71

Having now concluded the quotations from the Pentagon documents, we submit again that these documents lend support to our explanation sketch. These documents and all that we

have written in this section (and in this work) do not lend support to any moral claim of the evilness or goodness of American foreign policy-makers. We will make six factual claims which are matters of public record. (1) Leaders of the governing class and power elite do fall at times rather remarkably short of objectivity; for example, Dwight Eisenhower stated, not in an off-hand remark but in one of his publications for all to see, that it:

> . . . was almost impossible to make the average Vietnamese peasant realize that the French, under whose rule his people had lived for some eighty years, were really fighting in the cause of freedom, while the Vietminh, people of their own ethnic origins, were fighting on the side of slavery.72

(2) The Kennedy Senate Subcommittee on Refugees estimates that between 1965 and 1970 at least 300,000 South Vietnamese civilians have been killed, mostly by American firepower, and that as of August, 1970, Cambodia--a country of 6,000,000 people--had 1,000,000 refugees.[73] (3) Neil Sheenan states that the guesses on the total number of Indochinese who have died as a result of war during the past 20 years range from one to two million.[74] (4) The Pentagon documents do not evince a concern for Indochinese deaths. (5) Anthony Lewis points out that President Nixon, in his major speeches on the Vietnam war, beginning with the November 3, 1969 speech, has evinced a concern over American casualties--we might add that American deaths now exceed 45,000 and that the individuals represented by this figure were as a set disproportionately lower-class[75] --and the President, Lewis states, has spoken about "the defense of an independent South

Vietnam and the danger of the United States being seen as a pitiful helpless giant. He has not mentioned the human cost of the war to the people of Indochina--the continuing cost of a continuing war".[76] (6) From the Truman Administration's decision to support the French with aid and continuing on up to the present time, American involvement in Vietnam has been endorsed by five Administrations--three Democratic and two Republican.

We presented these six factual claims because together with our presentation of "the Magdoff thesis" they give us a clue to the values which dominate the consciousnesses of American foreign policy-makers. They apparently give high priority to material values, which hardly distinguishes them from most other Americans, whether Consciousness I or II or neither. They have a big-business outlook; and in at least one other way American foreign policy-makers would seem to share something with Consciousness II; as Reich puts it:

> Consciousness II believes in <u>control</u>. Even the broadest civil libertarian outlook is placed in a framework of procedures, super-vision, and limits.77

Sometimes it would seem that the <u>sine qua non</u> liberty--the liberty of life--must be restricted by the limits and procedures imposed by the Consciousness II-big business search for a cherished order. Whether in their search for order in Vietnam and Indochina American foreign policy-makers have given impetus to an eventual domestic regime-displacement by stimulating an already developing form of Consciousness that cherishes neither the procedural nor the material, is a question that only the

long-range future can answer; but we should not forget Proposition V-4: If a fundamental and very widespread change in Consciousness occurs, then a regime-displacement will occur.

In this chapter we have looked at two complex sets of events. We conclude that both are in need of more study: good research designs, much more gathering of theoretically-oriented data, new and better models or theoretical reformulations, and so on.

Footnotes to Chapter VII

[1] G. William Domhoff estimates that 200,000 households have 22% of all wealth in the United States; see The Higher Circles (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 355. For similar and other related estimates, see Robert J. Lampman, "The Share of Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth, 1922-1956", and Dorothy Projector and Gertrude Weiss, "The Distribution of Wealth in 1962", both in Maurice Zeitlin, ed., American Society, Inc. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 87-104 and pp. 105-112, respectively.

[2] See Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), chap. 1, passim.

[3] (Washington, D.C., 1962).

[4] Ibid., p. 7.

[5] "The Politics of Poverty", in Marvin E. Gettleman and David Mermelstein, eds., The Great Society Reader (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 215-216.

[6] J. H. O'Dell, "The July Rebellions and the 'Military State'", in Zeitlin, ed., American Society, Inc., pp. 407-421.

[7] See Domhoff's excellent discussion of this group in The Higher Circles, pp. 112-123, which is the source for most of the information we present on it here.

[8] Ibid., p. 118, where Domhoff quotes from Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1964 (New York: Antheneum Publishers, 1965), pp. 67-68.

[9] "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy", in James N. Rosenau, ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 247.

[10] The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969). We view "the Magdoff thesis" as opposed to the American "man-in-the-street" view of American foreign policy as benevolent or quasi-altruistic. We view "the Magdoff thesis" as imperialist, but we do not view it as either a "pure economic" interpretation of imperialism or as necessarily identical to the more sophisticated view presented by Magdoff himself. In The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), Robert W. Tucker argues against "the economic theory of imperialism" and suggests a "pure power" interpretation of imperialism. We do not view the economic and the power theses as alternatives that are in essential and sharp conflict, but rather we view them as variants of a broader thesis of imperialsim which are not incompatible. Although we tend to provisionally

accept an emphasis on economic factors similar to that advocated by Magdoff, we recognize that within the broad context of the imperialist interpretation to which we adhere, non-economic factors, e.g., the factor of power disparity discussed by Tucker, may be of greater weight than Magdoff believes. It is this broader interpretation with more or less of an emphasis on economic factors to which we refer by term "the Magdoff thesis", and thus we place quotation marks around that term each time it is used.

[11] Ibid., p. 46.

[12] Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 50.

[13] Magdoff, Imperialism, p. 50.

[14] Cited in ibid., p. 51.

[15] Kolko, Roots, p. 53.

[16] Magdoff, Imperialism, p. 56.

[17] Ibid., p. 59.

[18] Actually, balance of payments is extremely important, but for reasons often slighted in media coverage; see ibid., p. 115.

[19] Kolko, Roots, p. 75.

[20] Magdoff, Imperialism, p. 42.

[21] Ibid., p. 73.

[22] Ibid., p. 106.

[23] Ibid., pp. 34-35.

[24] Ibid., p. 180.

[25] Ibid., p. 183.

[26] Ibid., p. 21.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Kolko, Roots, p. 55.

[29] Magdoff, Imperialism, p. 117.

[30] While U. S. foreign investments are heaviest in the advanced capitalist nations rather than the underdeveloped nations,

profits from investments in the advanced capitalist nations are in part dependent on the dominant position of those nations (and the U. S.) over the Third World.

[31] Kolko, Roots, p. 85.

[32] See Ernest Mandel, "Where is America Going?" in Zeitlin, ed., American Society, Inc., pp. 519-524.

[33] See Michael Parenti, The Anti-Communist Impulse (New York: Random House, 1969).

[34] Magdoff, Imperialism, p. 200.

[35] Ibid., pp. 200-201.

[36] Ibid., p. 7 and pp. 14-15.

[37] Ibid., p. 176.

[38] The Pentagon Papers (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1971), as published by The New York Times.

[39] Ibid., pp. 35-36.

[40] Ibid., p. 37.

[41] Ibid., p. 46.

[42] Quoted in Kolko, Roots, p. 109.

[43] See Jerome Skolnick, The Politics of Protest (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1969), p. 38.

[44] The Pentagon Papers, p. 53.

[45] The New York Times, July 22, 1971, p. 11.

[46] The Pentagon Papers, p. 126.

[47] Ibid., p. 128.

[48] Ibid., p. 129.

[49] Ibid., p. 130.

[50] Ibid., p. 142.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

53 Ibid., pp. 148-149.

54 Ibid., p. 149.

55 Ibid., p. 150.

56 Ibid., p. 152.

57 Ibid., pp. 274-276.

58 Ibid., p. 278.

59 Ibid., p. 285.

60 Ibid., pp. 285-286.

61 Ibid., p. 286.

62 Ibid., p. 349.

63 Ibid., p. 356.

64 Ibid., p. 357.

65 Ibid., p. 364.

66 Ibid., p. 365.

67 Ibid., p. 367.

68 Ibid., p. 630.

69 Ibid., p. 426.

70 Ibid., p. 432.

71 Ibid., p. 438.

72 Mandate for Change (Garden City, 1963), p. 337, quoted by Kolko, Roots, p. 101.

73 Though they are available in other places, of course, I took the death figures from Daniel Ellsberg, "Laos: What Nixon Is Up To", The New York Review of Books, XVI, No. 4 (March 11, 1971), p. 16, and the refugee figures from Anthony Lewis, "Indochina's Casualties", St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 7, 1971, p. 3-G.

74 Pentagon Papers, p. ix.

75 See Maurice Zeitlin, "A Note on Death in Vietnam", in Zeitlin, ed., American Society, Inc., pp. 174-175.

[76] Lewis, "Indochina's Casualties", p. 3-G.

[77] Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1970), p. 74.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary

Assistance--however minor--to the development of the underdeveloped science known as political science is the goal of this work. We proceed primarily--though hardly exclusively--in a context-of-discovery manner.

The rationale for this work is not that it will lead to a scientifically more advanced political science. The rationale for this work is that the question of whether this type of a study can be of some aid to the development of political science is a question worth asking and attempting to answer in part.

Our conception of political science is shared by some other political scientists, and this conception is not antithetical to what might be called the standard conception of political science but rather is complementary to it. Thus "our" conception rests on the past and sometimes conflicting work of a large number of scholars who have studied politics in a variety of ways.

An empirical or scientific theory of politics (whether conceived as one grand theory or as a set of compatible theories) is the long-run goal of political science. This goal, of course, is greatly beyond the confines of this work. This work in part is an attempt to see what direction(s) would seem to be fruitful

for the theoretical development of the political science sub-area of American national politics. This attempt stems from the theoretical and empirical concern with avoiding decisions and from the focus on American national politics.

One underlying assumption of science is that there are some systematic relations among things. Political behavior is embedded in and influentially surrounds other kinds of human phenomena which traditionally have been the major concerns of disciplines other than political science. Out of such considerations comes our adherence to the idea that political science is most fruitfully conceived and practiced as part of a unified social science.

Politics is defined as the public policy-making process. Political science is the scientific study of the public policy-making process. Public policies are the outcomes of the decisions and avoiding decisions that authoritatively allocate values for a society or sanction the existing allocation of values. Thus public policy is a set of outputs composed of what government does and does not do.

An issue--a demand that has at least some official life--is an alternative to an existing public policy with the proviso that that alternative has been publicly and favorably commented upon by some relevant public authorities (e.g., the President, the Speaker of the House, a United States Senator) and publicly and unfavorably commented upon by other relevant public authorities. A latent issue--a demand which at least officially lies

dormant--is anything which meets the following four conditions: (1) it is an alternative to an existing public policy; (2) it has been publicly adhered to by more than one individual in the political system; (3) at least some of those favoring this policy alternative are aware that their preference is a shared one; and (4) it has not been publicly and favorably commented upon by any relevant public authority. Latent issues have been given relatively little study by political scientists in the past. Thus we chose to begin our context-of-discovery study by exploring one of what we called "the five policy routes" of American politics--the route which involved latent issues. This contraction of interest led to an expansion which led us back to our basic concern with the theoretical development of political science.

Theoretical development must, of course, be grounded in factual claims. The factual claims surrounding such a concept as Domhoff's concept of the "governing class" are worthy of consideration by political scientists, and these claims have great relevance for the "politics of latent issues". Domhoff and others have presented evidence which indicates that: there is a social upper class in the United States, its economic bases are the major corporations and the large banks, law firms, etc., that intermingle in the corporate world or the world of big business; this upper class dominates the foundations, the key associations, the leading universities, the major mass media, and the federal government; this upper class possesses a share

of the country's wealth which is disproportionate by a factor of approximately 50 and receives a share of the annual income which is disproportionate by a factor of approximately 10; this upper class has been a national one since around the end of the nineteenth century; there are a number of grounds for antagonisms within this upper class which often result in its members having differing viewpoints; and this upper class is a governing class because of its disproportionate wealth, its disproportionate income, and its disproportionate membership in the key decision-making institutions of the society.

The following are some reasons why denial of the governing-class hypothesis is premature and partially hinders the development of political science. Substantial inequality characterizes the allocation of wealth and income, and these values substantially affect the allocation of other values. A group's present situation has evolved from a past which may give it tremendous advantages (or severe handicaps) in politics. A highly privileged group in a society receives a very important benefit--the maintenance of its position--if the only public policy alternatives which become issues (much less policy changes) in a political system do not threaten its position. Financial resources are important in American politics. The backgrounds of key office-holders at the national level are greatly disproportionately upper class and power elite. American foreign policy has a considerable impact on the domestic arena, and most scholars agree that foreign policy is largely determined by the

governing class or something akin to it.

Merelman's critique of the type of approach adopted in this work would seem to be faulty. But "the proof of the pudding is in the eating", and we consider our work to be evidence for the weakness of Merelman's position.

Bachrach and Baratz are to be credited with pointing out something that needed to be pointed out. Their analytic framework, however, can be expanded in such a manner that subjective interests or wants are not taken as given but rather are considered as phenomena whose generation is worthy of study.

Subjective interests or wants or preferences are conscious. The consciousness of man is not even remotely approached by that of other animals. Other animals have no choice but to confront their reality as it is. Man--the "world-open" animal--is capable not only of perceiving the environment but also of percieving and reflecting about himself in the environment and of envisioning alternative possibilities for the things of nature and for himself. Other animals are merely in and of the world, but man is in and of the world and also makes the world. Man lives in society, and he makes society and is made by it.

A set which is a society can be divided into two subsets: the material component and the ideational component. Within the material component of society there is a prevailing and more or less interconnected set of arrangements by which values are produced and allocated. This set is the basic status quo or the social order or the regime.

Within the set of all possible public policies there is at any given point in time the extant subset: the status quo or existing public policy. When this subset is subtracted from the set of all possible public policies what is left is the subset of all public policy alternatives. This set contains all alternatives that if realized would leave the basic status quo intact: the subset which is the issue range. The status quo and the issue range together form the set which is the regime space. The regime space is a subset within the set of all possible public policies. When the regime space is subtracted from the set of all possible public policies, or the issue range from the set of all public policy alternatives, what is left is the subset of all public policy alternatives that if realized would change the basic status quo. These alternatives form a set which is outside the regime space and the issue range.

In "normal" (non-crisis) times, there is within the ideational component a clearly dominant and more or less interconnected set of outlooks: the culture or prevailing definition of reality or Consciousness. This set corresponds to and legitimates the regime. In crisis times, the prevailing definition of reality does not usually collapse, but its dominance will weaken or become somewhat more fragile, and a comparatively more seriously challenging alternative definition of reality may more or less threaten to supplant it should it continue to decline for long. There is an ongoing and very complex interaction

between the ideational component and the material component. It seems much safer to assume that this interaction is reciprocal than to assume that either one of the components always dominates or determines the other. Such a drastic change in the material component as a regime-displacement will have or involve a more or less substantial impact on the ideational component. Similarly, a regime cannot long endure a fundamental and very widespread change in the ideational component. More modest changes in each component will likely have some effect on the other component.

The core part of the American regime is the socio-politico-economic capitalistic system. While there are many conflicts within the governing class, its members have a fundamental interest in the continuation of the regime or in the preservation of the basic status quo. They are, after all, the category of people who receive the paramount benefits of the regime. If a public policy alternative is within the issue range, then governing-class members will usually differ as to its merits. If a public policy alternative is outside the issue range (and thus the regime space), then governing-class members will unite in opposition to it.

There is in the United States a prevailing definition of reality, which is a mixture of Consciousnesses I and II, and which in its more immediately obviously politically relevant elements (which are considerable and cardinal) is the American political culture. There are a number of ways of arguing the

case for the importance to the governing class of the material-ideational interrelationship. One way follows. If the regime is displaced by an alternative regime, the governing class loses. If the American political culture or Consciousness is displaced by an alternative definition of reality, then the regime will be displaced. Hence the governing class loses from such a "cultural revolution" or radical transformation in the society's Consciousness. Since the members of the governing class do not desire to lose but want to keep on winning, their interest as class actors is in the continuation of the regime; therefore their interest is served by, or we can say that they have also an interest in, the maintenance of the prevailing definition of reality or Consciousness or the American political bulture.

There are a number of reasons for stating that the governing class is in a strategic position to maintain the political culture or substantially defines the limits of the political culture: virtual control of the major means of mass communications, heavy contribution to individual campaign funds, considerable influence on both major parties (especially to the extent that they can be considered national), control over and influence on the funding of social research, high status and prestige in the society, co-optation, etc. While the middle classes are of course better off materially than the lower classes, the governing class has tremendous financial-institutional resources compared to the rest of the society.

The political culture and the material advantages of class

discontent to be a threat and took actions to arrest its growth, including avoiding decisions. Some conceptions of the regime space were expanded as Consciousness II emerged. American politics has been greatly shaped by events in the Progressive Era.

Theory and research are both indispensable to scientific development. We have no theory to offer, but we do present a primitive attempt which points to areas of theoretical concern. This attempt is called "a model of American national politics". Though parts of the model will be recapitulated in the concluding section of this chapter, and though, in one way or another, most of its major points already have been brought out, let us here state a few points relating to the model. Sets of behaviors involving the mass media, major political parties, foreign policy, socialization, symbolic politics, pragmatic interest groups, social co-optation, and miscellaneous factors serve to protect the regime space, or serve to keep beneath the issue stage public policy alternatives that would threaten the basic status quo. These forces or sets of behavior involve the prevailing definition of reality and its reinforcement, and it is principally through that definition that the regime space is protected. That protection is facilitated by governing-class disunity which is often along conservative and moderate-liberal lines, within the regime space. No conspiracy need be postulated and none is.

Two explanation sketches consistent with the model are attempted. The politics of poverty is seen as involving latent issues and a program embedded in the prevailing definition of

reality. The explanation sketch of American foreign policy in general and in Vietnam in particular rests very heavily on "the Magdoff thesis", and foreign policy is seen to have at least latent functions as a part of issue-avoidance. The Pentagon documents published by The New York Times lend support to this explanation sketch.

Conclusion

This study has had three major and interrelated concerns: concerns which have been labelled "conceptual", "substantive", and "disciplinal". The impetus behind the conceptual concern was a desire to link the concept "nondecision" (Bachrach and Baratz) and the concept "governing class" (Domhoff) to one another and to other things, such as "symbolic politics". The basis of the linkage as we propose it is the conceptual scheme of public policy presented in Chapter I. The term "regime" (or "basic status quo" or "social order") denotes that which is usually dominant within the material component of society: the prevailing and more or less interconnected set of arrangements by which valued things are produced and allocated. We posit that there is a set of all possible public policies. The subset extant at any given point in time is the status quo or existing public policy. The subtraction of this subset leaves the set or subset of all alternatives to existing public policies. This set of alternatives can be divided into two subsets: (1) that which is composed of all alternatives such that if realized the regime would remain essentially intact--the subset we call the "issue range"; and (2) that which is composed of all alternatives

such that if realized would fundamentally change--indeed, terminate--the regime.

The union of the issue range and existing public policies is the regime space. Public policy alternatives which are not within the regime space are much less likely to reach the issue stage than are those alternatives which are within the regime space. A statement such as the preceeding one displays the interrelationship between the conceptual and the substantive concerns.

Substantively, the focus has been on American politics at the national level. Let us recapitulate our three most important substantive points and thus, in effect, very briefly summarize some core parts of the model of American national politics presented in Chapter V. (1) The socio-politico-economic inequalities which had developed at one point in time have continued to have a substantial effect on American national politics; in different language, "class" is a more important factor in American national politics than it is often given credit for being. (2) There exist considerable odds against any set of individuals which advocates public policy alternatives outside the regime space; to elaborate, public policy alternatives which would seriously and adversely affect the fundamental governing-class interest are highly unlikely to reach the issue stage because the level or magnitude of political effectiveness necessary to move a public policy alternative along the policy change path to the issue stage usually resides only in those sectors of the set of political actors which do not desire anti-regime

changes, the consequence being that certain alternatives are virtually excluded from serious contention. (3) There are real conflicts within the governing class and, at least given the condition of a formal democracy such as that in the United States, these conflicts are beneficial to the fundamental governing-class interest because when challenges arise the conflicts facilitate responses which accommodate the more moderate forms of dissent and thereby bolster the regime-legitimacy which is so very crucial to the maintenance of a governing-class regime under the condition of a formal democracy.

Four points stand out as parts of the disciplinal concern. (1) The degree to which a study is scientific is not dependent on either the breadth of its topic or the use of any specific research techniques. (2) Political science is most fruitfully conceived and practiced as part of a unified social science. (3) The political researcher should bear in mind that the limited and particular scope of politically feasible public policy alternatives is a product of history and not of inevitability. (4) There is what reasonably can be called a politics of the protection of the regime space, or class politics, or the politics of class interests. The politics within the regime space is the politics of group interests, or interest group politics. Neither the group interest approach or the class interest approach is sufficient to lead to an explanation of American national politics; rather both are needed. While for certain analytical purposes it may be helpful to treat class politics and interest

group politics as if they were in separate and unconnected realms, we believe that ultimately that it is in the inter-relationships within and between these two kinds of politics that the clues to a scientific understanding of political behavior lie. The approach to politics suggested by our conceptual scheme of public policy and our model is of greater sweep than approaches that center on one concept, such as "nondecision", or "governing class", or "power elite", or "symbolic politics".

In the very beginnings of the 1970's, there were questions concerning the empirical status of "nondecision", concerning who--if anybody--ruled in America, concerning methodology, and concerning many other problems in political science. What was needed, along with many other things, was for someone to do a primarily context-of-discovery study on the possible relationships among "nondecisions", "latent issues", "governing class", "consciousness", "public policy", and other possibly key concepts and on the implications for methodology, and, in so doing, hopefully contribute in a small way to the basic and long-range goal of the theoretical development of political science. This is what we have tried to do.

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